Vol. 13 · pages 591–595

these remarks really exaggerate the position and have really no bearing on the problem. I support the amendment of Dr. Ambedkar as amended by Shrimati Durgabai’s amendment. The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : I am prepared to accept the amendment of Shrimati Durgabai. I cannot accept any other amendment. Mr. President: Do you wish to reply ? The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : I do not think it is necessary for me to reply except to say that if I accept the amendment of Shrimati Durgabai, it would in certain respects be inconsistent with article 152 and 55, because in the case of the provincial Upper House we have fixed the limit at thirty-five and also for the Vice-President we have the age limit at thirty-five. It seems to me that even if this distinction remains, it would not matter very much. Further still it is open to the House, if the House so wishes, to prescribe a uniform age limit. Mr. President : I will now put the amendment to vote [Following amendment of Smt. Durgabai was adopted.] “That in the new article 68-A proposed for insertion after article 68, in clause (b) for the word ‘thirty-five’ the word ‘thirty’ be substituted.” Article 68-A as amended was added to the Constitution. ***** ARTICLE 69 *The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambekar : Sir, I regret that I cannot accept any of the amendments which have been moved to this article. I do not think that any of the amendments except the one which I have chosen now for my reply calls for any comment. The amendments moved by Prof. Shah raise certain points. His first amendment (No. 1470) and his second amendment (No. 1479) refer more or less to the same subject and consequently I propose to take them together to dispose of the arguments that he has urged. In those two amendments Prof. Shah insists that the interval between any two sessions of the Parliament shall not exceed three months. That is the sum and substance of the two amendments. I might also take along with these two amendments of Prof. Shah the amendment of Mr. Kamath (No. 1471) because it also raises the same question. It seems to me that neither Prof. Shah nor Mr. Kamath has understood the reasons why these clauses were originally introduced in *CAD, Vol. VIII, 18th May 1949. pp. 104-07. 558 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

the Government of India Act, 1935. I think Prof. Shah and Mr. Kamath will realise that the political atmosphere at the time of the passing of the Act of 1935 was totally different from the atmosphere which prevails now. The atmosphere which was then prevalent in 1935 was for the executive to shun the legislature. In fact before that time the legislature was summoned primarily for the purpose of collecting revenue. It only met for the purpose of the budget and after the executive had succeeded in obtaining the sanction of the legislature for its financial proposals, both relating to taxation as well as to appropriation of revenue, the executive was not very keen to meet the legislature in order to permit the legislature either to question the day-to-day administration by exercising its right of interpellation or of moving legislation to remove social grievances. In fact, I myself have been very keenly observing the conduct of some of the provincial legislatures in India which function under the Act of 1935, and I know of one particular province ( I do not wish to mention the name) where the legislature never met for more than 18 days in the whole year and that was for the purpose of the legislature’s sanction to the proposals for collecting revenue. Mr. Tajamul Husain : Who was responsible for that ? The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : As I was going to explain the same, mentality which prevailed in the past of the executive not wishing to meet the legislature and submitting itself and its administration to the scrutiny of the legislature was responsible for this kind of conduct. Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru : Which province was it ? The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : You better let that lie. I can tell my honourable Friend privately which province it was. It was felt that if such a tiling happended as did happen before 1935, it would be a travesty of popular government. To summon the legislature merely for the purpose of getting the revenue and then to dismiss it summarily and thus deprive it of all the legitimate opportunities which the law had given it to improve the administration either by questions or by legislation was, as I said, a travesty of democracy. In order to prevent that sort of thing happening this clause was introduced in the Government of India Act, 1935. We thought and personally I also think that the atmosphere has completely changed and I do not think any executive would hereafter be capable of showing this kind of callous conduct towards the legislature. Hence we thought it might be desirable 559DRAFT CONSTITUTION

as a measure of extra caution to continue the same clause in our present Constitution. My Friends Mr. Kamath and Prof. Shah feel that that is not sufficient. They want more frequent sessions. The clause as it stands does not prevent the legislature from being summoned more often than what has been provided for in the clause itself. In fact, my fear is, if I may say so, that the sessions of Parliament would be so frequent and so lengthy that the members of the legislature would probably themselves get tired of the sessions. The reason for this is that the Government is responsible to the people. It is not responsible merely for the purpose of carrying on a good administration : it is also responsible to the people for giving effect to such legislative measures as might be necessary for implementing their party programme. Similarly there will be many private members who might also wish to pilot private legislation in order to give effect to either their fads or their petty fancies. Again, there may be a further reason which may compel the executive to summon the legislative more often. I think the question of getting through in time the taxation measures, demands for grants and supplementary grants is another very powerful factor which is going to play a great part in deciding this issue as to how many times the legislature is to be summoned. Therefore my submission to the House is that what we have provided is sufficient by way of a minimum. So far as the maximum is concerned the matter is left open and for the reasons which I have mentioned there is no fear of any sort of the executive remaining content with performing the minimum obligation imposed upon them by this particular clause. I come to the amendment of Prof. Shah (No. 1477). By this particular amendment Prof. Shall wants to omit the words “ either House ” from clause 67 (2) (a). I could not understand Ms argument. He seemed to convey the impression—he will correct me if I am wrong—that because the Upper Chamber is not subject to dissolution it is not necessary for the President to summon it for the transaction of business. It seems to me that there is a complete difference between the two situations. A House may not be required to be dissolved at any stated period such as the Lower House is required to be dissolved at the end of five years; but the summoning of that House for transacting business is a matter that still remains. The House is not going to sit here in Delhi every day for 24 hours and all the twelve months of the year. It will be called and 560 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

the members will appear when they are summoned. Therefore it seems to me that the power of summoning even the Upper House must be provided for as it is provided for in the case of the Lower Chamber. Then I take the two other amendments of Prof. Shah (Nos. 1473 and 1478). The amendments as they are worded are rather complicated. The gist of the amendments is this. Prof. Shah seems to think that the President may fail to summon the Parliament either in ordinary times in accordance with the article or that he may not even summon the legislature when there is an emergency. Therefore he says that the power to summon the Legislature where the President has failed to perform his duty must be vested either in the Speaker of the Lower House or in the Chairman or the Deputy Chairman of the Upper House. That is, if he have understood it correctly, the proposition of Prof. K. T. Shah. It seems to me that here again Prof. Shah has entirely misunderstood the whole position. First of all, I do not understand why the President should fail to perform an obligation which has been imposed upon him by law. If the Prime Minister proposes to the President that the Legislature be summoned and the President, for no reason, purely out of wantonness or cussedness, refuses to summon it, I think we have already got a very good remedy in our own Constitution to displace such a President. We have the right to impeach him, because such a refusal on the part of the President to perform obligations which have been imposed upon him would be undoubtedly violation of the Constitution. There is therefore ample remedy contained in that particular clause. But, another difficulty arises if we are to accept the suggestion of Professor K. T. Shah. Suppose for instance the President for good reason does not summon the Legislature and the Speaker and the Chairman do summon the Legislature. What is going to happen ? If the President does not summon the Legislature it means that the Executive Government has no business which it can place before the House for transaction. Because, that is the only ground on which the President, on the advice of the Prime Minister, may not call the Assembly in session. Now, the Speaker cannot provide business for the Assembly, nor can the Chairman provide it. The business has to be provided by the Executive, that is to say, by the Prime Minister who is going to advise the President to summon the Legislature. Therefore, merely to give the power to the Speaker or the Chairman to summon the Legislature without making 561DRAFT CONSTITUTION

proper provisions for the placing of business to be transacted by such an Assembly called for in a session by the Speaker or the Chairman would to my mind be a futile operation and therefore no purpose will be served by accepting that amendment. With regard to the last amendment No. 1482 moved by Prof. K. T. Shah, the purpose is that the President should not grant the dissolution of the House unless the Prime Minister has stated his reasons in writting for dissolution. Well, I do not know what difference there can be between a case where a Prime Minister goes and tells the President that he thinks that the house should be dissolved and a case where the Prime Minister writes a letter stating that the house should be dissolved. Professor K. T. Shah, in the course of his speech, has not stated what purpose is going to be served by this written document which he proposes to be obtained from the Prime Minister before dissolution is sanctioned. I am therefore unable to make any comment. If the object of Prof. K. T. Shah is that the Prime Minister should not arbitrarily ask for dissolution, I think that object would be served if the convention regarding dissolution was properly observed. So far as I have understood it, the King has a right to dissolve Parliament. He generally dissolves it on the advice of the Prime Minister, but at one time, certainly at the time, when Macaulay wrote English History where he has propounded this doctrine of the right of dissolution of Parliament, the position was this : it was agreed by all politicians that, according to the convention then understood; the King was not necessarily bound to accept the advice of the Prime Minister who wanted a dissolution of Parliament. The King could, if he wanted, ask the leader of the Opposition, if he was prepared to come and form a Government so that the Prime Minister who wanted to dissolve the house may be dismissed and the leader of the Opposition could take charge of the affairs of Government and carry on the work with the same Parliament without being dissolved. The King also had the right to find some other Member from the house if he was prepared to take the responsibility of carrying on the administration without the dissolution of the House. If the King failed either to induce the leader of the Opposition or any other Member of Parliament to accept responsibility for governing and carry on the administration, he was bound to dissolve the House. In the same way, the President of the Indian Union will test the feelings of the House whether the House agrees that 562 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES