Vol. 13 · pages 641–645

608 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES is this. The Drafting Committee felt, as everybody in this House knows, that the Governor is not to have any kind of functions—to use a familiar phraseology, “no functions which he is required to discharge either in his discretion or in his individual judgment.” According to the principles of the new Constitution he is required to follow the advice of his Ministry in all matters. Having regard to this fact it was felt whether it was desirable to impose upon the electorate the obligation to enter upon an electoral process which would cost a lot of time, a lot of trouble and I say a lot of money as well. It was also felt, nobody, knowing full well what powers he is likely to have under the Constitution, would come forth to contest an election. We felt that the powers of the Governor were so limited, so nominal, his position so ornamental that probably very few would come forward to stand for election. That was the reason why the Drafting Committee thought that another alternative might be suggested. It has been said in the course of the debate that the argument against election is that there would be a rivalry between the Prime Minister and the Governor, both deriving their mandate from the people at large. Speaking for myself, that was not the argument which influenced me because I do not accept that even under election there would be any kind of rivalry between the Prime Minister and the Governor, for the simple reason that the Prime Minister would be elected on the basis of policy, while the Governor could not be elected on the basis of policy, because he could have no policy, not having any power. So far as I could visualise, the election of the Governor would be on the basis of personality : is he the right sort of person by his status, by his character, by his education, by his position in the public to fill in a post of Governor ? In the case of the Prime Minister the position would be; is his programme suitable, is his programme right ? There could not therefore be any conflict even if we adopt the principle of election. The other argument is, if we are going to have a Governor, who is purely ornamental, is it necessary to have such a functionary elected at so much cost and so much trouble ? It was because of this feeling that the Drafting Committee felt that they should suggest a second alternative. Now, so far as the course of debate has gone on in this House, the impression has been created in my mind that most speakers feel that there is a very radical and fundamental difference between the

609DRAFT CONSTITUTION second alternative suggested by the Drafting Committee and this particular amendment. In my judgment there is no fundamental distinction between the second alternative and the amendment itself. The second alternative suggested by the Drafting Committee is also a proposal for nomination. The only thing is that there are certain qualifications, namely, that the President should nominate out of a panel elected by the provincial Legislature. But fundamentally it is a proposal for nomination. In that sense there is no vital and fundamental difference between the second alternative proposed by the Drafting Committee and the amendment which has been tabled by Mr. Brajeshwar Prasad. In other words, the choice before the House, if I may say so, is between the second alternative and the amendment. The amendment says that the nomination should be unqualified. The second alternative says that the nomination should be a qualified nomination subject to certain conditions. From a certain point of view I cannot help saying that the proposal of the Drafting Committee, namely that it should be a qualified nomination is a better thing than simple nomination. At the same time I want to warn the House that the real issue before the House is really not nomination or election—because as I said this functionary is going to be a purely ornamental functionary; how he comes into being, whether by nomination or by some other machinery, is a purely psychological question—what would appeal most to the people—a person nominated or a person in whose nomination the Legislature has in some way participated. Beyond that, it seems to me it has no consequence. Therefore, the thing that I want to tell the House is this : that the real issue before the House is not nomination or election, but what powers you propose to give to your Governor. If the Governor is a purely constitutional Governor with no more powers than what we contemplate expressly to give him in the Act, and has no power to interfere with the internal administration of a Provincial Ministry, I personally do not see any very fundamental objection to the principle of nomination. Therefore my submission is……. Shri Rohini Kumar Chaudhari : Can he contemplate any situation, where a Governor—whether you call him a mere symbol or not—will not have the power to form the first Ministry ? Will he not be competent to call upon any one, whether he has a big majority or a substantial minority ? And that is a very big power of which he cannot be deprived under any circumstances.

610 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Well that power an elected or a nominated Governor will have. If he happens to call the wrong person to form a Ministry, he will soon find to his cost that he has made a wrong choice. That is not a thing that could be avoided by having an elected Governor. Such a Governor may have a friend of his choice whom he can call in to form a Ministry and that issue can be settled by the House itself by a motion of noconfidence or confidence. But that is not the aspect of the question which is material. The aspect of the question which is material is. Is the Governor going to have any power of interference in the working of a Ministry winch is composed of a majority in the local Legislature ? If that Governor has no power of interference in the internal administration of a Ministry which has a majority, then it seems to me that the question whether he is nominated or elected is a wholly immaterial one. That is the way I look at it and I want to tell the House that in coming to their decision they should not bother with the more or less academic question—wether the Governor has to be nominated or to be elected—they should bear in mind this question : What are the powers with which the Governor is going to be endowed ? That matter, I submit, is not before us today. We shall take it up at a later stage when we come to the question of articles 175 and 188 and probably by “amendment or the addition of some other clause which would give him powers. The House should be careful and watchful of these new sections that will be placed before them at a later stage. But today it seems to me, if the Constitution remains in principle the same as we intend that it should be, that the Governor should be a purely constitutional Governor, with no power of interference in the administration of the province, then it seems to me quite immaterial whether he is nominated or elected. Shri L. Krishnaswami Bharathi : Is the honourable Member accepting the amendment ? The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambdekar : I am leaving it to the House. Mr. President: I shall then put amendment 2015 moved by Shri Brajeshwar Prasad to the vote. The question is : “That for article 131. the following be substituted :— ‘131. The Governor of a State shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal.’” The amendment was adopted.

611DRAFT CONSTITUTION Mr. President: I think after this all the other amendments to this article fall to the ground and therefore I shall put the article as amended to the vote. Article 131, as amended, was added to the Constitution. ARTICLE 132 *Mr. President: There is an amendment by Dr. Ambedkar. The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Sir, I move : “That with reference to amendments Nos. 2033 and 2041 of the List of Amendments for article 132, the following article be substituted :— ‘Term of office of Governor.—132. (1) The Governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the President. (2) The Governor may. by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office. (3) Subject to the foregoing provisions of this article, a governor shall hold office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office : Provided that a Governor shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term, continue to hold office until his successor enters upon his office’.” Now, Sir, this article………..† Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena : On a point of order. Amendment No. 2033 has not been moved. There is another amendment 2041, to which this is an amendment. But even that has not been moved. Mr. President: But that has not been moved. Shri T. T. Krishnamachari : Amendment No. 2041, stands in the name of Dr. Ambedkar. Mr. President : Well, he may formally move it. The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : I have said that I am moving this in place of that amendment. Mr. President : Dr. Ambedkar is moving No. 2041. ***** ‡The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir, the position is this : This power of removal is given to the President in general terms. What Professor Shah wants is that certain grounds should be stated in the Constitution itself for the removal of the Governor. It seems to me that when you have given the general power, you also give the power to the President to remove a Governor for corruption, for bribery, for violation of the Constitution or for any other reason which the President no doubt feels is legitimate ground for the removal of the Governor. * CAD, Vol. VIII, 31st May 1949, p. 470. †Dots indicate interruption. ‡ Ibid., p. 474.

612 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES It seems, therefore, quite unnecessary to burden the Constitution with all these limitations stated in express terms when it is perfectly possible for the President to act upon the very same ground under (he formula that the Governor shall hold office during his pleasure. I, therefore, think that it is unneccessary to categories the conditions under which the President may undertake the removal of the Governor. [Amendment of Dr. Ambedkar as given above, was accepted. Article 132, as amended was added to the Constitution.] ARTICLE 134 *Mr. President: We have dropped the first alternative, and we have to take the amendments only to the second alternative, and I think amendment No. 164 standing in the name of Dr. Ambedkar would cover. The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir, I move : “That with reference to amendment No. 2061 of the List of Amendments, for article 134, the following be substituted :— Qualifications for appointment as Governor. —‘ No person shall be eligible for appointment as Governor unless he is a citizen of India has completed the age of thirty-five years’.” Sir, may I take it that the amendment is moved ? Shri T. T. Krishnamachari : Mr. President, the Chair and the House can permit the substitution of an amendment. Mr. President : You need not read the amendment in full. The Honourable dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir, I move Amendment No. 2061,.Sir, I also move that for amendment No. 2061, the following be substituted :— “Qualifications for appointment as Governor. —” No person shall be eligible for appointment as Governor unless he is a citizen of India has completed the age of thirty-five years.’” [Motion was accepted. Article 134 was added to the Constitution.] ARTICLE 135 †The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir, I move : “That in clause (1) of article 135, for the words ‘either of Parliament or,’ the words ‘of either House of Parliament or of a House’ be substituted.” This is a formal amendment. Sir, I move : “That in clause (1) of article 135— (a) for the words ‘member of Parliament or’ the words ‘member of either House of Parliament or of a House’ be substituted. (b) for the words ‘in Parliament or such legislature as the case may be’ the words ‘in that House’ be substituted.” * CAD, Vol. VIII, 31st May 1949, p. 475. † Ibid., p. 476.