Vol. 2 · pages 641–645

620 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES a federation, and Ireland is not a federation. Dr. Ambedkar: That is so. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru: The Bryce Committee had nothing to do with a federation. Dr. Ambedkar: My reply is that unless your federal constitution was so composed that the Upper House exclusively represented some other interests not represented in the Lower Chamber, the proposition would stand. This has nothing to do with the form of the Government, whether it was unitary or federal. Sir Provash Chnnder Mitter: I should like to ask one question. The House of Lords was a hereditary House. Was not the Irish Upper House one at that stage also ? Dr. Ambedkar: I am submitting that even the House of Lords, which is a most ancient House, with all the dignity, traditions and privileges behind it, consented to this revolutionary change. What are the Indian States as compared with the House of Lords, if I may submit it with all due deference ? H.H. The Maharaja of Bikaner: With all due respect to the great Peers of the British Realm, the States possess sovereignty over any territory which is not British territory, whereas even the most important Peers of the Realm and their estates are in a totally different position. Dr. Ambedkar: The sovereignty is subject to the influence and power of the House of Lords. Sir Muhammad Shaft: May I ask Dr. Ambedkar what are the privileges of the House of Lords ? Dr. Ambedkar: Taking this position, the next thing that I would submit is that the constitution should contain a definition of what a Finance Bill is. It may be defined, as has been suggested, in the way in which it is defined in the Irish Constitution, which is not different from the one given in the Parliament Act of 1911. The next point that I would submit, arising out of the matter, is that a Member in charge of a Bill should have the privilege of. claiming that his Bill is a Finance Bill. If there is a dispute between the two Houses as to whether or not a Bill claimed to be a Finance Bill is a Finance Bill, I submit that the dispute should be resolved by the decision of a Joint Committee of both Houses, in which each House should be represented by a number of Members proportionate to its strength, and in which all parties should also be represented according to their strength. Sir Maneckjee Dadabhoy: You want to make a departure from the existing practice. Dr. Ambedkar: Very much so. Mr. Zafrullah Khan: If the existing practice were satisfactory we would not be here. Dr. Ambedkar: The next matter to which I want to come is non-financial

621IN THE FEDERAL STRUCTURE COMMITTEE Bills. In the case of non-financial Bills I am prepared to modify the principle applicable to Finance Bills, but for only two purposes. First, the Second Chamber may have power to revise and amend non-financial Bills brought up from the Lower House, subject to the proviso that no amendment shall be made by the Second Chamber which is of a financial character. Secondly, the Second Chamber will have power to hold up, and to enforce so much delay (and no more) in the passing of a non-financial Bill into law, as may be necessary to prevent hasty action, or as may be needed to enable the opinion of the electorate adequately to be expressed upon it. In view of this, my answer to the question propounded in the sub-head dealing with nonfinancial Bills is that the Upper House should have the right to amend a non-financial Bill. If the amendments are accepted by the Lower House, well and good ; but if they are not accepted, then the constitution should provide that, if a non-financial Bill is passed three times by the Lower Chamber in three different sessions of its life, it shall become law, notwithstanding the opposition of the Second Chamber. Lastly, I submit that these relations between the two Houses should be embodied in law, and should not be left to convention. That is all that I have to submit. ***** †Dr. Ambedkar: Is it your view, Mr. Gavin Jones, that the Constitutions of South Africa and Australia have defined the relations between the two Houses in the manner in which they have done because of the fact that they knew that they were drafting a Constitution for a Federal form of government ? Mr. Gavin Jones: Yes, certainly. Dr. Ambedkar: Then why is it that the Canadian Constitution did not lay down any rules regarding the relations of the two Houses ? Sir Muhammad Shafi: Because the general rule is that the relations shall be the same as those of the House of Lords and the House of Commons. Dr. Ambedkar: But the House of Lords and the House of Commons make a unitary government, not a federal government. I said this has nothing to do with unitary or federal form of government; and, if you will permit me to proceed, I will say that the various Dominions made the relations of the two Chambers in their constitutions what they were as they found them existing between the House of Lords and House of Commons at the time when they made their constitutions. They were not drafting them either for federal or for unitary. The Canadian Constitution said — Chairman: You must give Mr. Gavin Jones a chance to speak, Dr. Ambedkar. Mr. Gavin Jones: All that I would say is that the Australian Constitution is a federal constitution. †Proceedings of the Federal Structure Committee and Minorities Committee, Vol. I, p. 281-82.

622 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES Dr. Ambedkar: Certainly. Mr. Gavin Jones: I will also say that Australia is one of the most democratic countries in the world. Dr. Ambedkar: I quite agree. Mr. Gavin Jones: If they found it necessary to have all these safeguards, I think that it is very advisable that we should have them in India. Dr. Ambedkar: That is another matter. The point is whether Australia made the provision it did in this connection because it wanted a federal constitution. I say that they simply took their relations as they found them in England at the time that they drafted their constitution. Twenty-eighth Sitting—23rd September 1931 HEAD 1 (Strength and Composition of the Federal Legislature ) *Dr. Ambedkar: I do not propose to say anything on sub-heads (i), (ii), (iii) and (v). I agree with what my friend, Mr. Joshi, said this morning upon all those points except in one respect. I am not wedded to any particular figure regarding the composition of the two Chambers. In my opinion, a given figure ought not to be our starting point. The figure ought to be the resultant of all relevant considerations. I may also say here that my sympathies are in favour of a larger Chamber, because I think that a Chamber, being a deliberative body, ought to be constituted in such a manner that all interests can find their place in it, without any particular interest having to be cramped into it. There is one argument that has been brought forward against a large Chamber namely that our Chambers must be business-like. I think there is some force in that argument, but I do not quite understand how the strength of the Chamber has anything to do with its business character. I should have thought that the business character and despatch of a Chamber depended less upon the numbers of which it was composed, and more upon the Standing Orders and the rules of business that it had framed for itself. Consequently, I would not limit it by that consideration. The point with regard to which I propose to speak in particular is subhead (iv). Taking part ( b) of sub-head (iv) first, it reads thus— “To what minimum extent must the adherence of Indian States be secured in order to justify the initiation of proceeding of the Federal Structure Committee a Federal Constitution ?” It seems to me, with all respect, that that is a question which ought to be addressed to His Majesty’s Government It is they who ought to tell us what number was, in their opinion, necessary before the Federation could be initiated. *Proceedings of the Federal Structure Committee and Minorities Committee, Vol. I, pp. 344-46.

623IN THE FEDERAL STRUCTURE COMMITTEE There is one question, the veil from which has not as yet been lifted. We are all told that the Indian Constitution of the future must be a Federal Constitution ; but no one has yet made it clear whether it is the view of those who assert that proposition that the entry of the Indian States is a condition precedent for the establishment of a responsible government in a federal form. It is a subject on which it is difficult for me to speak unless I know definitely what is the view of those who take their stand upon that proposition. If you wish me to answer that question, then I will do so for myself; and my answer is that we need not wait for the adherence of any prescribed number of States for the initiation of the Federal Constitution. I do not know that there would be any British Indian who would like to put the establishment of responsible government in cold storage until the Princes make up their minds to enter into the Federal Government of India. I therefore think that all that we need do for the initiation of the Federal Government of India is to put a clause in the Constitution to permit His Majesty, by Order in Council, to admit new States as they desire to come into the Federation. This is not something which is new. Such an arrangement finds a place in the Canadian Constitution, Sections 146 and 147, and in the Australian Constitution, Sections 121 to 124. The Canadian Constitution, Section 146, provided that, in the case of other units, which were not included in the Federation at the time when it was formed, in 1867, and which thereafter showed their willingness to enter into it, His Majesty could, by Order in Council, admit them as units of the Constitution. I think that it would be sufficient for our purposes to initiate the Federal Constitution with a clause of this sort. This would be consistent with the freedom of the Princes to enter or not to enter the Federation. Coming to (a) of sub-head ( v), we have had the suggestion from His Highness The Maharaja of Bikaner that the States joining the Federation, whether one or all or a few, should be entitled to exercise the whole of the voting strength that is assigned to them. In all humility, I submit that that is a proposition which to my mind is an astounding proposition. It is a proposition, if I may say so with due respect, without rhyme or reason. No justification has been made out for what I may call an extraordinary proposition of this character. What does it mean ultimately ? It means this— that a single Prince coming into the Federation and taking part in legislation affecting the destinies of subjects of British India, will be able to throw in, in his voting capacity, the whole of the power of the Native States, without the British Indians participating in the Legislature having any right to do anything to affect the destinies of the subjects of those Princes who do not choose to come into the Federation. It is a terribly one-sided arrangement. A Prince who chooses to keep outside the Legislature will, under this provision, be able to acquire and transfer his vote to a neighbouring Prince or his colleague and give him the power to affect the destinies of British

624 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES India. That, I submit, is something which is without justice and without equity in it, and it is something to which I, for myself, can never consent. The only right thing and the only proper thing, would be that the voting strength of such Princes as would be willing to come into the Federation should be confined to the particular quota of votes that will be assigned to them under the arrangements proposed by Sir Mirza Ismail. If a single Prince comes in, and if he has one representative, he will be entitled to one vote. If groups of Princes come in, and under the system proposed by Sir Mirza Ismail the group has got two votes assigned to it, the group will have to come as a group and will not have the power to exercise more than its two votes. The other arrangement would be one to which I, at least, would be unable to give my consent. Thirtieth Sitting—25th September 1931 HEAD 4 (Distribution of Financial Resources between the Federation and its Units ) *Dr. Ambedkar: I attach a very great deal of importance to the point which has been raised by Sir Muhammad Shafi. I hope that you will provide us with an opportunity, at least later on, to discuss this question—whether this recommendation made by the Federal Structure Sub-Committee of the division of subjects into “Central” and Federal should be incorporated in the Constitution. Another point which I would suggest for your consideration is whether it would not be proper first to consider that subject, and then to refer this matter to the Finance Sub-Committee, or whether you should have the Finance Sub-Committee and then consider this matter afterwards. That is a matter for your consideration. I should have thought that it would be much better for us to come to some conclusion, one way or the other, whether we retain this dichotomous division in the constitution, or whether we had not better hand over those subjects to the Sub-Committee for consideration. Thirty-fourth Sitting—14th October 1931 HEAD 4 (Distribution of Financial Resources between the Federation and its Units ) Discussion on the Report of the Federal Finance Sub-Committee †Dr. Ambedkar: My Lord Chancellor, we have heard the debate that has been going on for the last two days on the Report of the Finance SubCommittee, and I am afraid that the debate has become somewhat wearisome and tiresome. I should not have intervened in this debate at all if I had *Proceedings of the Federal Structure Committee and Minorities Committee, Vol. I, p. 418. †Ibid., pp. 529-34.