Vol. 1 · pages 266–270

251 EVIDENCE BEFORE THE SOUTHBOROUGH COMMITTEE affairs of men, the secular interests of a group can be well represented by a candidate from another group. 8. From this point of view a territorial constituency will be sufficient for a popular Government. A little more consideration will show that it will be sufficient for only one-half the definition of popular Government. How true it is, will be shown presently. In an electoral fight between the various groups in a territorial constituency the voters will discriminate in favour of a candidate with whom they are in sympathy. But with whom they will be in sympathy is determined for them in advance. Given two candidates belonging to different groups but purporting to represent the same interest, the voters will mark their votes on the person belonging to the same community. Any group yielding a large number of electors will have its own candidate elected. This discrimination on the part of the voters, though it may not leave unrepresented the interests of the members of the minor groups, leaves them without any chance of personal representation. 9. To those who are busy in devising schemes for the proper and adequate representation of interests and opinions dilating on the importance of personal representation is likely to seem idle. But personal representation is not therefore unimportant. In recent times “Government for the people” has claimed more attention than “Government by the people”. In fact there are instances to show that “Government for the people” can exist in the best sense of the phrase without there being a “Government by the people.” Yet all political theorists will unanimously condemn such a form of Government. And the why of it is important to know. It will be granted that each kind of association, as it is an educative environment, exercises a formative influence on the active dispositions of its members. Consequently, what one is as a person is what one is as associated with others. A Government for the people, but not by the people, is sure to educate some into masters and others into subjects; because it is by the reflex effects of association that one can feel and measure the growth of personality. The growth of personality is the highest aim of society. Social arrangement must secure free initiative and opportunity to every individual to assume any role he is capable of assuming provided it is socially desirable. A new rule is a renewal and growth of personality. But when an association—and a Government is after all an association—is such that in it every role cannot be assumed by all, it tends to develop the personality of the few at the cost of the many—a result scrupulously to be avoided in the interest of Democracy. To be specific, it is not enough to be electors only. It is necessary to be law-makers ; otherwise who can be law-makers will be masters of those who can only be electors. 10. Territorial constituencies are therefore objected to, and rightly, on the ground that they do nothing to prevent this absurd outcome. They erroneously suppose that electors will vote on the programmes of the

252 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES candidates without any regard for their persona. As a matter of fact, the electors before they are electors are primarily members of a group. The persona of the candidates does matter with them. Naturally, therefore, as members of a group they prefer the candidate who belongs to their group to another candidate who does not belong to their group though both of them claim to represent the same interest. As a result of this preference the electors of a large group are destined to rise to a higher position of becoming eventual law-makers, while the electors of a smaller group for no fault of theirs are doomed to a lower position of remaining electors. One crux of popular Government is the representation of interests and opinions. The other crux is personal representation. Territorial constituencies fail to create popular Government because they fail to secure personal representation to members of minor groups. 11. If this is a correct analysis as to how the social divisions operate to the prejudice of the political life of some communities, never was a more improper remedy advocated to meet the situation than proportional representation. Proportional representation is intended to give proportionate representation to views. It presupposes that voters vote for a candidate because of his views and not because of his persona. Proportional representation is ill-suited for the purpose in hand. 12. We have therefore two possible methods of meeting the situation : either to reserve seats in plural constituencies for those minorities that cannot otherwise secure personal representation or grant communal electorates. Both have their usefulness. So far as the representation of the Mohammedans is concerned, it is highly desirable that they should participate in a general election with seats reserved for them in plural constituencies. The angularity of the division that separates the Hindus and Mohammedans is already sharp and communal representation, it may be urged, sharpens it the more. Communal election, however, seems to be a settled fact, so far as the Mohammedans are concerned and nothing is likely to alter it, even though alteration is likely to be beneficial. 13. But this argument is mainly intended to concern itself with the representation of the Hindus in general, and of the untouchable Hindus in particular. The discussion of the representation of the Hindus may be best introduced by a quotation which expresses the newer consciousness that has arisen in the various Hindu groups. It is said : “A community may claim representation only on the ground of separate interests which require protection. In India, such interests are of three kinds only : either they arise out of religious antipathies which are pretty strong in India, or out of the backward state of a community in educational matters, or out of the socioreligious disabilities to which a community may be subject. Confining ourselves to the Hindu communities there are certain communities who, besides being very

253 EVIDENCE BEFORE THE SOUTHBOROUGH COMMITTEE backward, are suffering under a great social tyranny. The untouchable classes must have their own men in the Council Hall to fight for the redress of their grievances. The non-Brahmins as a class are subjected to the social and intellectual domination of the Brahmin priesthood and may therefore rightly advocate separate representation.” 14. From this it will be seen that the new consciousness among the Hindus while acknowledging the separate interests of the untouchables does not accept the position that the touchable Hindus form a group by themselves. The new consciousness insists on dividing the touchable group into Brahmins and non-Brahmins each with its own separate interests. Separate electorates or reserved seats in mixed electorates are demanded for the three groups in which the Hindus are divided. Before dealing with the problems of the representation of the untouchables something will be said on the question of the Brahmins and non-Brahmins. 15. That the non-Brahmins are “backward in educational matters” cannot be said in any way to be their special interest. It is the general interest of all even of those Brahmins who are educationally backward. “The intellectual and social domination of the Brahmins” is not a matter that affects the non-Brahmins alone. It affects all and it is therefore the interest of all. What remains then as a special interest for the non-Brahmins to require their protection ? The case for separate representation for non-Brahmins fails because they cannot prove to have a common non-Brahmin interest. 16. But do they fail to secure personal representation ? This can be best shown by reference to figures— Group I Group II Caste of Local Board voters No. of voters for the Local Boards of the districts of Belgaum, Bijapur and Dharwar 2 Total population of the three districts No. of voters for the Local Boards of the districts of Ratnagiri and Kolaba Total population of the two districts 1 2 345 Brahmins . . 4,600 85,739 4,477 89,786 Lingayats . . 12,730 933,123 . . . . . . . . Marathas . . 1,074 255,526 3,667 446,077 Mahars . . 22 196,751 33 138,738 Mohammedans . . 661 295,838 1,169 106,273 Others . . 4,241 1,065,821 2,837 1,016,930 Total . . 23,328 2,832,798 12,183 1,797,804

254 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES Reducing the above figures to the basis of a thousand we have the following interesting result : Group I Group II Names of Castes Propor tion of popula tion of a caste to every thousand of the popula tion covered Propor- tion of voters of a caste to every thousand of the popula tion of the same caste Propor- tion of voters of a caste to every thousand of voters Propor- tion of popula- tion of a caste to every thousand of the popula- tion covered Propor- tion of voters of a caste to every thousand of the popula- tion of the same caste Propor- tion of voters of a caste to every thousand of voters 1 2 3 4 5 67 Brahmins . . 30.2 53.7 197.2 50.8 49.8 367.4 Lingayats . . 329.4 13.6 545.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . Marathas . . 90.2 4.2 46.0 248.8 8.2 300.9 Mahars . . 69.5 0.1 0.9 74.5 0.2 2.7 Mohammedans . . 104.4 2.2 28.3 59.2 10.9 95.9 Others . . 376.2 3.9 181.3 562.2 2.8 232.8 So arranged, the conclusions to be drawn from these figures are highly important. (1) The Brahmins, given a uniform franchise for all, though a small minority so far as numbers are concerned becomes a majority so far as the total of voters is concerned as is the case in Group II. (2) Though with an uniform franchise the non-Brahmin communities like the Lingayats and Marathas do not fail to figure on the voters’ list, the proportion of their voters to their population is insignificant as compared with the proportion which the Brahmin voters bear to the Brahmin population. 17. The proportion of the Brahmins to their voters is really extravagant. It is justified neither by faith in them nor by their own numbers. The Lingayats though they can legitimately complain that the proportion of their voters is small will succeed in securing personal representation. The Marathas though larger in numbers than the Brahmins, besides the very small proportion of their voters suffer on the voters’ list and very likely will fail to secure personal representation for themselves.

255 EVIDENCE BEFORE THE SOUTHBOROUGH COMMITTEE So argued, the case for special provision of the Marathas can be sustained and should be admitted. 18. The question is in what form the provision should take. In my opinion such provision instead of taking the form of separate electorates of reserved seats should take the form of a low pitched franchise. The franchise for the non-Brahmin should be lower than that for the Brahmin. By this arrangement the Marathas would improve their position on the voters’ list and the altogether favoured position of the Brahmin would be equalized. It is in the interest of all that the Brahmin should not play such a preponderant part in politics as he has been doing hitherto. He has exerted a pernicious influence on the social life of the country and it is in the interest of all that his pernicious influence should be kept at a minimum in politics. As he is the most exclusive he is most anti-social. 19. Even the authors of the report on constitutional reforms are not in favour of a limited or uniform franchise. They say, “We consider that the limitations of the franchise, which it is obviously desirable to make as broad as possible, should be determined rather with reference to practical difficulties than to any prior considerations as to the degree of education or amount of income which may be held to constitute a qualification. It is possible that owing to unequal distribution of population and wealth it may be necessary to differentiate the qualifications for a vote not merely between provinces, but between different parts of the same province” (P. 147) To this I should like to add that we should differentiate the qualifications for a vote not merely between provinces or parts thereof but between communities of the same province. Without this differentiation some communities with a small but wealthy or educated population will secure more votes than a large community consisting of poor and uneducated members. Uniformity in franchise should be dispensed with. An important result will be that communal representation or reservation of seats for some non-Brahmin communities who are now clamouring for it would be avoided. 20. The untouchables are usually regarded as objects of pity but they are ignored in any political scheme on the score that they have no interests to protect. And yet their interests are the greatest. Not that they have large property to protect from confiscation. But they have their very persona confiscated. The socio religious disabilities have dehumanized the untouchables and their interests at stake are therefore the interests of humanity. The interests of property are nothing before such primary interests. 21. If one agrees with the definition of slave as given by Plato, who defines him as one who accepts from another the purposes which control his conduct, the untouchables are really slaves. The untouchables are so socialized as never to complain of their low estate. Still less do they ever dream of trying to improve their lot, by forcing the other classes to treat