Vol. 2 · pages 366–370

347PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE in accordance with public opinion, it is essential that members of the Council who take part in the decision should each represent that opinion. Indeed no other person can be deemed to be qualified to give a decisive vote on the issues debated on the floor of the house. But the representatives of class interests merely reflect the opinions one might say, the prejudices of their class, and should certainly be deemed to be disqualified from taking part in the decision of issues which lie beyond the ambit of the interests of their class. Notwithstanding their class character as members of legislature they acquire the competence to vote upon all the issues whether they concern their own class or extend beyond. This, in my opinion, is quite subversive of the principle of popular government. It might be argued that representatives of such class interests are necessary to give expert advice on those sectional issues with which the unsectional house is not familiar. As against this, it is necessary to remember that in a democracy, the ultimate principle is after all self-government and that means that final decision on all matters must be made by popularly elected persons and not by experts. It is moreover not worthy that the advice of such people is not always serviceable to the house. For, their advice invariably tends to become eloquent expositions of class ideology rather than careful exposition of the formulae in dispute. 51. Assuming, however, that it is necessary either to safeguard the interests of these classes or to tender advice to the house on their behalf, it is yet to be proved that these interests will not secure sufficient representation through general electorates. Facts, such as we have, show that they can. Taking the case of the Inamdars, though they have been given three seats through special electorates of their own, they have been able to secure 12 seats through the general electorates. Indeed by virtue of the solidarity which they have with other landholding members of the Council, they felt themselves so strong in numbers that only a few months back they demanded a ministerial post for the leader of their class. Besides, it is not true that without class-electorates there will be no representation of the interests of these classes in the Council. Such interests will be amply safeguarded by a member belonging to that class, even if he is elected by a general constituency. This will be clear if we bear in mind that a member taking his seat in the legislature, although he represents directly his constituency, yet indirectly he does represent himself and to that extent also his class. Indeed, from the very nature of things this tendency on the part of a member, indirectly to represent himself, although it might be checked, controlled and over-ruled, so surely manifests itself that it throws, and must necessarily throw, direct representation into the background. No one for instance can believe that a European gentleman representing a Chamber of Commerce will only represent the interests of commerce and will not represent the interests of the European community because he is elected by a Chamber of Commerce and not by the general European community. It is in the nature of things that a man’s self should be nearer

348 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES to him than his constituency. There is a homely saying that a man’s skin sits closer to him than his shirt and without any imputation on their good faith so it is with the members of the legislature. It is the realisation of this fact which has led the English people who at one time wished that the shipping trade, the woollen trade and the linen trade should each have its spokesman in the House of Commons, to abandon the idea of such classelectorates. It is difficult to understand why a system abandoned elsewhere should be continued in India. It is not necessary in the interests of these classes and it is harmful to the body politic. The only question is whether or not persons belonging to the commercial and individual classes can secure election through the general constituencies. I know of nothing that can be said to handicap these classes in the race of election. That there is no handicap against them is proved by the success of Sardars and Inamdars in general election. Where Inamdars and Sardars have succeeded there is no reason why representatives of commerce and industry should not. 52. Reserved Electorates —Three objections can be raised against the system of reserved electorates. One is that it seeks to guarantee an electoral advantage to a majority. It is true that the Marathas and the allied castes form a majority in the Marathi speaking part of the Presidency both in population as well as in voting strength and as such deserve no political protection. But it must be realised that there is all the difference in the world between a power informed and conscious of its strength and power so latent and suppressed that its holders are hardly aware of that they may exercise it. That the Marathas and the allied castes are not conscious of their power, is sufficiently evident if we compare the voting strength of the Marathas and the allied castes in those constituencies wherein, seats are reserved for them, with the rank of their representatives among the different candidates contesting the elections. In every one of such constituencies the Maratha voters, it must be remembered, have a preponderance over the voters of other communities. Yet in the elections of 1923 and 1926, out of the seven seats allotted to them, they could not have been returned in three had it not been for the fact that the seats were reserved for them. It is indeed strange that the candidates of a community which is at the top in the electoral roll, should find themselves at the bottom, almost in a sinking position. This strange fact is only an indication that this large community is quite unconscious of the power it possesses, and is subject to some influence acting upon it from without. 53. The second ground of objection, urged by the members of the higher classes who are particularly affected by the system of reserved seats, is that it does an injustice to them in that it does not permit them the benefit of a victory in a straight electoral fight. It is true that the system places a restriction upon the right of the higher classes to represent the lower classes. But is there any reason why “the right to represent,” as distinguished from “a right to representation,” should be an unrestricted right’? Modern

349PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE politicians have spent all their ingenuity in trying to find out the reason for restricting the right to vote. In my opinion there is a greater necessity why we should strive to restrict the right of a candidate to represent others. Indeed, there is no reason why the implications of the representative function should not define the condition of assuming it. It would be no invasion of the right to be elected to the Legislature to make it depend, for example, upon a number of years’ service on a local authority and to rule out all those who do not fulfil that condition. It would be perfectly legitimate to hold that that service in a legislative assembly is so important in its results, that proof of aptitude and experience must be offered before the claim to represent can be. admitted. The argument for restricting the rights, of the higher classes to represent the lower classes follows the same line. Only it makes a certain social attitude as a condition precedent to the recognition of the right to represent. Nor can it be said that such a requirement is unnecessary. For aptitude and experience are not more important than the social attitude of a candidate towards the mass of men whom he wishes to represent. Indeed, mere aptitude and experience will be the cause of ruination if they are not accompanied and regulated by the right sort of social attitude. There is no doubt that the social attitude of the higher classes towards the lower classes is not of the right sort. It is no doubt always said to the credit of these communities that they are intellectually the most powerful communities in India. But it can with equal truth be said that they have never utilised their intellectual powers to the services of the lower classes. On the other hand, they have always despised, disregarded and disowned the masses in belonging to a different strata, if not to a different race than themselves. No class has a right to rule another class, much less a class like the higher classes in India. By their code of conduct, they have behaved as the most exclusive class steeped in its own prejudices and never sharing the aspirations of the masses, with whom they have nothing to do and whose interests are opposed to theirs. It is not, therefore, unjust to demand that a candidate who is standing to represent others shall be such as shares the aims, purposes and motives of those whom he desires to represent 54. The third objection to the system of reserved electorates is that it leads to inefficiency inasmuch as a candidate below the line gets the seat in supersession of a candidate above the line. This criticism is also true. But here, again, there are other considerations which must be taken into account. First of all, as Professor Dicey rightly argues, “it has never been a primary object of constitutional arrangement to get together the best possible Parliament in intellectual capacity. Indeed, it would be inconsistent with the idea of representative government to attempt to form a Parliament far superior in intelligence to the mass of the nation.” Assuming, however, that the displacement of the intellectual classes by the candidates belonging to the non-intellectual classes is a loss, that loss will be more than amply recompensed by the natural idealism of the backward communities. There

350 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES is no doubt that the representatives of the higher orders are occupied with the pettiest cares and are more frequently concerned with the affairs of their own class than with the affairs of the nation. Their life is too busy or too prosperous and the individual too much self-contained and self-satisfied for the conception of the social progress to be more than a passing thought of a rare moment. But the lower orders are constantly reminded of their adversity, which can be got over only by a social change. The consciousness of mutual dependence resulting from the necessities of a combined action makes for generosity, while the sense of untrained powers and of undeveloped faculties gives them aspirations. It is to the lower classes that we must look for the motive power for progress. The reservation of seats to the backward Hindu communities makes available for the national service such powerful social forces, in the absence of which any Parliamentary government may be deemed to be poorer. 55. Communal Electorates—That some assured representation is necessary and inevitable to the communities in whose interests communal electorates have been instituted must be beyond dispute. At any rate, for some time to come the only point that can be open to question is, must such communal representation be through communal electorates ? Communal electorates have been held by their opponents to be responsible for the communal disturbances that have of late taken place in the different parts of the country. One cannot readily see what direct connection there can be between communal electorates and communal disturbances. On the contrary it has been argued that by satisfying the demand of the Mohamedans, communal electorates have removed one cause of discontent and ill-feeling. But it is equally true that communal electorates do not help to mitigate communal disturbances and may in fact help to aggrevate them. For communal electorates do tend to the intensification of communal feeling and that they do make the leaders of the two communities feel no responsibility towards each other, with the result that instead of leading their people to peace, they are obliged to follow the momentary passions of the crowd. 56. The Mohamedans who have been insisting upon the retention of the communal electorates take their stand on three grounds. 57. In the first place they say that the interests of the Mohamedan community are separate from those of the other communities, and that to protect these interests they must have separate electorates. Apart from the question whether separate electorates are necessary to protect separate interests, it is necessary to be certain that there are any interests which can be said to be separate in the sense that they are not the interests of any other community. In the secular, as distinguished from the religious field, every matter is a matter of general concern to all. Whether taxes should be paid or not, if so, what and at what rate; whether national expenditure should be directed in any particular channel more than any other; whether education should be free and compulsory ; whether Government lands should

351PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE be disposed of on restricted tenure or occupancy tenure ; whether State aid should be granted to industries ; whether there should be more police in any particular area ; whether the State should provide against poverty of the working classes by a scheme of social insurance against sickness, unemployment or death; whether the administration of justice is best served by the employment of honorary magistrates, and whether the code of medical ethics or legal ethics should be altered so as to produce better results, are some of the questions that usually come before the Council. Of this list of questions, is there any which can be pointed out as being the concern of the Mohamedan community only ? It is true that the Mohamedan community is particularly interested in the question of education and public service. But there again it must be pointed out that the Mohamedan community is not the only community which attaches particular importance to these questions. That the non-Brahmin and the depressed classes are equally deeply interested in this question becomes evident from the united effort that was put forth by all three in connection with the University Reform Bill in the Bombay Legislative Council. The existence of separate interests of the Mohamedan community is therefore a myth. What exists is not separate interests but special concern in certain matters. 58. Assuming, however, that separate interests do exist, the question is, are they better promoted by separate electorates than by general electorates and reserved seats ? My emphatic answer is that the separate or special interests of any minority are better promoted by the system of general electorates and reserved seats than by separate electorates. It will be granted that injury to any interest is, in the main, caused by the existence of irresponsible extremists. The aim should therefore be to rule out such persons from the councils of the country. If irresponsible persons from both the communities are to be ruled out from the councils of the country, the best system is the one under which the Mohamedan candidates could be elected by the suffrage of the Hindus and the Hindu candidates elected by the suffrage of the Mohamedans. The system of joint electorates is to be preferred to that of communal electorates, because it is better calculated to bring about that result than is the system of separate electorates. At any rate, this must be .said with certainty that a minority gets a larger advantage under joint electorates than it does under a system of separate electorates. With separate electorates the minority gets its own quota of representation and no more. The rest of the house owes no allegiance to it and is therefore not influenced by the desire to meet the wishes of the minority. The minority is thus thrown on its own resources and as no system of representation can convert a minority into a majority, it is bound to be overwhelmed. On the other hand, under a system of joint electorates and reserved seats the minority not only gets its quota of representation but something more. For, every member of the majority who has partly succeeded on the strength of the votes of the minority if not a member of the minority, will certainly be a member for the minority. This, in my opinion, is a very great advantage which makes