Vol. 8 · pages 401–405
Pakistan or the Partition of India
This text was extracted automatically from the official PDF of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, so it may contain small errors. Always check the original page before quoting.
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376 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
be difficult to find in any political literature. The concept of a
sub-nation is unheard of. It is not only an ingenious concept
but it is also a preposterous concept. What does the theory
of a sub-nation connote ? If I understand its implications
correctly, it means a sub-nation must not be severed from the
nation to which it belongs even when severance is possible : it
means that the relations between a nation and a sub-nation
are no higher than the relations which subsist between a
man and his chattels, or between property and its incidents.
Chattels go with the owner, incidents go with property, so a
sub-nation goes with a nation. Such is the chain of reasoning
in Mr. Jinnah’s argument. But does Mr. Jinnah seriously
wish to argue that the Hindus of the Punjab and Bengal
are only chattels so that they must always go wherever the
Muslims of the Punjab and the Muslims of Bengal choose
to drive them ? Such an argument will be too absurd to
be entertained by any reasonable man. It is also the most
illogical argument and certainly it should not be difficult
for so mature a lawyer as Mr. Jinnah, to see the illogicality
of it. If a numerically smaller nation is only a sub-nation
in relation to a numerically larger nation and has no right
to territorial separation, why can it not be said that taking
India as a whole the Hindus are a nation and the Muslims
a sub-nation and as a sub-nation they have no right to selfdetermination or territorial separation ?
Already there exists a certain amount of suspicion with
regard to the bana fides of Pakistan. Rightly or wrongly,
most people suspect that Pakistan is pregnant with mischief.
They think that it has two motives, one immediate, the
other ultimate. The immediate motive, it is said, is to join
with the neighbouring Muslim countries and form a Muslim
Federation. The ultimate motive is for the Muslim Federation
to invade Hindustan and conquer or rather reconquer the
Hindu and re-establish Muslim Empire in India. Others think
that Pakistan is the culmination of the scheme of hostages
which lay behind the demand, put forth by Mr. Jinnah in his
fourteen points, for the creation of separate Muslim Provinces.
Nobody can fathom the mind of the Muslims and reach the
real motives that lie behind their demand for Pakistan. The
Hindu opponents of Pakistan if they suspect that the real
motives of the Muslims are different from the apparent ones,
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may take note of them and plan accordingly. They cannot
oppose Pakistan because the motives behind it are bad. But
they are entitled to ask Mr. Jinnah, Why does he want to
have a communal problem within Pakistan ? However vicious
may be the motives behind Pakistan it should possess at
least one virtue. The ideal of Pakistan should be not to
have a communal problem inside it. This is the least of
virtues one can expect from Pakistan. If Pakistan is to be
plagued by a communal problem in the same way as India
has been, why have Pakistan at all ? It can be welcomed
only if it provides an escape from the communal problem.
The way to avoid it is to arrange the boundaries in such
a way that it will be an ethnic State without a minority
and a majority pitched against each other. Fortunately it
can be made into an ethnic State if only Mr. Jinnah will
allow it. Unfortunately Mr. Jinnah objects to it. Therein
lies the chief cause for suspicion and Mr. Jinnah, instead
of removing it, is deepening it by such absurd, illogical and
artificial distinctions as nations and sub-nations.
Rather than resort to such absurd and illogical
propositions and defend what is indefensible and oppose what
is just, would it not be better for Mr. Jinnah to do what
Sir Edward Carson did in the matter of the delimitation
of the boundaries of Ulster ? As all those who know the
vicissitudes through which the Irish Home Rule question
passed know that it was at the Craigavon meeting held on
23rd September 1911 that Sir Edward Carson formulated
his policy that in Ulster there will be a government of
Imperial Parliament or a Government of Ulster but never
a Home Rule Government. As the Imperial Parliament
was proposing to withdraw its government, this policy
meant the establishment of a provisional government for
Ulster. This policy was embodied in a resolution passed
at a joint meeting of delegates representing the Ulster
Unionist Council, the County Grand Orange Lodges and
Unionist Clubs held in Belfast on 25th September 1911.
The Provisional Government of Ulster was to come into
force on the day of the passing of the Home Rule Bill. An
important feature of this policy was to invest the Provisional
Government with a jurisdiction over all “ those districts
which they (Ulsterites) could control. ”
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378 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
The phrase “those districts which they could control” was no
doubt meant to. include the whole of the administrative division
of Ulster. Now this administrative division of Ulster included
nine counties. Of these three were overwhelmingly Catholic. This
meant the compulsory retention of the three Catholic counties
under Ulster against their wishes. But what did Sir Edward
Carson do in the end ? It did not take long for Sir Edward
Carson to discover that Ulster with three overwhelmingly
Catholic districts would be a liability, and with all the courage
of a true leader he came out with a declaration that he proposed
to cut down his losses and make Ulster safe. In his speech in
the House of Commons on the 18th of May 1920 he announced
that he was content with six counties only. The speech that he
made on that occasion giving his reasons why he was content
only with six counties is worth quoting. This is what he said* :—
“The truth is that we came to the conclusion after many
anxious hours and anxious days of going into the whole matter,
almost parish by parish and townland by townland, that we
would have no chance of successfully starting a Parliament
in Belfast which would be responsible for the government of
Donegal, Caven and Monaghan. It would be perfectly idle
for us to come here and pretend that we should be in a
position to do so. We should like to have the very largest
areas possible, naturally. That is a system of land grabbing
that prevails in all countries for widening the jurisdiction of
the various governments that are set up; but there is no use
in our undertaking a government which we know would be a
failure if we were saddled with these three counties.”
These are wise, sagacious and most courageous words.
The situation in which they were uttered has a close parallel
with the situation that is likely to be created in the Punjab
and Bengal by the application of the principle of Pakistan.
The Muslim League and Mr. Jinnah if they want a peaceful
Pakistan should not forget to take note of them. It is no use
asking the non-Muslim minorities in the Punjab and Bengal
to be satisfied with safeguards. If the Musalmans are not
prepared to be content with safeguards against the tyranny
of Hindu majority why should the Hindu minorities be asked
to be satisfied with the safeguards against the tyranny of the
Muslim majority ? If the Musalmans can say to the Hindus
“Damn your safeguards, we don’t want to be ruled by you”—an
* Hansard (House of Commons), 1920, Vol. 129, p. 1315. Italics are mine.
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PAKISTAN : THE PROBLEMS OF PAKISTAN
argument which Carson used against Redmond—the same
argument can be returned by the Hindus of the Punjab
and Bengal against the Muslim offer to be content with
safeguards.
The point is that this attitude is not calculated to lead
to a peaceful solution of the problem of Pakistan. Sabrerattling or show of force will not do. In the first place,
this is a game which two can play. In the second place,
arms may be an element of strength. But to have arms
is not enough. As Rousseau said : “The strongest is never
strong enough to be always master, unless he transforms
his might into right, and obedience into duty.” Only ethics
can convert might into right and obedience into duty. The
League must see that its claim for Pakistan is founded on
ethics.
VI
So much for the problem of boundaries. I will now turn
to the problem of the minorities which must remain within
Pakistan even after boundaries are redrawn. There are two
methods of protecting their interests.
First is to provide safeguards in the constitution for
the protection of the political and cultural rights of the
minorities. To Indians this is a familiar matter and it is
unnecessary to enlarge upon it.
Second is to provide for their transfer from Pakistan
to Hindustan. Many people prefer this solution and would
be ready and willing to consent to Pakistan if it can be
shown that an exchange of population is possible. But
they regard this as a staggering and a baffling problem.
This no doubt is the sign of a panic-stricken mind. If the
matter is considered in a cool and calm temper it will be
found that the problem is neither staggering nor baffling.
To begin with consider the dimensions of the
problem. On what scale is this transfer going to be ?
In determining the scale one is bound to take into
account three considerations. In the first place, if the
boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal are redrawn
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there will be no question of transfer of population so far
as these two Provinces are concerned. In the second place,
the Musalmans residing in Hindustan do not propose to
migrate to Pakistan nor does the League want their transfer.
In the third place, the Hindus in the North-West Frontier
Province, Sind and Baluchistan do not want to migrate. If
these assumptions are correct, the problem of transfer of
population is far from being a staggering problem. Indeed it
is so small that there is no need to regard it as a problem
at all.
Assuming it does become a problem, will it be a baffling
problem ? Experience shows that it is not a problem which
it is impossible to solve. To devise a solution for such a
problem it might be well to begin by asking what are the
possible difficulties that are likely to arise in the way of
a person migrating from one area to another on account
of political changes. The following are obvious enough :
(1) The machinery for effecting and facilitating the transfer of
population. (2) Prohibition by Government against migration.
(3) Levy by Government of heavy taxation on the transfer
of goods by the migrating family. (4) The impossibility
for a migrating family to carry with it to its new home
its immovable property. (5) The difficulty of obviating a
resort to unfair practices with a view to depress unduly
the value of the property of the migrating family. (6) The
fear of having to make good the loss by not being able to
realize the full value of the property by sale in the market.
(7) The difficulty of realizing pensionary and other charges
due to the migrating family from the country of departure.
(8) The difficulty of fixing the currency in which payment
is to be made. If these difficulties are removed the way to
the transfer of population becomes clear.
The first three difficulties can be easily removed by the
two States of Pakistan and Hindustan agreeing to a treaty
embodying an article in some such terms as follows:—
“The Governments of Pakistan and Hindustan agree
to appoint a Commission consisting of equal number of
representatives and presided over by a person who is
approved by both and who is not a national of either.