Vol. 4 · pages 146–150

135APPENDIX I “Indra, as thou hast been like a joy to former worshippers who praised thee, like waters to the thirsty, I invoke thee again and again with this hymn.” “The ancient rishis, resplendent and sage, have placed in front of them (Brihaspati) with gladdening tongue”. “Neither the ancients nor later men, nor any modern man, has attained to (conceive) thy prowess, O Madhavan.” “As (Indra’s) former worshippers were (may we be) blameless, irreproachable, and unharmed.” “For now, O energetic god, men are thy worshippers, as the ancients born of old and the men of the middle and later ages have been thy friends. And, O much-invoked, think of the most recent of all”. “To Him (Indra) our ancient fathers, the seven Navagva sages, desiring food, (resorted) with their hymns.” “Glorified by our newest hymn, do thou bring to us wealth and food with progeny.” A close study of the Rig-Veda will show that the Rig-Veda itself makes a distinction between old hymns and new hymns. Some of them are given below: “Glorified by our newest hymn, do thou bring to us wealth and food with progeny.” “Agni, thou hast announced (or do thou announce) among the gods this our offering, our newest hymn”. “Through our new hymns, do thou, vigorous in action, destroyer of cities, sustain us with invigorating blessings.” “I bring to Agni, the son of strength, a new and energetic hymn, a production of thought uttered by the voice (vachah)”. “I present to the mighty protector a mental production, a new utterance (now) springing up”. “May the new prayer impel thee, the heroic, well-accounted; the loudthundering to succour us.” “I seek life, the ancients, to stimulate thee the ancients, with a new hymn.” “May the new hymns made to praise you, may these prayers gratify you.” “Sing, O Sobhari, with a new hymn to these youthful, vigorous, and brilliant (gods).” “Indra, slayer of Vrittra, thunderer, invoked of many, we (thy) numerous (worshippers) bring to thee, as thy hire, hymns which never before existed.”

136 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES “I will address to this ancient (deity) my new praised, which he desires; may he listen to us.” “Desiring horses, cattle and wealth, we invoke thee to approach us.” Given this abundance of evidence to prove the human origin of the Vedas it is a riddle to find that the Brahmins should so strenuously propagate so extravagent view that the Vedas are of supernatural origin. What made the Brahmins propagate such a view? III What is the authority of the Vedas? With regard to this there prevail two distinct dogmas amongst the Hindus. The first is that the Vedas are eternal. Stopping to examine this dogma the question is what justification is there for such a view? If the Hindus believed that the Vedas were the most ancient works in the world no one can have any quarrel with them. But there is nothing to justify the extraordinary proposition that they are eternal in the sense that they had no beginning in time. Once it is established that the Rishis are the makers of the Vedas it needs no additional proof to establish that the Vedas have a beginning in time which must coincide with the existence of the Rishis. Given that the Rishis are the authors of the Vedas the dogma as to their eternal character is an absurdity. The dogma is sought to be sustained by a series of reasoning which is no less absurd. In the first place let it be noted that this dogma does not rest on the ground that the Vedas are created by God. That was the view of one school of philosophers called Naiyayiks. But strange as it may appear Jaimini the author of the Purva Mimansa whose views on this subject have become the dogmas of the Hindus was not prepared to accept this ground. The following quotation from the Mimansakas is worthy of note: “But (asks the Mimansaka) how can the Veda have been uttered by the incorporeal Paramesvara (God), who has no palate or other organs of speech, and therefore cannot be conceived to have pronounced the letters (of which it is composed)? This object (answers the Naiyayika) is not happy, because, though Parameshvara is by nature incorporeal, he can yet, by way of sport, assume a body, in order to show kindness to his devoted worshippers. Consequently the arguments in favour of the doctrine that the Veda had no personal author are inconducive.

137APPENDIX I “I shall now (says the Mimansaka) clear up all these difficulties. What is meant by this Paurusheyatva (‘derivation from a personal author’) which it is sought to prove? Is it (1) mere procession from a person (purusha) like the procession of the Veda from persons such as ourselves, when we daily utter it? or (2) is it the arrangement—with a view to its manifestation—of knowledge acquired by other modes of proof, in the sense in which persons like ourselves compose a treatise? If the first meaning be intended, there will be no dispute. If the second sense be meant, I ask whether the Veda is proved (to be authoritative) in virtue ( a) of its being founded on inference, or (b) of its being founded on supernatural information? The former alternative (a) (i.e. That the Veda derives its authority from being founded on inference) cannot be correct, since this theory breaks down, if it be applied to the sentences of the Malati Madhava or any other secular poem (which may contain inferences destitute of authority). If, on the other hand, you say ( b) that the contents of the Veda are distinguished from those of other books having authority, this explanation also will fail to satisfy a philosopher. For the word of the Veda is (defined to be) a word which proves things that are not provable by any other evidence. Now if it could be established that this Vedic word did nothing more than prove things that are provable by other evidence, we should be involved in the same sort of contradiction as if a man were to say that his mother was a barren woman. And even if a man were conceded that (in that case) he should perceive things beyond the reach of the senses, from the want of any means of apprehending objects removed from him in place, in time, and in nature. Nor is it to be thought that his eyes and other senses alone would have the power of producing such knowledge since men can only attain to conceptions, corresponding with what they have perceived. This is what has been said by the Guru (Prabhakara) when he refutes (this supposition of) an omniscient author: ‘Whenever any object is perceived (by the organ of sight) in its most perfect exercise, such perception can only have reference to the vision of something very distant or very minute, since no organ can go beyond its own proper objects, as e.g. the ear can never become cognizant of form. Hence the authority of the Veda does not arise in virtue of any supernatural information (acquired by the Deity) in a corporeal shape.” What is then the reasoning on which this dogma of the eternity of the Veda is founded? The reasoning can be best appreciated if I give it in the very words of Jaimini’s Purva Mimansa.

138 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES “In the preceding aphorism it was declared that the connection of words and their meanings is eternal. Desiring now to prove that this (eternity of connection) is dependent on the eternity of words (or sound), he begins by setting forth the first side of the question, viz., the doctrine of those who maintain that sound is not eternal.” “Some, i.e. the followers of the Nyaya philosophy, say that sound is a product, because we see that it is the result of effort, which it would not be if it were eternal.” “That it is not eternal, on account of its transitoriness, i.e. because after a moment it ceases to be perceived.” “Because, we employ in reference to it the expression ‘making’, i.e. we speak of ‘making’ a sound”. “Because it is perceived by different persons at once, and is consequently in immediate contact with the organs of sense of those both far and near, which it could not be if it were one and eternal”. “Because sounds have both an original and a modified form; as e.g. in the case of dadhi atra, which is changed into dadhya atra, the original letter being altered into by the rules of permutation. Now, no substance which undergoes a change is eternal. Because sound is augmented by the number of those who make it. Consequently the opinion of the Mimansaka, who say that sound is merely manifested, and not created, by human effort, is wrong, since even a thousand manifesters do not increase the object which they manifest, as a jar is not made larger by a thousand lamps.” These objections against the Mimansaka theory that sound is manifested, and not created, by those who utter it, are answered in the following Sutras: “But, according to both schools, viz., that which holds sound to be created, and that which regards it as merely manifested, the perception of it is alike momentary. But of these two views, the theory of manifestation is shown in the next aphorism to be the correct one.” The non-perception at any particular time, of sound, which, in reality, perpetually exists, arises from the fact that the utterer of sound has not come into contact with his object, i.e. sound. Sound is eternal, because we recognise the letter k, for instance, to be the same sound which we have always heard, and because it is the simplest method of accounting for the phenomenon to suppose that it is the same. The still atmosphere which interferes with the perception of sound, is removed by the conjunctions and disjunctions of air issuing from a speaker’s mouth, and thus sound (which always exists though unperceived) becomes perceptible. This is the reply to the objection of its ‘transitoriness’.”

139APPENDIX I “The word ‘making’ sounds, merely means implying or uttering them”. “One sound is simultaneously heard by different persons, just as one Sun is seen by them at one and the same time. Sound, like the Sun, is a vast, and not a minute object, and thus may be perceptible by different persons, though remote from one another.” “The letter y, which is substituted for i in the instance referred to under Sutra 10, is not a modification of i, but a distinct letter. Consequently sound is not modified.” “It is an increase of ‘noise’, not of sound, that is occasioned by a multitude of speakers. The word ‘noise’ refers to the ‘conjunctions’ and ‘disjunctions’ of the air which enter simultaneously into the hearer’s ear from different quarters; and it is of these that an increase takes place”. “Sound must be eternal, because its utterance is fitted to convey a meaning to other persons. If it were not eternal (or abiding), it would not continue till the hearer had learned its sense, and thus he would not learn the sense, because the cause had ceased to exist.” “Sound is eternal, because it is in every case correctly and uniformly recognized by many persons simultaneously; and it is inconceivable that they should all at once fall into a mistake”. “When the word go (cow) has been repeated ten times, the hearers will say that the word Go has been ten times pronounced, not that ten words having the sound of Go have been uttered; and this fact also is adduced as a proof of the eternity of sound in Sutra 20”. “Because each sound is not numerically different from itself repeated.” “Sound is eternal, because we have no ground for anticipating its destruction.” “But it may be urged that sound is a modification of air, since it arises from its conjunctions, and because the Siksha (or Vedanga treating of pronunciation) says that ‘air arrives at the condition of sound’ and as it is thus produced from air, it cannot be eternal”. A reply to this difficulty is given in Sutra 22— “Sound is not a modification of air, because, if it were, the organ of hearing would have no appropriate object which it could perceive. No modification of air (held by the Naiyayikas to be tangible) could be perceived by the organ of hearing, which deals only with intangible sound”. “And the eternity of sound is established by the argument discoverable in the vedic text, ‘with an eternal voice, O Virupa’.