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Vol. 13 · pages 751–755

The Principal Architect of the Constitution of India

This text was extracted automatically from the official PDF of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, so it may contain small errors. Always check the original page before quoting.

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718 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES entities to sue or be sued are different from what we are providing in subclause (1), the Union of India or the corresponding State shall be inserted in the old proceedings, so that the States may be sued in accordance with 274 (1). With regard to the objection taken by my Honourable Friend, Mr. Santhanam that the words “enacted by virtue of powers conferred by this Constitution” as being superfluous, all I can say is I disagree with him and I think these are very necessary. [All the amendments of Dr. Ambedkar were accepted and Article 274 was added to the Constitution] ARTICLE 274-A *The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir, I would like this article to be held over. Mr. President : Then there is a long amendment, a new part to be added by Mr. Sidhva. Shri T. T. Krishnamachari : May I suggest that the House may take up Part XIII—the election chapter, article 289 and onwards as put in the Order Paper ? Shri R. K. Sidhva : Sir, this new article which I seek to move relates to the delimitation in local areas, urban and rural of the entire territory of India. The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : This is to be held over. * * * * * ARTICLE 289 * * * * * †The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Mr. President, Sir, I move : “That for article 289, the following article be substituted :— Superintendance, directions and control of elections to be vested in an election commission. 289. (1) The superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of the electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to Parliament and to the Legislature of every State and of elections to the offices of President and Vice-President held under this Constitution, including the appointment of election tribunals for the decision of doubts and disputes arising out of or in connection with elections to Parliament and to the Legislatures of States shall lie vested in a Commission Rreferred to in this Constitution as the Election Commission) to be appointed by the President. (2) The Election Commission shall consist of the Chief Election Commissioner and such number of other Election Commissioners, if any, as the President may, from time to time appoint, and when any other Election Commissioner is so appointed, the Chief Election Commissioner shall act as the Chairman of the Commisssion. *CAD, Vol. VIII, 15th June 1949, p. 903. †Ibid., pp. 904-07.

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719DRAFT CONSTITUTION (3) Before each general election to the House of the People and to the Legislative Assembly of each State and before the first general election and thereafter before each biennial election to the Legislative Council of each State having such Council, the President shall also appoint after consultation with the Election Commission such Regional Commissioners as he may consider necessary to assist the Election Commission in the performance of the functions conferred on it by clause (1) of this article. (4) The conditions of service and tenure of office of the Election Commisssioners and the Regional Commissioners shall be such as the President may by rule determine : Provided that the Chief Election Commissioner shall not be removed from office except in like manner and on the like grounds as a judge of the Supreme Court and the conditions of the service of the Chief Election Commissioner shall not be varied to his disadvantage after his appointment: Provided further that any other Election Commissioner or a Regional Commissioner shall not be removed from office except on the recommendation of the Chief Election Commissioner. (5) The President or the Governor or Ruler of a State shall, when so requested by the Election Commission, make available to the Election Commission or to a Regional Commissioner such staff as may be necessary for the discharge of the functions conferred on the Election Commission by clause (1) of this article.” Mr. President : I have notice of a number of amendments, some in substitution of the articles 289,290 and 291 and some amendments to the amendments which are going to be moved. I think I had better take the amendments which are in the nature of substitution of these articles. Dr. Ambedkar has moved one. There is another amendment in the name of Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava. Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru (United Provinces : General) : May I ask, Sir, whether Dr. Ambedkar is not going to say anything in support of the proposition that he has moved ? It concerns a very important matter. Is it not desirable that Dr. Ambedkar who has put forward an amendment to article 289 should say something in support of his amendment. I think he would be proceeding on sound lines if he took the trouble of explaining to the House the reasons for asking it to replace the old article 289 by a new article. The matter is of the greatest importance and it is a great pity that Dr. Ambedkar has not considered it worth his while to make a few remarks on this proposition. The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Mr. President, Sir, I did not make any observation in support of the motion for two reasons. One reason was that if a debate took place on this article,—it is quite likely that a debate would undoubtedly take place—there would be certain points that will be raised in the debate, which it would be profitable for me to reply to at the close so as to avoid a duplication of any speech on my part. That is one reason.

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720 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES The second reason was that I thought that everybody must have read my amendment; it is so simple that they must have understood what it meant. Evidently, my Honourable Friend Pandit Kunzru in a hurry has not read my new Draft. Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru : I have read every line of it; I only want that the Honourable Member should treat the House with some respect. The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : The House will remember that in a very early stage in the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly, a Committee was appointed to deal with what are called Fundamental Rights. That Committee made a report that it should be recognised that the independence of the elections and the avoidance of any interference by the executive in the elections to the Legislature should be regarded as a fundamental right and provided for in the chapter dealing with Fundamental Rights. When the matter came up before the House, it was the wish of the House that while there was no objection to regard this matter as of fundamental importance, it should be provided for in some other part of the Constitution and not in the Chapter dealing with Fundamental rights. But the House affirmed without any kind of dissent that in the interests of purity and freedom of elections to the legislative bodies, it was of the utmost importance that they should be freed from any kind of interference from the executive of the day in pursuance of the decision of the House, the Drafting Committee removed this question from the category of Fundamental rights and put it in a separate part containing articles 289,290 and so on. Therefore, so far as the fundamental question is concerned that the election machinery should be outside the control of the executive government, there has been no dispute. What article 289 does is to carry out that part of the decision of the Constituent Assembly. It transfers the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of the electoral rolls and of all elections to Parliament and the Legislatures of States to a body outside the executive to be called the Election Commission. That is the provision contained in sub-clause (1). Sub-clause (2) says that there shall be a Chief Election Commissioner and such other Election Commissioners as the President may, from time to time appoint. There were two alternatives before the Drafting Committee, namely, either to have a permanent body consisting of four or live members of the Election Commission who would continue in office throughout without any break, or to permit the President to have an ad hoc

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721DRAFT CONSTITUTION body appointed at the time when there is an election on the anvil. The Committee, has steered a middle course. What the drafting committee proposes by sub-clause (2) is to have permanently in office one man called the Chief Election Commissioner so that the skeleton machinery would always be available. Elections no doubt will generally take place at the end of five years; but there is this question namely that a bye-election may take place at any time. The Assembly may be dissolved before its period of five years has expired. Consequently, the electoral rolls will have to be kept up to date all the time so that the new election may take place without any difficulty. It was therefore felt that having regard to these exigencies, it would be sufficient if there was permanently in session one officer to be called the Chief Election Commissioner, while when the elections are coming up, the President may further add to the machinery by appointing other members to the Election Commission. Now, Sir, the original proposal under article 289 was that there should be one Commission to deal with the elections to the Central Legislature, both the Upper and the Lower House, and that there should be a separate Election Commission for each province and each State, to be appointed by the Governor or the Ruler of the State. Comparing that with the present article 289, there is undoubtedly, a radical change. This article proposes to centralise the election machinery in the hands of a single Commission to be assisted by regional Commissioners, not working under the provincial Government, but working under the superintendence and control of the Central Election Commission. As I said, this is undoubtedly a radical change. But, this change has become necessary because today we find that in some of the provinces of India, the population is a mixture. There are what may be called original inhabitants, so to say, the native people of a particular province. Along with them there are other people residing there, who are either racially, linguistically or culturally different from the dominant people who are the occupants of that particular Province. It has been brought to the notice both of the Drafting Committee as well as of the central Government that in these provinces the executive Government is instructing or managing things in such a manner that those people who do not belong to them either racially, culturally or linguistically, are being excluded from being brought on the electoral rolls. The House will realise that franchise is a most fundamental thing in a democracy. No person who is entitled to be brought into the electoral rolls on the grounds

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722 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES which we have already mentioned in our Constitution, namely, an adult of 21 years of age, should be excluded merely as a result of the prejudice of a local Government, or the whim of an officer. That would cut at the very root of democratic Government. In order, therefore, to prevent injustice being done by provincial Governments to people other than those who belong to the province racially, linguistically and culturally, it is felt desirable to depart from the original proposal of having a separate Election Commission for each province under the guidance of the Governor and the local Government. Therefore, this new change has been brought about, namely, that the whole of the election machinery should be in the hands of a central Election Commission which alone would be entitled to issue directives to returning officers, polling officers and others engaged in the preparation and revision of electoral rolls so that no injustice may be done to any citizen in India, who under this Constitution is entitled to be brought on the electoral rolls. That alone is, if I may say so, a radical and fundamental departure from the existing provisions of the Draft Constitution. So far as clause (4) is concerned, we have left the matter to the President to determine the conditions of service and the tenure of office of the members of the Election Commission, subject to one or two conditions, that the Chief Election Commissioner shall not be liable to be removed except in the same manner as a Judge of the Supreme Court. If the object of this House is that all matters relating to elections should be outside the control of the Executive Government of the day, it is absolutely necessary that the new machinery which we are setting up, namely, the Election Commission should be irremovable by the executive by a mere fiat We have therefore given the Chief Election Commissioner the same status so far as removability is concerned as we have given to the Judges of the Supreme Court. We, of course, do not propose to give the same status to the Other members of the Commission. We have left the matter to the President as to the circumstances under which he would deem fit to remove any other member of the Election commission, subject to one condition that the Chief Election Commissioner must recommend that the removal is just and proper. Then the question was whether the Electoral Commission should have authority to have an independent staff of its own to carry on the work which has been entrusted to it. It was felt that to allow the Election