Vol. 1 · pages 386–390

COMMUNAL DEADLOCK AND A WAY TO SOLVE IT 371 6. PUNJAB Community Percentage of population to total Percentage of Representation Muslims .. .. .. 57.06 40 Hindus .. .. .. 22.17 28 Sikhs .. .. .. 13.22 21 Scheduled Castes .. .. .. 4.39 9 Indian Christians .. .. .. 1.71 2 7. C.P. & BERAR Community Percentage of population to total Percentage of Representation Hindus .. .. .. 72.20 40 Scheduled Castes .. .. .. 20.23 34 Muslims .. .. .. 5.70 25 Indian Christians .. .. .. 0.36 1 8. BIHAR Community Percentage of population to total Percentage of Representation Hindus .. .. .. 70.76 40 Muslims .. .. .. 15.05 30 Scheduled Castes .. .. .. 13.80 28 Indian Christians .. .. .. 1.71 2 9. ASSAM Community Percentage of population to total Percentage of Representation Hindus .. .. .. 45.60 40 Muslims .. .. .. 44.59 39 Scheduled Castes .. .. .. 8.76 19 Indian Christians .. .. .. 0.48 2 10. ORISSA Community Percentage of population to total Percentage of Representation Hindus .. .. .. 70.80 40 Scheduled Castes .. .. .. 17.66 36 Muslims .. .. .. 2.07 22 Indian Christians .. .. .. 0.37 2

372 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 11. SIND Community Percentage of population to total Percentage of Representation Hindus .. .. .. 23.08 40 Muslims .. .. .. 71.30 40 Scheduled Castes .. .. .. 4.26 19 Indian Christians .. .. .. 0.29 1 VI EFFECT ON MINORITIES It may be desirable to set out in a tabular form the changes in the representation of the different minorities as prescribed in the Government of India Act, 1935, and as laid down in the proposals— EFFECT ON MUSLIMS Ratio of Representation Legislature Population Ratio Under the Government of India Act, 1935 Under the proposed scheme Central .. .. 28.50 32.00 32 Madras .. .. 8.00 13.49 24 Bombay .. .. 10.00 17.40 28 U.P. .. .. 15.30 28.95 29 C.P. .. .. 5.70 12.50 25 Bihar .. .. 15.00 26.32 28 Assam .. .. 44.60 31.48 38 Orissa .. .. 2.00 6.66 22 EFFECT ON SCHEDULED CASTES Ratio of Representation Legislature Population Ratio Under the Government of India Act, 1935 Under the proposed scheme Central .. .. 14.30 7.60 20 Madras .. .. 16.50 13.90 30 Bombay .. .. 9.60 8.50 28 Bengal .. .. 12.60 12.00 25 U.P. .. .. 21.40 8.70 29 Punjab .. .. 4.40 4.50 9 C.P. .. .. 20.20 17.80 34 Bihar .. .. 13.80 9.80 28 Assam .. .. 8.70 6.50 20 Orissa .. .. 17.60 10.00 36 Sind .. .. 4.20 Nil. 19

COMMUNAL DEADLOCK AND A WAY TO SOLVE IT 373 EFFECT ON INDIAN CHRISTIANS Ratio of Representation Legislature Population Ratio Under the Government of India Act, 1935 Under the proposed scheme Central .. .. 1.16 3.00 3 Madras .. .. 4.10 4.20 5 Bombay .. .. 1.70 1.70 2 Bengal .. .. 0.19 0.80 1 U.P. .. .. 0.24 0.90 1 Punjab .. .. 1.70 1.14 2 C.P. .. .. 0.35 Nil 1 Bihar .. .. 1.70 0.66 2 Assam .. .. 0.48 0.90 2 Orissa .. .. 0.37 0.16 2 Sind .. .. 0.29 Nil 1 EFFECT ON SIKHS Ratio of Representation Legislature Population Ratio Under the Government of India Act, 1935 Under the proposed scheme Centre .. .. 1.50 2.40 4 Punjab .. .. 13.20 18.29 21 EFFECT ON HINDUS Population Ratio of Representation Legislature Ratio Under the Government of India Act, 1935 Under the proposed scheme Bengal 30.00 20.00 33 Punjab 22.10 20.00 28 Sind 23.80 31.60 40 VII PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE PROPOSALS I may now proceed to state the principles on which this distribution has been made. They are : (1) Majority Rule is untenable in theory and unjustifiable in practice. A majority community may be conceded a relative majority of representation but it can never claim an absolute majority.* *I have not framed any scheme of representation for the North-West Frontier province as the minority is so small that even the Principle of relative majority cannot help it.

374 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES (2) The relative majority of representation given to a majority community in the legislature should not be so large as to enable the majority to establish its rule with the help of the smallest minorities. (3) The distribution of seats should be so made that a combination of the majority and one of the major minorities should not give the combine such a majority as to make them impervious to the interest of the minorities. (4) The distribution should be so made that if all the minorities combine they could, without depending on the majority, form a government of their own. (5) The weightage taken from the majority should be distributed among the minorities in inverse proportion to their social standing, economic position and educational condition so that a minority which is large and which has a better social, educational and economic standing gets a lesser amount of weightage than a minority whose numbers are less and whose educational, economic and social position is inferior to that of the others. If I may say so, the representation is a balanced representation. No one community is placed in a position to dominate others by reason of its numbers. The Muslim objection to the Hindu majority and the Hindu and Sikh objections to the Muslim majority are completely eliminated, both in the Central as well as in the Provinces. VIII NATURE OF THE ELECTORATE With regard to the question of electorates the following propositions should be accepted : (1) Joint electorate or separate electorate is a matter of machinery for achieving a given purpose. It is not a matter of principle. (2) The purpose is to enable a minority to select candidates to the Legislature who will be real and not nominal representatives of the minority. (3) While separate electorate gives an absolute guarantee to the minority, that its representatives will be no others except those who enjoy its confidence, a system of joint electorates which will give equal protection to the minorities should not be overlooked. (4) A Four-member constituency, with a right to the minorities to have a double vote and requiring a minimum percentage of minority votes, may be considered as a possible substitute.

COMMUNAL DEADLOCK AND A WAY TO SOLVE IT 375 IX MATTERS NOT COVERED (i) QUESTION OF SPECIAL SAFEGUARDS There are other demands made on behalf of particular minorities such as : (1) Provision of a Statutory Officer to report on the condition of minorities. (2) Statutory provision of State aid for education, and (3) Statutory provision for land settlement. But they are not of a communal character, I do not therefore wish to enlarge upon them here. (ii) ABORIGINAL TRIBES It will be obvious that my proposals do not cover the Aboriginal Tribes although they are larger in number than the Sikhs, Anglo Indians, Indian Christians and Parsees. I may state the reasons why I have omitted them from my scheme. The Aboriginal Tribes have not as yet developed any political sense to make the best use of their political opportunities and they may easily become mere instruments in the hands either of a majority or a minority and thereby disturb the balance without doing any good to themselves. In the present stage of their development it seems to me that the proper thing to do for these backward communities is to establish a Statutory Commission to administer what are now called the ‘excluded areas’ on the same basis as was done in the case of the South African Constitution. Every Province in which these excluded areas are situated should be compelled to make an annual contribution of a prescribed amount for the administration of these areas. (iii) INDIAN STATES It will also be noticed that my proposals do not include the Indian States. I am not opposed to the inclusion of the Indian States, provided the terms and conditions of inclusion are such— (1) that the dichotomy of divided sovereignty between British India and Indian States is completely done away with, (2) that the judicial and political boundaries which separate British India from Indian States will disappear, that there will be no such entities as British India or Indian States and in their place there will be only one entity namely India, and (3) that the terms and conditions of inclusion do not prevent India from having full and plenary powers of a Dominion. I have worked out a scheme for the fusion of the Indian States and British India, which will permit the realization of these objects. I do not wish to overburden this address with the details of the plan. For the moment, it is better if British India marches to her goal without complicating its progress by an entanglement with the Indian States.