Vol. 3 · pages 91–95
Philosophy of Hinduism; Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Ancient India; Buddha or Karl Marx
This text was extracted automatically from the official PDF of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, so it may contain small errors. Always check the original page before quoting.
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78 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
leaves men in darkness face to face with the unthinking energies of
nature which gives them birth to which after a few fruitless struggles
they succumb. Not less cruel than the crudest irreligion, does it leave
men divorced from all communion with God.
Such is the philosophy of Hinduism. It is Superman’s heaven and the
common man’s damnation.
I am conscious that my position regarding the philosophy of Hinduism
will be assailed from different sides. So contrary it is to the current
views about it that it is bound to be assailed. The attack may come
from various sides.
It will be said that I am wrong in taking the Manu Smriti as the book
of Hindu religion and that the true gospel of Hinduism is contained in
the Vedas and the Bhagwat Gita..
I am sure no orthodox Hindu will be bold enough to repudiate the
authority of Manu Smriti as a book of Hindu Religion. Such a charge
can be made only by some reformed sects of Hinduism such as the Arya
Samajists. But there can be no doubt that this charge is not well founded.
To refute this charge it is perhaps desirable to explain 1 how the Smritis
obtained a place and position of authority among the Hindus.
The Smritis originally were a collection of rules relating to social
traditions, customs and conventions approved of and recommended by
those who were learned in the Vedas. For a long time these rules existed
only in the memory of those learned in the Vedas, so they began to be
called Smritis i.e. things which are remembered in contrast to Vedas or
Shruti that is things which were heard. In the beginning the Smritis
even when they were codified were treated as rules of inferior value as
compared with the rules contained in the Vedas.
The difference in their authority and binding force was the result of
the natural difference between the trustworthiness of what is heard as
compared to what is only remembered. There was also another reason of
this differentiation in the two sorts of Dharma Shastra literature. This
was based upon the status of their authors. The authors of the Vedas
were Rishis. The authors of the Smritis were only learned men. The
Rishis were superior in status and sanctity than those who were merely
learned. Consequently the Vedas were treated as more authoritative
than the Smritis.
The consequence arising from this was well expressed in the Hindu
theological formula according to which if there was a conflict in the
rules of two Vedas on the same subject it meant option for a rule of
1 See the interesting article by Prof. Altekar on “The Position of Smritis as a Source of
Dharma” in the Kane Memorial Volume pp. 18-25.
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Vedas cannot be deemed to be inoperative. On the other hand, in a conflict
between a rule of Shriti and a rule of Smriti the rule of Shruti prevailed
becuse for the reasons stated above Smriti was inferior in authority to
the Shruti. But as pointed out by Prof. Altekar, the Smritis in course
of time came to be invested with the same authority as belonged to
the Vedas. Various means were adopted to accomplish this purpose. In
the first place the authors of the Smritis were elevated to the status of
Rishis. The early Dharma Shastra writers like Gautama, and Baudhayana
were never given the status of a Rishi. But Manu and Yajnavalkya are
reckoned as Rishis. By this means the status of the Smritis was equated
to that of the Shrutis. The second means adopted was to regard the
Smriti as the record from memory of a Shruti which was lost. Thus
Smriti instead of being regarded as something quite different from Shruti
came to be regarded as akin to and indistinguishable from Shruti. The
result of these steps was a complete change in the rules regarding the
authority of the two. Originally if there was a conflict between a Smriti
and a Shruti, the Shruti prevailed. The new rule was that in case of
conflict there was an option which meant that the Smriti rule was as
operative as the Rule of Shruti. This new rule has been expressly laid
down by Kumarila in his commentary on the Purvamimansa Sutra
whereby the Smritis were made as authoritative as Shrutis.
While originally Hindu Society was bound to the Vedas and could not
follow any rule which was contrary to the Vedas, the new rule altered
the situation and left it to the option of society either to follow the
Shruti or the Smriti. But even this option was later on taken away.
This was done by making the study of the Smritis as compulsory as
that of the Shruti.
This was done gradually. In the first place it was suggested that
the Shrutis and Smritis are the two eyes of the Brahamana, if he is
devoid of one he becomes a one-eyed person. Then came the theory that
Brahmanyam is possible only as the result of a joint study of both the
Vedas and the Smritis. Finally came the rule according to which the
study of the Smruti only was recognized and a contempt of the Smriti
was made a sin and a person guilty of it was declared to be condemned
to be born as a beast for 21 generations.
This is how the Smritis have been recognized as a source of Hindu
Religion and there is no doubt that, to quote Prof. Altekar, the Smritis;
“have played a great part in determining the features of many a
social and socio-religious institutions and customs and in moulding the
development of modern Hinduism.”
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80 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
It cannot therefore be maintained that I was wrong in taking Manu
Smriti as containing the philosophy of Hinduism.
This work of elevating the Smritis to the status of the Vedas was
undertaken by the Brahmins for a most selfish reason. The Smritis
contain in all its wild and luxurious growth the doctrine of Caste, the
doctrine of the superiority of the Brahmins, their rights and privileges,
the doctrine of the subordination of the Kshatriyas and Vaishyas and the
doctrine of the degradation of the Shudras. Such being the philosophy
of the Smritis, the Brahmins were directly interested in investing the
Smritis with the authority which was claimed for the Vedas and in
which they ultimately succeeded to their advantage but to the ruination
of the whole country. But conceding—which orthodox and pious Hindu
would do—that the Smritis do not contain the philosophy of Hinduism
but that the same is to be found in the Vedas and the Bhagwat Geeta
the question is what difference would this make in the result.
It seems to me that it matters very little whether one takes the
Smritis, or the Vedas or the Bhagwat Geeta.
Do the Vedas teach something which is fundmentally different from
what the Smritis do? Does the Bhagwat Geeta run contrary to the
injunctions of the Smritis. A few illustrations will make the matter clear.
It is indisputable that the Vedas lay down the theory of Chaturvarna
in what is known as the Purushasukta. This Purushasukta recognizes
two basic principles. It recognizes the division of society into four sections
as an ideal. It also recognizes that the ideal relationship between the
four sections is inequality.
What the Bhagwat Geeta teaches is also beyond controversy. Its
teaching may be summarized in the following four pronouncements made
by Krishna in the Bhagwat Geeta.
(1) “I myself have created the arrangement known as Chaturvarna (i.e.
the fourfold division of society into four castes Brahmins, Kshatriyas,
Vaishyas and Shudras) assigning them different occupations in
accordance with the native capacities. It is I who am the maker of this
Chaturvarna”.— Gita. IV. 13
(2) “Even if it may be easier to follow the occupation of another Varna
yet to follow the occupation of one’s own Varna is more mertorious,
although one may not be able to do it quite efficiently. There is bliss
in following the occupation of one’s own Varna, even if death were to
result in performing it; but to follow the occupation of another Varna
is risky “.—Geeta. III. 35.
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(3) “The educated should not unsettle the faith of the uneducated who
have become attached to their occupation. He himself should perform
the occupation of his Varna and make others perform their’s accordingly.
An educated man may not become attached to his occupation. But the
uneducated and dull-minded people who have become attached to their
occupation should not be spoiled by the educated by putting them on
a wrong path by abandoning their own occupation”—Geeta III. 26, 29.
(4) “Oh, Arjun! Whenever this religion of duties and occupations (i.e.
this religion of Chaturvarna) declines, then I myself will come to birth
to punish those who are responsible for its downfall and to restore
it—Geeta IV, 7-8.
Such is the position of Geeta. What difference is there between it and
the Manu Smriti ? Geeta is Manu in a nutshell. Those who run away
from Manu Smriti and want to take refuge in Geeta either do not know
Gita or are prepared to omit from their consideration that soul of Geeta
which makes it akin to Manu Smriti.
Compare the teachings of the Veda, of the Bhagwat Geeta with what
is contained in the Manu Smriti which I have taken as the text for
elucidating the philosophy of Hinduism. What difference does one find ?
The only difference one can find is that the Vedas and the Bhagwat
Geeta deal with General Theory while the Smritis are concerned in
working out the particulars and details of that theory. But so far as
the essence is concerned all of them—the Smritis, the Vedas and the
Bhagwat Geeta—are woven on the same pattern, the same thread runs
through them and are really parts of the same fabric.
The reason for this is obvious. The Brahmins who were the authors
of the whole body of Hindu Religious Literature—except the Upanishad
Literature—took good care to inject the doctrines formulated by them
in the Smritis, into the Vedas and the Bhagwat Geeta. Nothing is to
be gained in picking and chosing between them. The Philosophy of
Hinduism will be the same whether one takes the Manu Smriti as its
Gospel or whether one takes the Vedas and the Bhagwat Geeta as the
gospel of Hinduism.
Secondly it will be contended that Manu Smriti is a Book of Laws
and not a code of ethics and that what I have presented as a philosophy
of Hinduism is only legal philosophy and is not the moral philosophy
of Hinduism.
My answer to this contention is simple. I hold that in Hinduism there
is no distinction between legal philosophy and moral philosophy. That
is because in Hinduism there is no distinction between the Legal and
the Moral, the Legal being also the Moral.
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82 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
Not much evidence is necessary to support my contention. Take the
meaning1 of the word Dharma in the Rig Veda. The word Dharma
occurs in the Rig Veda 58 times. It is used in six different senses. It
is used to denote (I) Ancient custom, (2) Laws, (3) Any arrangement
which maintains law and order in society, (4) The course of nature, (5)
The quality of a substance and (6) Duty of good and evil. It will thus
be seen that from the very beginning the word Dharma in Hinduism
has a two fold connotation. It means both law and moral. That is one
reason why in the philosophy of Hinduism there can be no distinction
between legal philosophy and moral philosophy.
This is not to say that the Hindus have no code of morality. To be
sure they have. But it is very pertinent to ask the nature and character
of conduct which the Hindu Code of Ethics declares to be moral.
To have an idea of the nature of conduct which the Hindu thinks
moral, it is better to begin by recognizing that there are three levels of
conduct2 which must be distinguished. (I) Conduct arising from instincts
and fundamental needs (2) Conduct regulated by standards of society and
(3) Conduct regulated by individual conscience. Conduct on the first level,
we do not call moral conduct. It is of course not immoral; it is merely
unmoral. It is governed by forces not as moral in purpose but as valuable
in result. The forces are biological or sociological or psychological. These
have purpose, such as to satisfy hunger, or to forge a weapon against an
enemy. But the end is one set up by our physical or instinctive nature.
So long as this is merely accepted as an inevitable end and not compared
with others, valued, and chosen, it is not properly moral. Conduct on the
second level is no doubt social. Wherever groups of men are living there
are certain ways of acting which are common to the group—“folkways”.
There are approved ways of acting, common to a group, and handed
down from generation to generation. Such approved ways of acting are
called the mores or the morals of the group. They imply the judgment
of the group that they are to be followed. The welfare of the group is
regarded as in some sense imbedded in them. It becomes the duty of
the individual to follow them and if any one acts contrary to them he
is made to feel the group’s disapproval. We cannot strictly speaking
call the conduct moral. Because the end is accepted as a standard of
‘good’ prescribed by society. If it had spoken of a moral conduct it is
only because it conforms to the mores or morals of the Society. It may
be called customary morality. Conduct on the third level is conduct
which alone is truly and completely moral. That is because in it the
1 What follows if taken from an article on the subject by Mr. Yeshwant Ramkrishna Date
in a Marathi Magazine called “Swadhaya” Double No. 7-8. First year pp. 18-21.
2 In this I am entirely following the analysis given by Crawley and Tufts in their volume
on Ethics.