Vol. 2 · pages 531–535

2 COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE CONFERENCE †Comments on the Interim Report of Sub-Committee No. I (Federal Structure)—16th December 1930 ‡Dr. Ambedkar: I should like to raise the point which my friend Mr. Joshi made before we adjourned. The Lord Chancellor, as the Chairman of this Sub-Committee, invited some of the delegates to submit any views they might have on these particular matters, and a few delegates including myself submitted a letter to the Chairman of the Sub-Committee, and expressed our wish that that letter should be submitted to the Sub-Committee for consideration. I do not find in the Report any reference to that letter, and I was informed by Lord Sankey that that letter was not placed before the Sub-Committee, but was sent to you, Sir, as Prime Minister. I do not think that that was quite a proper way of dealing with it. The letter was submitted to the Chairman of the Sub-Committee, for the Sub-Committee’s use and it expressed certain definite views we held on the question of Federation. I am bound to make this comment because, speaking for myself, the Report as drawn up is so much at variance with the principles expressed in the letter that I find we shall have at some stage to raise a debate on this question, and I should like to know what steps the Lord Chancellor proposes to take. Lord Sankey: I am very much obliged to Dr. Ambedkar for raising the point he has done, because I should have liked to have raised it myself, and it gives me the opportunity of saying a few words which I should have said at the beginning.......This is not a complete picture.......soon you are going to be presented with the complete picture, and Dr. Ambedkar, I shall want your assistance,.......Now with regard to the letter, Dr. Ambedkar, that you were good enough to send to me, I have considered it very carefully, and it will be vital to discuss it when we come to No. 6.§ † Proceedings of the R.T.C., pp. 193-95. ‡ Dr. Ambedkar was not the member of this Sub-Committee. He was nowever included as member of the Federal Structure Committee in the 2nd R.T.C. § Head No. 6 dealt with the constitution, character, powers and responsibilities of the Federal Executive.

511IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE CONFERENCE Dr. Ambedkar : All I should like to know, if I may say so, is whether you will place that letter before the Committee. At what stage you may do so is a matter which I must leave to you. Lord Sankey : One moment, Dr. Ambedkar. I am going to do a good deal more than that; I am not only going to place your letter before the Committee. I am going to draw the Committee’s attention to it myself. Dr. Ambedkar : I am obliged. That is enough for me. Lord Sankey : One moment. I have not finished. When you are as old as I am, you will not be in such a hurry. Instead of having to do the job myself, I personally should very much take the gentlemen who presented the letter to come and do the job. If I have to do it myself, I shall not do it as well as you gentlemen would. But I will do this : not a word of the letter shall be left out; but it is not quite the time to consider it yet, because it must be considered at that important time when we come to No. 6. Comments on paragraph 16 of the Report which dealt with Governor-General’s special power †Dr. Ambedkar: Sir, before you proceed, I should like to make it plain that the power given to the Governor-General to intervene to avoid serious prejudice to the interests of any section of the population must remain. The power must be embodied in the constitution in the same form as under section 93 of the Canadian Constitution. Lt. Col. Gidney: Sir, I agree with and support everything that Dr. Ambedkar has said about the Governor-General having reserved power in such matters as he has mentioned. ***** ‡Chairman: Paragraph 34. I call on Col. Gidney. Lt. Col. Gidney: I have one observation to make on this paragraph and I do so in conjunction with paragraph 29. Whereas in paragraph 29 a population ratio is to be adopted in estimating the representation of various communities in the upper chamber, in this paragraph 34, you use the word “possibly” which still further closes the door to minorities and special interests even to get a single representative in the upper chamber. I would suggest that that word “possibly” be deleted from this paragraph and the other words following, “and certainly in the Lower Chamber” be also deleted, as that the reconstructed paragraph will read : “Provision should be made for the representation in both chambers, however small this representation be” I think all the minority communities have every entitlement to representation in the upper house, however small it be. Dr. Ambedkar: I associate myself with what Col. Gidney has said. (Paragraph 34 dealt with representation of special interests and of the Crown in Federal Legislature.) † Proceedings of the R.T.C., p. 261. ‡ Ibid., pp. 278-79.

3 IN SUB-COMMITTEE No. II (PROVINCIAL CONSTITUTION) First Sitting—4th December 1930 †Dr. Ambedkar: I propose to divide my remarks under three heads : (l) provincial autonomy, (2) responsibility in the provinces, (3) provincial services. I make a distinction between provincial autonomy and provincial services. It seems to me that the question of provincial autonomy raises the definition of the relations of the provincial Executive and Legislature vis-a-vis the Central Government and the Central Legislature. The first remark I would offer with the attitude of those who hold that the time has arrived when the provincial Governments ought to be left with as complete an autonomy as is possible under the circumstances, and they should be free from such control as the Central Government now exercises. But, Sir, I cannot help making this further observation, that viewing the problem of provincial autonomy from the standpoint of the particular class I represent in this Conference and of the interests of India as a whole and the working classes in particular, I think that in any future constitution that we propose to devise for endowing the Provinces with provincial autonomy we must take into consideration certain facts which are bound to limit the character of that autonomy. The first limiting factor in the provincial autonomy is that it must be made subject to such questions of a provincial character which are, although provincial in nature, also of an All-India character. The Provinces may have their say with regard to these subjects, and yet the Central Government should not be excluded from its jurisdiction with regard to them. For instances, I would like to draw an illustration from labour legislation, legislation affecting tenants and affecting agriculture. These, no doubt, in a country like India, must become provincial subjects yet I do not think they can be viewed entirely from such a small compass. They cannot be † Proceedings of the Sub-Committee No. II (Provincial Constitution), Government of India, Central Publication Branch, Calcutta, 1931, pp. 18-22. The terms of reference to this Committee were as under:— (1) “The powers of the Provincial Legislature.” (2) “The constitution, character, powers and responsibilities of the Provincial Executive.”

513IN SUB-COMMITTEE NO. II regarded as entirely provincial and without an All-India character. The Central Government must have some jurisdiction over subjects of this character, notwithstanding that it cuts across provincial autonomy. Secondly, I should state that in dividing the powers of Government between the Central and the Provincial Governments in the future constitution of India with a view to giving the Provinces as complete an autonomy as possible, it will also be necessary that such powers as remain undefined must be left with the Central Government. Well, I do not think that there is no other view on that point. But I say that in the present situation in India, where the separatist tendency exists to such an extent as we all know it, where provincial and local parochialism is more dominant than national feeling, while we are building up a Federated India with complete autonomy of the units, we still have the problem of making India as a whole a strong and united country. I would make this further observation, namely, that I do not think that the reservation of powers in the Central Government is likely to affect the autonomy of the Provinces. The reservation of powers as interpreted by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Canada has not had this over-riding effect. It means a power that comes into existence in an emergency in a field not specifically allotted to the Provinces. I do not think that the Provincial autonomy should be really affected. The second thing I should like to observe in connection with this question of Provincial autonomy is that that autonomy must be limited by the affording of protection for the interests of the minorities and of the Depressed Classes. As I visualise the situation in India as it. will result from the new constitution, I find there will be certain Provinces in which some communities will be in a majority, but in all the Provinces the Depressed Classes, whom I represent, will be in a minority. They will be in a minority in every Province. I cannot understand how we can at this state permit the Provincial majorities to have a complete uninterrupted and undiluted sway over the destinies of these poor people, without any right of appeal being given to the latter in regard to mal-administration or neglect of their interests. There must be some authority somewhere, over and above the Provincial Government, which will be in a position to intervene and rescue them from any adverse position in which they may be placed by the Provincial majorities. These are the three things which, in my opinion at any rate must limit the autonomy of the future Provincial Governments of India. Coming to the question of the character of responsibility in the Provincial Governments, my first observation is that the whole question of responsibility in the Provincial Legislature is entirely dependent upon the kind of Legislature that you are going to get in the Provinces. If the Legislature that you are going to get in the Provinces is a Legislature which is going to be a mirror of the whole population of the Province, if it is going to be

514 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES thoroughly representative and not merely representative as a museum is, where there are a few specimens of every species for the observation of the general onlooker; if every minority and every class which fears its existence will be jeopardised is placed on a position to make its influence felt, then I think in a Legislature of that sort there will be no harm in conceding the principle that Provincial responsibility may be introduced to the fullest extent. That is my first observation. Making that a condition that the Legislatures shall be fully and adequately representative of all the classes, I see no objection to the subjects which are now reserved being transferred to popular control. Coming to the question of whether the responsibility in the Provinces should be joint or should be individual I have not the slightest hesitation in saying that the responsibility not only should be joint but must be joint. I have been a member of Legislative Council, and I have seen how Ministries in the Provinces have worked. It has been a most painful experience for me, as it has been the experience, I believe, of many of those who have had the misfortune or the good fortune to be members of a Legislative Council, to find that Ministries have been working as a kind of loose confederation, without having any complete or unanimous view on a particular policy which they adopted. There have been divided counsels, and cases of Ministers not being very willing to support each other. What has been the result? The result is this, that in no instance have we had any considered policy put forward by the Cabinet as a whole, worked out in detail and placed before the Legislative Council Things have been done by fits and starts, and I do not think we want our responsibility in future to be bungled in that fashion. Turning now to the question of communal representation in the Cabinets, I must confess that I am not very much drawn to the suggestion which is often made that there should be communal representation in the Cabinet I am not, of course, oblivious of the fact; in fact, I am very conscious of it that if the minority communities are not represented in the Cabinet it is very possible, and even very likely, that in matters of administration which affect their daily lives their interests may be affected very prejudicially by the policy of Ministers whose dominant interest is communalism. I do not forget that for a moment, but my submission is that there is a better way of dealing with that sort of evil, and it seems to me that if the minorities could get constitutional and statutory guarantees laid down in the Constitutional Act itself against anything likely to injure their interests being done or left undone by the Cabinet, the danger which most of us apprehend from the fact that the Cabinets may be communally dominated, will vanish, and we shall not have much cause to insist on communal representation in the Cabinet Although I am very desirous that the Chief Minister, whoever he is,