Vol. 1 · pages 381–385

366 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES IV NECESSITY OF A NEW APPROACH I shall be asked that if the Constituent Assembly is not the correct approach, what is the alternative ? I know I shall be confronted with such a question. But I am confident in my view that if the Communal Question has become difficult of solution it is not because it is insoluble, nor because we had not yet employed the machinery of Constituent Assembly. It has become insoluble because the approach to it is fundamentally wrong. The defect in the present approach is that it proceeds by methods instead of by principles. The principle is that there is no principle. There is only a series of methods. If one method fails another is tried. It is this swing from one method to another which has made the Communal Problem a jig-saw puzzle. There being no principle there is no guide to tell why a particular method has failed. There being no principle there is no assurance that the new method will succeed. The attempts at the solution of the Communal Problem are either in the nature of a coward’s plan to cow tow to the bully or of bully’s plan to dictate to the weak. Whenever a community grows powerful and demands certain political advantages, concessions are made to it to win its goodwill. There is no judicial examination of its claim ; no judgement on merits. The result is that there are no limits to demands and there are no limits to concessions. A start is made with a demand for separate electorate for a minority. It is granted. It is followed by a demand for a separate electorate for a community irrespective of the fact whether it is a minority or majority. That is granted. A demand is made for separate representation on a population basis. That is conceded. Next, a claim is made for weightage in representation. That is granted. It is followed by a demand for statutory majority over other minorities with the right for the majority to retain separate electorates. This is granted. This is followed by a demand that the majority rule of another community is intolerable, and therefore without prejudice to its rights to maintain majority rule over other minorities, the majority of the offending community should be reduced to equality. Nothing can be more absurd than this policy of eternal appeasement, it is a policy of limitless demand followed by endless appeasement. Frankly, I don’t blame the community that indulges in this strategy. It indulges in it because it has found that it pays, it pursues it because there are no principles to fix the limits and it believes that more could be legitimately asked and would be easily given. On the other hand, there is a community economically poor, socially degraded, educationally backward and which is exploited, oppressed and tyrannized without shame and without remorse, disowned by society, unowned by Government and which has no security for protection and no guarantee for justice, fair play and equal opportunity. Such a community is told that it can have no safeguards, not

COMMUNAL DEADLOCK AND A WAY TO SOLVE IT 367 because it has no case for safeguards but only because the bully on whom the bill of rights is presented thinks that because the community is not politically organized to have sanctions behind its demand he can successfully bluff. All this differential treatment is due to the fact, that there are no principles, which are accepted as authoritative and binding on those who are parties to the Communal Question. The absence of principles has another deleterious effect. It has made impossible for public opinion to play its part. The public only knows methods and notes that one method has failed another is being suggested. It does not know why one method has failed and why another is said to be likely to succeed. The result is that the public, instead of being mobilized to force obstinate and recalcitrant parties to see sense and reason, are only witnessing the discussions of Communal Questions whenever they take place is mere shows. The approach I am making for the solution of the Communal Problem is therefore based upon two considerations : (1) That in proceeding to solve the Communal Problem it is essential to define the governing principles which should be invoked for determining the final solution, and (2) That whatever the governing principles they must be applied to all parties equally without fear or favour. V PROPOSALS FOR SOLUTION OF THE COMMUNAL PROBLEM Having made my position clear on certain preliminary points, I will now proceed to deal with the subject. The Communal Problem raises three questions : (A) The question of representation in the Legislature ; (B) The question of representation in the Executive; and (C) The question of representation in the Services. A. R EPRESENTATION IN PUBLIC SERVICES To take the last question first. This can hardly be said to be a subject of controversy. The principle that all communities should be represented in the Public Services in a prescribed proportion and no single community should be allowed to have a monopoly has been accepted by the Government of India. This principle has been embodied in the Government of India Resolutions of 1934 and 1943 and rules to carry it out have been laid down. It has even prescribed that any appointment made contrary to the rules shall be deemed to be null and void. All that is necessary is to convert administrative practice into statutory obligation. This can be done by adding a Schedule to the Government of India Act, which will include the provisions contained in these Resolutions and similar provisions for the different provinces and make the Schedule a part of the Law of the Constitution.

368 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES B. REPRESENTATION IN THE EXECUTIVE This question raises three points : (i) The quantum of representation in the Executive; (ii) The nature of the Executive ; (iii) The method of filling the places in the Executive. (i) Quantum of Representation For the solution of this question, the principle which should be adopted is that the representation of the Hindus, the Muslims and the Scheduled Castes should be equal to the quantum of their representation in the Legislature. With regard to the other minorities such as the Sikhs, Indian Christians and Anglo-Indians, it is difficult to give them representation in the Executive in strict proportion to their representation in the Legislature. This difficulty arises largely from the smallness of their numbers. If they are to get representation in the Executive in exact proportion to their numbers, the Executive would have to be enlarged to a fantastic degree. All that can be done, therefore, is to reserve a seat or two for them in the Cabinet for their representation and to establish a convention that they will get a fail portion of representation in the corps of Parliamentary Secretaries that will have to be raised, when the new Constitution comes into existence. (ii) Nature of the Executive In the Constitution of the Executive, I would propose the adoption of following principles : (1) It must be recognised that in a country like India where there is a perpetual antipathy between the majority and the minorities and on which account the danger of communal discrimination by majority against minorities forms an ever-present menace to the minorities, the executive power assumes far greater importance than the legislative power. (2) In view of (1) above, the system under which a party which has secured a majority at the poll is deemed entitled to form a Government on the presumption that it has the confidence of the majority is untenable in Indian conditions. The majority in India is a communal majority and not a political majority. That being the difference, the presumption that arises in England cannot be regarded as a valid presumption in the conditions of India. (3) The Executive should cease to be a Committee of the majority party in the Legislature. It should be so constituted that it will have its mandate not only from the majority but also from the minorities in the Legislature. (4) The Executive should be non-Parliamentary in the sense that it shall not be removeable before the term of the Legislature. (5) The Executive should be Parliamentary in the sense that the members of the Executive shall be chosen from the members of the

COMMUNAL DEADLOCK AND A WAY TO SOLVE IT 369 Legislature and shall have the right to sit in the House, speak, vote and answer questions. (iii) Method of Filling Places In this connection, I would propose the adoption of the following principles : ( a) The Prime Minister as the executive head of the Government should have the confidence of the whole House. ( b) The person representating a particular minority in the Cabinet should have the confidence of the members of his community in the Legislature. ( c) A member of the Cabinet shall not be liable to be removed except on ; impeachment by the House on the ground of corruption or treason. Following those principles, my proposal is that the Prime Minister and the members of the Cabinet from the majority community should be elected by the whole House by a single transferable vote and that the representatives of the different Minorities in the Cabinet should be elected by a single transferable vote of the members of each minority community in the Legislature. C. REPRESENTATION IN THE LEGISLATURE This is the most difficult question. All other questions depend upon the solution of this question. It raises two points : (i) The quantum of representation; and (ii) The nature of the electorate. (i) Quantum of Representation I would first put forth my proposals and then explain the principles on which they are based. The proposals are worked out in the following tables, which show the scale of representation for the different communities in British India in the Central Legislature as well as in the Provincial Legislature : Proposed Ratio of Representation in the Legislatures N.B.—The percentages of population in the following Tables differ from the census figures as they have been taken after deducting the population of Aboriginal Tribes : 1. CENTRAL ASSEMBLY Community Percentage of population to total Percentage of Representation Hindus .. .. .. 54.68 40 Muslims .. .. .. 28.50 32 Scheduled Castes .. .. .. 14.30 20 Indian Christians .. .. .. 1.16 3 Sikhs .. .. .. 1.49 4 Anglo-Indians .. .. .. 0.05 1

370 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 2. BOMBAY Community Percentage of population to total Percentage of Representation Hindus .. .. .. 76.42 40 Muslims .. .. .. 9.98 28 Scheduled Castes .. .. .. 9.64 28 Indian Christians .. .. .. 1.75 2 Anglo-Indians .. .. .. 0.07 1 Parsees .. .. .. 0.44 1 3. MADRAS Community Percentage of population to total Percentage of Representation Hindus .. .. .. .. 71.20 40 Scheduled Castes .. .. .. 16.53 30 Muslims .. .. .. .. 7.98 24 Indian Christians .. .. .. 4.10 5 Anglo-Indians .. .. .. 0.06 1 4. BENGAL Community Percentage of population to total Percentage of Representation Muslims .. .. .. 56.50 40 Hindus .. .. .. 30.03 33 Scheduled Castes .. .. .. 12.63 25 Indian Christians .. .. .. 0.19 1 Anglo-Indians .. .. .. 0.05 1 5. UNITED PROVINCES Community Percentage of population to total Percentage of Representation Hindus .. .. .. 62.29 40 Scheduled Castes .. .. .. 21.40 29 Muslims .. .. .. 15.30 29 Indian Christians .. .. .. 0.24 1 Anglo-Indians .. .. .. 0.03 1