Vol. 6 · pages 611–615
The Evolution of Provincial Finance in British India; The Problem of the Rupee; other economic writings
This text was extracted automatically from the official PDF of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, so it may contain small errors. Always check the original page before quoting.
PDF page 611 (printed page 596)
596 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
silver currency as may prove necessary. The Government
should continue to give rupees for gold, but fresh rupees
should not be coined until the proportion of gold in the
currency is found to exceed the requirements of the public.
We also recommend that any profit on the coinage of
rupees should not be credited to the revenue or held as
a portion of the ordinary balance of the Government of
India, but should be kept in gold as a special reserve,
entirely apart from the paper-currency reserve and the
ordinary Treasury balances” [and be made freely available
for foreign remittances whenever the exchange falls below
specie point.]
Taking the two recommendations of the Committee together,
where is the departure ? What the Government has done is
precisely what the Committee had recommended. That the
Government of India or the Chamberlain Commission should
have admitted for a moment that there was a departure is
not a little odd, for the very despatch which conveyed the
Minute of Sir Edward Law to the Secretary of State opens with
remarks which show that Government was earnestly following
the recommendations of the Fowler Committee. It runs:—
“In our despatch No. 301 of August 24, 1899, we wrote
with reference to paragraph 60 of the Report of the Indian
Currency Committee [i.e. the Fowler Committee], that any
profit made on rupee coinage should be held in gold as
a special reserve, has not escaped our attention ; but the
need for the coinage of additional rupees is not likely to
occur for some time, and a decision on this point may be
conveninently deferred.”
What Sir Edward Law did was to carry that recommendation
into effect when the occasion arrived. In view of this it is
useless to belabour the Government of India if the ideal of a
gold standard with a gold currency was defeated by the coinage
of rupees. But, even though the Government has in ignorance
taken the blame on itself, it cannot be rightly thrown at its
door. If the project has been defeated by the coinage of rupees,
the question must be referred to the Fowler Committe. Why
did the Committee permit the coinage of rupees ? There is no
direct answer, but it may be guessed. It seems the Committee
first decided that there should be a gold standard and a gold
currency as desired by the Government of India. But then they
seemed to have been worried by the question whether in the
PDF page 612 (printed page 597)
597A RETURN TO THE GOLD STANDARD
ideal they had sketched they had made enough provision for
the maintenance of the gold value of the rupee. In the view
of the opponents of the Government of India the rupee ought
to have been made either convertible as a bank note or a
limited legal tender as a shilling. The Committee rejected both
these demands as being unnecessary. Stating their ground for
refusing to reduce the rupee to the status of a shilling, the
Committee argued*:—
“It is true that in the United Kingdom the silver
currency has a fixed limit of 40s., beyond which it cannot
be used to pay a debt …… While it cannot be denied
that 40s. limitation tends to emphasize and maintain the
subsidiary character of our silver coinage, yet the essential
factor in maintaining those tokens at their representative
nominal value is not the statutory limit on the amount
for which they are a legal tender in any one payment,
but the limitation of their total issue. Provided the latter
restriction is adequate, there is no essential reason why
there need be any limit on the amount for which tokens
are a tender by law.”
Regarding the necessity for convertibility the Committee
observed†:—
“Outside the United Kingdom there are two principal
instances of countries with a gold standard and currency,
which admit silver coins to unlimited tender. These
countries are France and the United States of Amercia.
In France the five-franc piece is an unlimited tender and
for all internal purposes is equivalent to gold. The same
remark applies in the United States to the silver dollar
…… Both in France and the United States the Mints
are now closed to the coinage of silver coins of ultimated
tender. In neither country are such coins convertible by law
into gold ; in both countries alike they are equivalent to
gold for all internal purposes. For international payments,
so far as specie is concerned, France and the United
States depend ultimately on the international medium of
exchange, which is gold. In the last resort, it is their gold
which, acting through the foreign exchanges, maintains
the whole mass of their currency at its nominal value for
internal purposes.
* Report, par. 56.
† Report, pars. 57-60.
PDF page 613 (printed page 598)
598 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
“The position of the currency question in India being
such as we have explained in the preceding paragraph,
we do not consider it necessary to recommend a different
policy in the case of that country from that which is found
sufficient in France and the United States, by imposing a
legal obligation on the Government of India to give gold
for rupees, or, in other words, to substitute the former for
the latter on the demand of the holders. This obligation
would impose on the Government of India a liability to
find gold at a moment’s notice to an amount which cannot
be defined beforehand, and the liability is one which, in
our opinion, ought not to be accepted.”
Although confident of its opinions, the Committee was
considerably impressed by those who, owing to the large
quantity of rupees in circulation, entertained doubts
“whether the mere closing of the Indian Mints to silver
would in practice be attended with such a restriction of
the rupee currency as would make the rupee permanently
exchangeable for gold at a fixed rate.”
So much was the Committee shaken by these doubts that
it admitted that*
“the forces which affect the gold value of the rupee
are complicated and obscure in their mode of operation,
and we are unable, therefore, to say positively that the
mere closing of the Mints to silver will, in practice, lead
to such a limitation of the rupee currency, relatively to
the demands for it, as will make the rupee permanently
exchangeable for gold at a fixed rate.”
As a remedy against such a contingency the Committee
thought that the Government of India should accept the obligation
of convertibility of the rupee into gold for foreign remittances
whenever the rupee fell below specie point. Having hit upon
such a simple solution the next question was how was the
Government to get its gold reserve ? Borrowing for the purposes
of such a gold reserve was one way of doing it. But that project
was somehow unpalatable to the Committee. Perhaps because
* Report, par. 58.
PDF page 614 (printed page 599)
599A RETURN TO THE GOLD STANDARD
it had admonished the Government, in another part of its
Report,* to
“husband the resources at their command, exercise a
resolute economy, and restrict the growth of their gold
obligations,”
or because it was a vicious principle to borrow
“for the establishment or the maintenance of a gold
standard,Ӡ
the Committee was averse to the proposal for gold borrowing.
But if a gold reserve was not to be built up by borrowing,
how could it be built up otherwise ? The Committee seems to
have been considerably troubled over the problem of finding
an alternative mode of raising a reserve until some member of
it, probably at a moment when his intellect was rather weak,
proposed ‘Well, why not allow the Governments to coin rupees ?
If that were allowed it could easily build up a gold reserve
without having to borrow, and can then discharge the obligation
of convertibility for foreign remittances.’ So innocuous seemed
the proposal that the Committee wholeheartedly adopted and
incorporated it into its Report with a certain sigh of relief
that is unmistakable from the firm language in which it was
expressed.
This may or may not be a correct interpretation of
the reasoning employed by the Committee in permitting
the Government to coin rupees. But the fact remains that
the Committee did not realize what was involved in that
recommendation. First of all, what was to happen to the gold
standard and currency if the coinage of rupees was to go
on ? In this regard is it possible to have more respect for a
Committee which lays down on the one hand the ideal of a
gold standard and currency, and permits on the other hand
the coinage of rupees, than Bagehot felt for the Directors of
the Bank of England, who on March 25, 1819, passed that
notorious resolution :—
“That the Court cannot refrain from adverting to an
opinion, strongly insisted upon by some, that the Bank
has only to reduce its issues to obtain a favourable turn
in the Exchanges, and a consequent influx of the precious
metals; the Court conceives it to be its duty to declare
that it is unable to discover any solid foundation for such
a sentiment.”
* Report, par. 70.
† See the Reservations to the Report by Campbell Holland and Muir Report, p. 27.
PDF page 615 (printed page 600)
600 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
If the opinions of the Directors were classical for their
nonsense, are those of the Fowler Committee less so ? Is there
any difference between them ? Bagehot, in commenting upon
the sentiments embodied in the resolution, not dissimilar to
the recommendations of the Fowler Committee, urged some
extenuating circumstances which compel us to forgive the Bank
Directors their nonsense. The Directors lived in an age when
economic reasoning was in a confused state ; nor were they
anxious for the “influx of gold,” being perfectly satisfied with
paper. None of these circumstances can excuse the nonsense
of the Fowler Committee. They framed their recommendations
at a time when the contrary of what the Bank Directors had
held was an established axiom. Besides, it cannot be said that
they were not anxious for the influx of gold into the Indian
currency. On the other hand, that was just the thing they were
looking forward to. Consequently, they should have carefully
weighed their words and allowed nothing that was inconsistent
with their main object. In not paying sufficient heed to that
elementary principle known as Gresham’s Law, the Committee
not only made a fool of itself but defeated the principal object
it had set forth in the earlier part of its Report.
Secondly, was it necessary to endow the Government with a
power to coin rupees ? What was the nature of the problem the
Committee was called upon to decide ? Let us re-state it. The
Herschell Committee,* by way of modifying the proposals of the
Government of India, submitted to it in 1892, had introduced
a proviso by which the Mints, although closed to the public,
were to remain open to the Government for the coinage of
rupees—a proviso which, by the way, reveals that after all that
imposing survey the Committee remained supremely ignorant
of the secret why, in the monetary systems it investigated,
the currency maintained its parity with gold with little or
no gold. If it had understood that it was limitation of issue
which maintained this parity it would not have introduced
the proviso which it did. However pernicious the proviso, the
Committee must be excused for that indiscretion, for it was
afraid that owing to the Mint closure there might be a sudden
contraction of currency, and as it had not made gold general
* See Chap. IV, supra, p. 471.