Vol. 13 · pages 771–775
The Principal Architect of the Constitution of India
This text was extracted automatically from the official PDF of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, so it may contain small errors. Always check the original page before quoting.
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738 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
first place, as regards the principle for which he is fighting, namely,
that the rights of a judge to his salary and pension once he is
appointed have accured to him and shall not be liable to be changed
by Parliament by any law that Parliament may like to make with
regard to that particular matter. I think, so far as my new article
is concerned, I have placed that matter outside the jurisdiction of
Parliament. Parliament, no doubt, has been given the power from
time to time to make laws for changing allowances, pensions etc., but
it has been provided in the article that that shall apply only to new
judges and shall not affect the old judges if that is adverse to the
rights that have already accrued. Therefore, so far as the principle
is concerned for which he is fighting, that principle has already been
embodied in this article.
From another point of view, his amendment seems to be quite
objectionable and the reason for this is as follows. As everybody
knows pensions have a definite relation to salary and the number
of years that a judge has served. To say, as my honourable Friend,
Pandit Kunzru suggests, that the Supreme Court judges should get
a pension not less than the pension to which each one of them would
be entitled in pursuance of the rules that were applicable to judges
of the Federal Court, seems to presume that the Federal Court judge
if he is appointed a judge of the Supreme Court shall continue to
get the same salary that he is getting. Otherwise that would be a
breach of the principle that pensions are regulated by the salary and
the number of years that a man has put in. We have not yet come
to any conclusion as to whether the Federal Court Judges should
continue to get the same salary that they are getting when they
are appointed to the Supreme Court. That matter, as I said, has
not been decided and I doubt very much (I may say in anticipation)
whether it will be possible for the Drafting Committee to advocate
any such distinction as to salary between existing judges and new
judges. The amendment, therefore, is premature. If the House accepts
the proposition for which my honourable Friend, Pandit Kunzru is
contending that the Federal Court Judges should continue to get the
same salary, then probably there might be some reason in suggesting
this sort of amendment that he has moved. At the present moment,
I submit it is quite unnecessary and it is impossible to accept it
because it seeks to establish a pension on the basis that the existing
salary will be continued which is a proposition not yet accepted by
the House.
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739DRAFT CONSTITUTION
Shri R. K. Sidhwa : The Honourable Dr. Ambedkar has not
answered my point as to how the Parliament is competent to give a
furnished house to the Chief Justice.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : We are not rejecting it.
Nothing is said about the furnished house. We shall discuss that.
[The amendment of Pandit Kunzru was negatived and the motion
moved by Dr. Ambedkar as shown before was accepted. Article 104, as
amended was added to the Constitution.]
NEW ARTICLE 148-A
*The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir, I move :
That after article 148, the following new article be inserted :—
Abolition or creation
of Legislative Councils
to States
“148A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained
in article 148 of this Constitution, Parliament may
by law provide for the abolition of the Legislative
Council of a State having such a Council, or for
the creation of such a Council in a State having no such Council, if the
Legislative Assembly of the State passes a resolution to that effect by a
majority of the total membership of the Assembly and by a majority of not
less than two-thirds of the members of the Assembly present and voting.
(2) Any law referred to in clause (1) of this article shall contain such
provisions for the amendment of this Constitution as may be necessary to
give effect to the provisions of the law and may also contain such incidental
and consequential provisions as Parliament may deem necessary.
(3) No such law as aforesaid shall be deemed to be an amendment of
this Constitution for the purpose of article 304 thereof.”
As honourable members will see, this new article 148A provides for
two contingencies : (i) for the abolition of the Second Chamber in those
province which will have a Second Chamber at the commencement
of the Constitution and (ii) for the creation of a Legislative Council
in a province which at the commencement of the Constitution has
decided not to have a Legislative Council but may subsequently
decide to have one.
The provision of this article follow very closely the provisions
contained in the Government of India Act, section 60, for the creation
of the Legislative Council and section 308 which provides for the
abolition. The procedure adopted here for the creation and abolition
is that the matter is really left with the Lower Chamber, which by a
resolution may recommend either of the two courses that it may decide
upon. In order to facilitate any change made either in the abolition of
* CAD, Vol. IX, dated 30th July 1949, pp. 13-14.
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740 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
the Second Chamber or in the creation of a Second Chamber, provision
is made that such a law shall not be deemed to be an amendment of the
Constitution, in order to obviate the difficult procedure which has been
provided in the Draft Constitution for the amendment of the Constitution.
I commend this article to the House.
* * * * *
*The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : I do not think any reply
is called for.
Mr. President : I shall now put the amendments to the vote. I shall
take up Prof. Saksena’s amendment first and I shall put it in two parts.
[3 Amendments were negatived, one was withdrawn and the motion
of Dr. Ambedkar as mentioned above was adopted New article 148A was
added to the Constitution.]
ARTICLE 150
†The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir, I move :
That for article 150. the following be substituted :—
Composition of the
Legislative Councils.
“150 (1) The total number of members in
the Legislative Council of a State having such
a Council shall not exceed
twenty-five per cent of the total number of members in the Assembly
of the State : Provided that the total number of members in the Legislative
Council of a State shall in no case be less than forty.
(2) The allocation of seats in the Legislative Council of a State, the manner
of choosing persons to fill those seats, the qualifications to be possessed for
being so chosen and the qualification entitling persons to vote in the choice
of any such persons shall be such as Parliament may by law prescribe.”
The original article was modelled in part on article 60 of the first
Draft of the Drafting Committee. Now, the House will remember that
that article 60 of the original Draft related to the composition of the
Upper Chamber at the Centre. For reasons, into which I need not go
at the present stage, the House did not accept the principle embodied
in the old article 60. That being so, the Drafting Committee felt that
it would not be consistent to retain principle which has already been
abandoned in the composition of the upper chamber for the Provinces.
-That having been the resulting position, the Drafting Committee was
presented with a problem to suggest an alternative. Now I must confess,
that the Drafting Committee could not come to any definite conclusion
* CAD, Vol. IX, dated 30th July 1949, p. 20
†Ibid., pp. 21-22.
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741DRAFT CONSTITUTION
as to the composition of the upper chamber. Consequently they
decided—you might say that they merely decided to postpone the
difficulty—to leave the matter to Parliament. At the present moment
I do not think that the Drafting Committee could suggest any
definite proposal for the adoption of the House, and therefore they
have adopted what might be called the line of least resistance in
proposing sub-clause (2) of article 150. That, as I said, also creates
an anomaly, namely, that the Constitution prescribes that certain
provinces shall have a second chamber, as is done in article 148-A,
but leaves the matter of determining the composition of the second
chamber to Parliament.
These are, of course, anomalies. For the moment there is no method
of resolving those anomalies, and I therefore request the House to
accept, for the present, the proposals of the Drafting Committee as
embodied in article 150 which I have moved.
[Amendment No. 90 of List III (First Week) was not moved.]
Shri H. V. Kamath : Sir, I move :
“That in amendment No. 5 of List I (First Week) of Amendments to
Amendments, in clause (2) of the proposed article 150, for the words ‘the
qualifications to be possessed for being chosen’ the words ‘qualifications
and disqualifications for membership of the Council’ be substituted.’
The House will see that on a previous occasion with regard to the
election of members to the legislature of a State they adopted various
articles in the relevant parts. I would invite the attention of the House
to article 167 for instance, which lays down the disqualifications for
membership of the State Assembly in addition to the qualifications
which have gone before. In providing for representation in the upper
chamber and election of members to this Council I do not see why
this House should not with equal validity, equal reason and equal
force lay down not merely the qualifications of members to be chosen
to the upper chamber but also what the disqualifications should be.
Article 167 lays down how under various circumstances a member
is to be disqualified for being chosen as or being a member of the
Assembly or the Council of a State. Therefore I do not see any reason
why the same thing should not be explicitly stated in article 150
moved by Dr. Ambedkar.
There is one other point about the article and that is this. The new
amendment lays down that the strengthf of the Council shall not exceed
one-fourth or 25 per cent of the total number of members in the lower
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742 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
House. It also lays down further in a proviso, “Provided that the total
number of members in a Legislative Council of a State shall in no case
be less than forty.” How these two can be reconciled in particular cases
passes my understanding. For instance, we have adopted article 148……
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : I would ask the honourable
Member to read article 167 again.
Shri H. V. Kamath : I am talking of the next point.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : What about the first point ?
Do you favour it ?
Shri H. V. Kamath : I do not favour it. Dr. Ambedkar says that
article 167 lays down the disqualifications…….
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Both for the Assembly
and the Council of States.
* * * * *
*Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad (West Bengal : Muslim) : ...This clause
looked very simple and inoffensive and the effect was that the number of
members of the Legislative Council shall not be more than 25 per cent.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir, I rise on a point of
Order. My Friend is criticisng a draft which is not before the House.
“Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad : I was trying to show how this
unsatisfactory state of affairs in today’s amendments arose.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : It is not before the Members.
* * * * *
†The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir, there are only two
points of comment, which I think call for a reply. The one point of
comment, that was made both by Mr. Kamath as well as by my Friend,
Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad, was that according to the proposal now placed
before the House, there is a certain amount of disproportion between
the membership of the Upper House and the membership of the Lower
House in certain provinces. He cited the instance. I believe, if I heard
him correctly, that in the province of Orissa, the members of the Lower
House, on the principles which we have laid down in article 149 of the
Constitution, would be near about 60. Consequently, if the minimum
for an Upper House was 40, in Orissa the Upper House would be
disproportionate to the Lower House in strength. Now, I think my
* CAD, Vol. IX, dated 30th July 1949, p. 27.
†Ibid., pp. 35-37.