Vol. 6 · pages 486–490
The Evolution of Provincial Finance in British India; The Problem of the Rupee; other economic writings
This text was extracted automatically from the official PDF of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, so it may contain small errors. Always check the original page before quoting.
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TOWARDS A GOLD STANDARD
backed by an adequate gold reserve. But the Herschell
Committee, after an extended investigation into the working
of the currency systems of different countries, reported*:—
“It is impossible ……… to review foreign systems of
currency, without feeling that, however admirable may
be the precautions of our own [English] currency system,
other nations have adopted different systems which appear
to have worked without difficulty, and enabled them to
maintain for their respective currencies a gold standard
and a substantial parity of exchange with the gold-using
countries of the world”
with little or no gold. The Committee, therefore, was completely
satisfied with the proposals of the Government of India, and
not only sanctioned their adoption,† but added, by way of
introducing a modification in them, that
“The closing of the Mints against the free coinage of
silver should be accompanied by an announcement that,
though closed to the public, they will be used by the
Government for the coinage of rupees in exchange for gold
at a ratio to be then fixed, say 1 s. 4 d. per rupee, and
that at the Government Treasuries gold will be received
in satisfaction of public dues at the same ratio.”‡
These recommendations were carried into effect on June
26, 1893, which forms as great a landmark in the history
of Indian currency as did the year 1835. On that date were
promulgated one legislative enactment and three executive
notifications, together calculated to accomplish the object
in view. The Act (VIII) of 1893 was only a repealing Act. It
repealed:—
(i) The Indian Coinage Act, XXIII of 1870.
Sections 19 to 26 (both inclusive), requiring the Mint
Masters to coin all silver brought to their Mints for coinage.§
* Report, par. 93.
† Report, par. 155.
‡ Report, par. 156.
§ These sections also contained provisions for the coinage of all gold brought
to the Mints for the purpose by private persons. The quantity brought to the
Mints was quite trifling, and the gold coins, i.e. the mohurs struck, were not
legal tender. As they were to be superseded by sovereigns to be coined at the
Mints upon their being subsequently thrown open to the free coinage of gold,
it was thought undesirable that any more of these mohurs should be coined
Consequently, along with silver, Mints were also closed to gold.
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472 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
(ii) The Indian Paper Currency, 1882.*
(a) Section 11, Clause (b), requiring the Paper Currency
Department to issue notes against silver coin made
under the Portuguese Convention Act, 1881,†
(b) Section 11, Clause (a), requiring the Paper Currency
Department to issue notes against silver bullion or
foreign silver coin.‡
( c) Section 13. Only the proviso limiting the gold portion
of the Paper Currency Reserve to one-fourth of the
Total Reserve.§
These repeals by the Act were supplemented by an executive
Notification No. 2663, announcing in conformity with the
suggestion of the Herschell Committee that the Government
Treasuries would receive sovereigns and half-sovereigns of
current weight in payment of public dues at the rate of 15
rupees and 7 rupees 8 annas respectively.
Since gold was not made general legal tender by any of
the above measures, it was feared that the Government might
be embarrassed by the accumulation in its Treasuries of a
stock money which it could not pay out in discharge of its
obligations. To enable Government to rid the Treasuries of
gold, should it accumulate in them to an inconvenient extent,
there followed another Notification, No. 2664, requiring that
the Currency Department should issue, on the requisition of
the Controller-General, currency notes in exchange for gold
coin or gold bullion, at the rate of one Government rupee for
7.53344 grs. trey of fine gold, or sovereigns or half-sovereigns
at the rate of 15 rupees and 7 rupees 8 annas respectively.
To give effect to the second modification introduced by the
Herschell Committee, there was issued a third Notification,
No. 2662, to the effect that
“The Governor-General in Council hereby announces
that, unitil further orders, gold coins and gold bullion will
be received by the Mint Masters of the Calcutta and Bombay
* The repeal of these sections of the Act also called for the repeal of other
sections depending upon them, such as sections 14 and 15 and alterations in
Sections 21 and 28, to bring the whole Act in accord with the policy of a gold
standard then inaugurated.
† The Convention had come to an end and the retention of the clause was
therefore unnecessary.
‡ The retention of this clause would have been inconsistent with the closure
of the Mints.
§ As gold was to be the future standard of India, this limitation was no longer
necessary.
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TOWARDS A GOLD STANDARD
Mints respectively, in exchange for Government rupees,
at the rate of 7.53344 grs. troy of fine gold for one rupee
on the following conditions :—
(1) Such coins or bullion must be fit for coinage.
(2) The quantity tendered at one time must not be less
than 50 tolas.
(3) A charge of one-fourth per mille will be made on all
gold coin or bullion which is melted or cut so as to
render the same fit for receipt into the Mint.
(4) The Mint Master, on receipt of gold coin or bullion
into the Mint, shall grant to the proprietor a receipt
which shall entitle him to a certificate from the Mint
and Assay Masters for the amount of the rupees
to be given in exchange for such coin or bullion
payable at the General (Reserve) Treasury, Calcutta
or Bombay. Such certificates shall be payable at the
General Treasury after such lapse of time from the
issue thereof as the Comptroller-General may fix,
from time to time.”
Before the policy adumbrated by these measures was
carried to completion there came up a move for the undoing
of it. After the failure of the International Monetary
Conference of 1892 the United States and France, two
countries most heavily burdened with an overvalued stock
of silver, opened negotiation with the British Government,
asking the latter to agree to certain conditions on the
grant of which they were to open their Mints to the free
coinage of silver at the ratio of 15½ to 1. These conditions
included :*
(1) Opening of the Indian Mints, which had been closed
to the free coinage of silver, and an undertaking not
to make gold legal tender in India.
(2) Placing one-fifth of the bullion in the Issue Department
of the Bank of England in silver.
(3) (a) Raising the legal-tender limit of silver in England
to £10.
* Cf. Correspondence respecting the Proposals on Currency made by the Special
Envoys from the United States, P.P.C. 8667 of 1897, p. 3.
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474 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
(b) Issuing the 20s. notes based on silver, which shall
be legal tender.
( c) Retirement, gradual or otherwise, of the 10s. gold
pieces, and substitution of paper based on silver.
(4) Agreement to coin annually a certain quantity of silver.
(5) Opening of English Mints to the coinage of rupees and
for coinage of British dollars, which shall be full legal
tender in Straits Settlements and other silver-standard
Colonies, and tender in the United Kingdom to the limit
of silver legal tender.
(6) Colonial action, and coinage of silver in Egypt.
(7) Something having the general scope of the Huskisson
plan.
In these negotiations the Treasury again reverted to its old
pose. It refused to discuss the conditions requiring a change
in the British currency, but argued that the opening of the
Indian Mints, if brought about, should be regarded as an
adequate “contribution which could be made by the British
Empire towards any international agreement with the object
of securing” a stable monetary par of exchange between gold
and silver,* and the representatives of the United States
and France seemed to have concurred in that view. The
negotiations, however, failed, because of the firm stand taken
by the Government of India. The Government had suffered too
long to be the scapegoat of the Treasury. Nor did it see any
reason why it should be called upon to pull the chestnuts off
the fire for the benefit of France and the United States. In
a letter commenting upon the proposals, the Government of
India observed†:—
“The changes which are involved in the arrangements
proposed to Her Mahesty’s Government are the following :
France and the United States are to open their Mints to the
free coinage of silver, continuing the free coinage of gold and
the unlimited legal tender of coins of both metals, the ratio
remaining unchanged in France and being altered in the
French ratio of 15½ to 1 in the United States. India is to open
* Cf. letter dated October 16, 1897, to the Foreign Office, P.P.C. 8667 of 1897,
p. 15.
† Despatch dated September 16, 1897, to the Secretary of State, ibid, p. 9.
Italics not in the original
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TOWARDS A GOLD STANDARD
her Mints to silver, to keep them closed to gold, and to
undertake not to make gold legal tender. France and the
United States would thus be bimetallic; India would be
monometallic (silver) ; whilst most of the other important
countries of the world would be monometallic (gold).
*****
“The first result of the suggested measures, if they
even temporarily succeed in their object, would be an
immense disturbance of Indian trade and industry, by
the sudden rise from about 16d. to about 23d. the rupee.
Such a rise is enough to kill our export trade, for the
time at least …… such an arrangement as is proposed
is an infinitely more serious question for India than for
either of the other two countries, for it seems clear that
practically the whole risk of disaster from failure would
fall on india alone. What would happen in each of the
three countries if the agreement broke down and came to
an end ? France possesses a large stock of gold, and the
United States are at present in much the same situation
as France, though the stock of that metal is not so large.
It may be admitted that if no precautions were taken
these gold reserves might disappear under the operation
of the agreement, and in that case, if the experiment
ultimately failed, the two countries concerned would suffer
great loss. But it is inconceivable that precautions would
not be taken, at all events, so soon as the danger of the
depletion of the gold reserves manifested itself, and,
therefore, it is probable that no particular change would
take place in the monetary system of France or the United
States, the only effect of the agreement being a coinage
of silver which would terminate with the termination of
the agreement. Thus the whole cost of the failure, if the
experiment should fail, would be borne by India. Here the
rupee would rise with great swiftness, it would keep steady
for a time, and then, when the collapse came, it would
fall headlong. What course could we then adopt to prevent
the fluctuation of the exchange value of our standard of
value with the fluctuations in the price of silver ? We do
not think that any remedy would be open to us, for if the
Indian Mints were reopened to silver now, it would ……
be practically impossible for the Government of India to
close them again, and even if they were closed it would
only be after very large additions had been made to the
amont of silver in circulation.”