Vol. 6 · pages 321–325

306 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES learned ....... By the device of appointing the ministers from the elected members of the (Legislature) and making their tenure of office conditional on the retention of their seats (there is) established at once some measure of responsibility, in the form of responsibility to their constituents and thus (is) put an end to the condition of affairs in which those entrusted with the administration are wholly irresponsible to the constituents who elect the (Legislature).” It is difficult to believe in the cogency of this piece of reasoning. To argue that nothing can be learned without experience is simply absurd. What is necessary for a proper conduct on the part of an individual or a group is to understand the meanings and values of things. For that it is unnecessary to undergo actual trial. A Legislature composed of responsible persons may be trusted to know the consequences of dismissing a Minister at the start without having to wait to learn it by experience. Again, to argue that the system is not the less responsible because ministers are responsible to their constituents is a shallow piece of pedantry. It was no doubt argued by Austin, in connection with the English Constitution, that the House of Commons was “ merely trustee for the body by which they are elected and appointed.” It is true that in a political sense the electors are the most important part of, we may even say, are actually, the Sovereign power, since their will is under every representative system of government sure to obtain ultimate obedience. But as Prof. Dicey points out, 2 “any expressions which attribute to Parliamentary electors a legal part in the process of law-making are quite inconsistent with the view taken by the law of the position of an elector The sole legal right of electors under the English constitution (and the same is true under the Indian constitution) is to elect members of Parliament. Electors have no legal means of initiating, of sanctioning, or of repealing the legislation of parliament. No court will consider for a moment the argument that a law is invalid as being opposed to the opinion of the electorate”: and this exactly defines the status of the Indian electors. To make the minister responsible to such a nonentity is to make him 1 Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 4th Ed., p. 253. 2 Law of the Constitution, 8th Ed., 1915, p. 57.

307 A CRITIQUE OF THE CHANGE virtually irresponsible. That the framers of the constitution were not alive to these considerations in suggesting this particular mode of appointing Ministers it is hard to believe. What is more probable is that this particular mode of appointing ministers was adopted because it permitted to select a man who was more likely to co-operate with those in charge of the reserved subjects and who being irremovable by the Legislature would be less swayed by its wishes. But the Ministers cannot remain altogether immune from the axe of the Legislature. The dangers of the position of a minister who has cultivated friendship with the councillor and has failed to ingratiate himself into the favour of the Legislature, cannot fail to come home to him on budget occasions. The proposals of the minister as embodied in the budget will be liable to be reversed by a vote of the majority of the Legislature, but neither he himself nor the governor will be able to intervene. The minister’s only remedy will be to resign. Anyhow these circumstances which have, so to say, saved dyarchy from failure are only transitory. The political dissensions may be no more than a passing phase, and the ministers from the second term of the reformed Legislature will become amenable to it: so that before long the forces may be organized better than they are, when dyarchy is sure to fail. Hybrid executives, divided responsibility, division of functions, reservation of powers, cannnot make for a good system of government, and where there is no good system of government there can be little hope for a sound system of finance. The primary solution is that there should be an undivided government with a collective responsibility. That, however, can be achieved only when the whole of government derives its mandate from a common source. That such a consummation should take place as early as possible is devoutly to be wished. In that behalf it is encouraging to know that dyarchy is but a transitional system. The only question is how long and protracted will the period of transition be. The justification for introducing a dyarchical form of government rests on the supposition that India is at present ill-prepared to sustain a system of responsible government in . anything like completeness, for owing to the lack of education and political experience, the Indian electorate will for some time be unable either to formulate their requirements intelligently or

308 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES effectively impose a mandate upon their representatives, and that owing to the inveterate social prejudices of the educated classes there is a great danger of their abusing the political power to exploit the masses. This cardinal fact, it was held, must differentiate the degree and the kind of responsibility which can be introduced at the outset from that which will be the eventual resultant of the new system, and must impose the obligation of ensuring that the forces which now hold the people together are not completely withdrawn before satisfactory substitutes are ready to take their place. On the other hand, it has been urged 1 that there is no necessity to wait till the cardinal fact disappears ; for “in all countries responsibility in the beginning has been entrusted to a very small section of the people, and government has been in the hands of a small educated minority, who have naturally cared for the interests of the uneducated masses pending the spread of education and the consequent extension of the franchise.” This is of course a familiar line of argument which is usually put forth in India by the political radicals and social tories. If we put aside the painful story of the harsh, cruel and inhuman treatment which the classes in India have accorded to the masses, truth is on their side, for in every country there have been downtrodden communities suffering from social oppression and social injustice, and yet no country has had to be without political power on that account. But those who use this argument forget that if other countries like America with her Negroes and Japan with her Hitas are in possession of political power without having first destroyed social inequality, it is due to the fact of their having been in possession of military power. Military force and moral force are the two chief means to political freedom, and a country which cannot generate the former must cultivate the latter. Thus in India the political problem is entirely a social problem, and a postponement of its solution virtually postpones the day when India can have a free government subject to the mandate of none but her own people. zzz 1 Cf. the evidence of the Hon. V. J. Patel and Mr. Madhava Rao before the Joint Select Committee on the Government of India Bill. House of Commons Return 203 of 1919, p. 106.

INDEX Accounts, Indian, mode of presentation : 199 Army Expenditure and Strength before Mutiny : 80, 81 Assam : Earthquake Relief Contributions : 167 Financial Arrangements for: 152 et seq. Imperial special Grants-in-Aid, 1897-1904: 168 Quasi-permanent Settlement, 19045: 171 Revision of Settlements, 1887-8: 160, 161, 162; 1892-3: 162, 163, 164 ; 1896-7: 164 et seq. Surpluses and Deficits : 167 See also Eastern Bengal and Assam Bengal : Budget of 1877-8, analysis : 139 Government Letter, January 1882 : 200 Imperial special Grants-in-Aid, 1897-1904 : 167 Permanent Settlements : 74, 177 Quasi-permanent Settlements, 19045: 172; 1906: 175 Revision of Settlements, 1887-8: 160, 161 ; 1892-3: 162, 163, 164; 1896-7: 164 et seq. Shared Revenue Settlements, 18823: 153 et seq. Surpluses and Deficits : 167 Bombay: Budget of 1877-8, analysis : 142 Imperial special Grants-in-Aid, 1897-1904: 168 Permanent Settlements, 1912: 177 Quasi-permanent Settlements, 19056: 170 Revision of Settlements, 1887-8: 160, 161 ; 1892-3: 162, 163, 164; 1896-7: 164 et seq. Shared Revenue, Settlements: 18823: 153 et seq. Surpluses and Deficits : 167 Bryce, James : 225 note Budget by Assignments, 1871-2 to 18767: 112 et seq. Budget by Assigned Revenues, 1877-82: 131 et seq. Budget by Shared Revenues, 18821921 : 149 et seq. Burke Edmund : 236 Burma : Financial Arrangements for: 149 et seq. Imperial special Grants-in-Aid, 1897-1904: 168 Permanent Settlement, 1912 : 177 Quasi-permanent Settlement, 1907: 172 Revision of Settlements, 1887-8: 160, 161 ; 1892-3: 162, 163; 1896-7 : 164 et seq. ; 1902-3 : 169 Cannan, Professor E.: 231 note Canning, Lord : 201, 230 Central Provinces : Budget of 1877-8, analysis : 141 Famine Relief Contributions, 1896-7 : 164 Financial Settlement, 1882-3: 153 et seq. Imperial special Grants-in-Aid, 1897-1904: 168 Permanent Settlement, 1912 : 177 Quasi-permanent Settlement: 170 Revision of Settlements, 1887-8: 160; 1892-3: 162, 163; 1896-7: 164 et seq. Chesney, Colonel: 97 Cladwell, Mr: 228 note Civil Service, Government of India Act, 1858, regulations : 233 note Colvin, Sir A.: 230 note Cowell, Herbert: 66 note Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 : 235 Criticism of Administrative Changes under Reforms Act, 1919: 282 et seq. Customs and Excise: Organization of yield from : 290, 291 Revenue, 1792-1817, Table: 77 note Taxes under Imperial System : 75 et seq.

310 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES Decentralization in British India, Report of Royal Commission, 1908 : 71 note, 178, 199 note, 201, 216 note, 217 note, 218 note, et seq. Devolution Rules, Government of India Act, 1919 : 299 et seq. Dicey, A. V.: 233 note, 306 Disraeli, Benjamin: 72 Durand, General, the Hon.: 99 Dyarchy in India, effects of: 296, 303, 307 Dyer, General: 228 East India’s Company’s Affairs : Committees, 1813 and 1852 : 77, 211 note Secret Committee, 1771 : 66 Eastern Bengal and Assam : Formation of Province and Financial Settlement, 1906: 175 Permanent Settlement, 1912 : 180 See also Assam. Ellenborough Lord : 86 Famine and Plague Relief Contributions : 164, 166 Federalism in India: Opposition to : 179 Origin of Movement: 89 et seq., 103, 104, 204 Financial changes under Government of India Act, Criticism of : 282 et seq. Finlay, J. F. : 89 note Fisher, H.A.L.: 227 note Fowler, R. N.: 228 note Frere, Sir Bartle : 105 note Ghose, N.: 234 note, 235 note Gokhale, Mr.: 281 Government of India Act, 1919: 225, 244, 255 et seq. Changes in Provincial Constitution and Powers : 245 et seq. Devolutions and Adjustments : 255 et seq. Report of Committee on the Bill, 1919: 245 note Report of Financial Relations Committee, 1919 : 267 et seq. Report of Committee (Revision of Draft Rules), 1920: 273 Halsbury, Lord : 233 note Hastings, Warren : 229 note Hearn, S.: 303 Hobart, Lord: 210 note Home Rule Demands in India : 284 et seq. Houghtom, Bernard : 234 note Hunter, W. W. : 7 note, 110 note llbert, Sir Courtenay : 238 Imperial System of Finance : Act of 1833:68 Deficits 1834-46, Table : 72 Derangement of Finances, 1866-70, Table: 110 Federalism v. Imperialism :89 et. seq. Irresponsibility of Provincial Governments: 85 et. seq., 89 et. seq. Origin and breakdown of : 65 et seq. Provincial Contributions to : 199 Revenues and Services under: 70 et. seq. Revision of Machinery : 100 et seq. Imperial Government: Financial relations with Provincial Governments : 196, 197 Limitations and restrictions: 213 et. seq. Import tariffs, Imperial system : 77 Income Tax Act, 1860 : 105 Indian Constitution, characteristics of: 226 Indian Constitutional Reforms Committee, 1918 : 216 note Indian Councils Act: 125 Indian Executive : Changes in Government, demand for: 225 et seq. Relations with Indian Legislature : 237 Repressive Legislation: Indian Expenditure: Percentage, 1877-8 to 1916-7, Table: 235 Royal Commission on : 197, 198 note Services, Military and Civil, 1809-15, Table: 81, 82 Indian Legislature, Constitution and Powers : 237 et seq. Indian National Congress, Reforms Scheme, 1918: 241, 245 lyengar, Sir Bhashyam : 226 note Jenkins, Sir Lawrence C. J.: 235 note Kelkar, N. C. : 226 note Laing.S. : 101, 105 Lal, Hon. Rai Bahadur Bakshi Sohan : 268 note Land Revenue: Inequities: 231 Provincial assessments : 113 Revenue, 1792-1817, Table : 74 note Taxes under Imperial Finance system: 73