Vol. 14, Part I · pages 286–290

DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES268 bride and bridegroom belong to the same varna, the same caste or the same sub-caste, there is nothing in this Code which can prevent him from giving effect to his wishes or giving effect to what he regards as his dharma. In the same way if one Hindu who is a reformist and who does not believe in varna, caste or sub-caste, chooses to marry a girl outside his varna, outside his caste, outside his sub- caste , the law regards his marriage also as valid. So far as the marriage law is concerned there is therefore no kind of imposition at all. The vydhikas, the orthodox, are left free to do what they think is right according to their dharma. The reformers who do not follow dharma but who follow reason, who follow conscience, have also been left to follow their reason and their conscience. Shri Mahavir Tyagi (U. P. : General): Are they permitted to marry outside their religion also if their conscience directs them in that manner? The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Well, we will have another Bill for that. I do not know whether my honourable friend Mr. Tyagi is unmarried. If he is I will hurry it up. Shri Mahavir Tyagi : I want to make way for others. The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Consequently, what will happen in Hindu society so far as marriage law is concerned if there will be a competition between the old and the new. And we hope that those who are following the new path will win subsequently. But, as I say, if they do not, we are quite content to allow two parallel systems of marriage to be operative in this country and anyone may make his choice. There is no violation of a shastra, no violation of a smriti at all. With regard to monogamy it may be that it is a new innovation. But I must point out that I do think that any Member in this house will be able to point out having regard to customary law or having regard to our shastras that a Hindu husband had at all times an unfettered, unqualified right to polygamy. That was never the case. Even today, in certain parts of South India there are people who follow this, a section of the Nattukottai Chettiyars— the case has been reported in the Reports of the Privy Council itself, I am not depending on mere heresay evidence—but among the Nattukottai Chettiyars there is a custom that a husband cannot marry a second wife unless he obtains the consent of his wife. Secondly, when a consent is obtained, he must allot to her certain property which I think in the Tamil language

DR. AMBEDKAR AND THE HINDU CODE BILL 269 is called moppu. That property becomes her absolute property so that if after her consent the husband marries and ill-treats her, she has a certain amount of economic competence in her own hands to lead an independent life. I cite that as an illustration to show that there has not been an unqualified right for polygamy. A second illustration wliich I would like to give would be from the Arthashastra of Kautilya. I do not know how many Members of the House have perused that book, I suppose many of them have. If they have, they will realise that the right to marry a second wife has been considerably limited by Kautilya. In the first place, no man can marry for the first ten or twelve years because he must be satisfied that the woman is not capable of producing children. That was one limitation. The second limitation imposed by Kautilya on the right of second marriage was that the husband was to return to the woman all the stridhan that she had acquired at the time of marriage. It is only under these two conditions that Kautilya’s Arthashastra permitted a Hindu husband to marry a second time. Thirdly, in our own country, in the ligislation that has been passed in various Provinces, monogamy has been prescribed. For instance in the marumakkathayam and the aliyasanthanam law both of them prescribe monogamy as a rule of marital life. Similarly, with regard to the recent legislation that has been passed in Bombay or in Madras, similarly in Baroda, the law is the law of monogamy. I hope the House will see from the instances I have given that we are not making any very radical or revolutionary change. We have precedent for what we are doing, both in the laws that have been passed by various States in India, also in the ancient shastras such as Kautilya’s Arthashastra. If I may go further, we have got the precedent of the whole world which recognises monogamy as the most salutary principle so far as marital relations are concerned. Shri Deshbandhu Gupta (Delhi) : What about the Mohammadan Law? The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : We shall come to Mohammadan law when we discuss the Mohammadan law. Coming to the question of divorce, there again I should like to submit to the House that this is in no way an innovation. Everybody in this House knows that communities wliich are called shudra have customary divorce and what is the total of what we call shudra ? Nobody has ever probably made any calculation as to the total number of shudras who go to compose the Hindu society, but I have not the

DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES270 slightest doubt in my mind that the shudras form practically 90 per cent of the total population of the Hindus. What are called the Regenerated classes probably do not fill more than ten per cent of the total population of this country, and the question that I want to ask of honourable Members is this : are you going to have the law of the 90 per cent of the people as the general law of this country, or are you going to have the law of the 10 per cent of the people being imposed upon the 90 per cent ? That is a simple question which every Member must answer and can answer. So far as the ‘regenerated’ classes are concerned there was a time, if one refers for instance to the time when the Narada smriti or the Parashara smriti were written, when the smritis recognised that a woman can divorce her husband when he has abandoned her, when he died, when he has taken parivrija, and she was entitled to have a second husband. Consequently, it may be that at a later stage I shall read to you some extracts from your shastras to show. ( An honourable member: “Your shastras”). Yes, because I belong to the other caste. I shall read the extracts to show that what has happened in this country is that somehow, unfortunately, unnoticed, unconsciously, custom has been Allowed to trample upon the text of the shastras which were all in favour of the right sort of marital relations. My submission, therefore, to the house is that so far as any new principles have been introduced in the law of marriage or divorce, whatever has been done is both just and reasonable and supported by precedent not only of our shastras but the experience of the world as a whole. With regard to adoption, there are again three points of controversy. One point of controversy with regard to adoption is this, that like the old Hindu law we do not make similarity or identity of caste a requisite for a valid adoption. We follow the same rule that we have followed with regard to marriage. Here again, I may say that if a Brahmin wants to adopt a Brahmin boy, he is free to do so. If a Kayasth wants to adopt a Kayasth boy, he is free to do so. If a Shudra wants to adopt a boy of his own community he is free to do so. If a Brahmin is so enlightened as not to adopt a boy belonging to his own community but adopts a Shudra, he is also permitted to do so. There is therefore no kind of imposition. Seth Govind Das (C. P. and Berar: General): Why do you consider such a Brahmin enlightened ? The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Well, I do not know. From my point of view certainly he is enlightened; from your point of view he may be a very dark man, but that is a difference of opinion.

DR. AMBEDKAR AND THE HINDU CODE BILL 271 With regard to the question of the limitation on the right of an adopted son to challenge all alienations made by the widow before adoption, I do not think that there can be any controversy at all. There is no reason why we should continue the notion that a boy when adopted becomes the son of the adopted father right from the time when the adopted father died. This is a pure fiction. It has no value at all. It is not merely a fiction; it is a fiction which gives rise to tremendous litigation and tremendous difficulties. It is therefore right that the adoption should be simultaneous with the vesting of the property. I do not think any member of the House will think that this is a proposition which we ought not to accept at this stage. ( Shri B. Das : “We all accept”.) Similarly, as I have stated, the limitation upon the right of a boy who is adopted to divest the mother completely and to make her nothing more than a dependant waiting for such maintenance as the adopted boy may give, I do not think that there is any member of the House who will think that such a situation can be justified on any ground whatsoever. I think it is right that we preserve the right of adoption which the orthodox community cherishes so much, but, Sir, I do not understand why there should be adoption. Most of us who make adoptions have no name to be recorded in history. Personally, I myself certainly would not like my name to go down in history, because my record is probably very poor. I am an unusual member of the Hindu community. But there are many who have no records to go down and I do not understand why they should indulge in adopting a son—a stupid boy, uneducated, without any character—not knowing his possibilities and fastening him and fathering him upon a poor woman, whom he can deprive of every property that she possessed. Therefore, my submission is this, that if you do want to cherish your old notions with regard to adoption at any rate make this provision that the adopted boy does not altogether deprive the mother of the property which is her mainstay. I do not think that that limitation can be at all a point of controversy. With regard to the question of the abolition of customary adoption, I would like to say two things. There is a general argument which the House will be able to appreciate. It is this. A Code is inconsistent with customary law. That is a fundamental proposition. If you allow a Code to remain and at the same time permit custom to grow and custom to plead against the Code, there is no purpose in having a

DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES272 Code at all, because a custom can always eat into the Code and make the Code null and void. With regard to this particular matter of customary adoption such as Krithrim adoption, Godha adoption and Dwaimushayan adoption, my submission is this, that these are really not adoption at all. As the Privy Council in one of its rulings has definitely stated, adoption is purely a religious affair. The getting of property by the adopted son is a secondary matter. He may get property, he may not get property, and even though he may not get property his adoption from a religious point of view may be valid. Therefore, my submission is this, that all these customary adoptions are nothing else but devices to keep property within the two families which enter into this bargain, and in my judgement, since we have passed the Constitution and included in the Directive Principles one article saying that the State should take steps not to allow property being concentrated in the hands of one or a few, such devices like the Dwaimushayan where two parties merely agree to share the property and keep it with them ought not to be tolerated. Besides, there is no reason why parties who want to make a genuine adoption should not conform to the rules and regulations regarding the Dattaka adoption which is permitted by the law. Mr. Deputy Speaker: It is now one o’clock. The honourable Minister may continue after Lunch. The Assembly then adjourned for Lunch till half Past Two of the Clock. The Assembly re-assembled after Lunch at Half Past Two of the Clock, Mr. Deputy Speaker (Shri M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar) in the Chair. The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : I want not to take up the points of controversy relating to the topic of co-parcenary law. The question is raised : Why does the Bill wish to seek to abolish the co-parcenary which is prescribed by what is called the Mitakshara law ? Now, Sir, having applied my mind in the best way I can for the proper exposition of this subjects, I think this is a question which required to be considered from three different points of view. One is how large a volume of property is included within the ambit of what is called co-parcenary property. If the volume that is comprised