Vol. 13 · pages 751–755
The Principal Architect of the Constitution of India
This text was extracted automatically from the official PDF of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, so it may contain small errors. Always check the original page before quoting.
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718 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
entities to sue or be sued are different from what we are providing in subclause (1), the Union of India or the corresponding State shall be inserted
in the old proceedings, so that the States may be sued in accordance with
274 (1). With regard to the objection taken by my Honourable Friend, Mr.
Santhanam that the words “enacted by virtue of powers conferred by this
Constitution” as being superfluous, all I can say is I disagree with him and
I think these are very necessary.
[All the amendments of Dr. Ambedkar were accepted and Article 274 was
added to the Constitution]
ARTICLE 274-A
*The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir, I would like this article
to be held over.
Mr. President : Then there is a long amendment, a new part to be added
by Mr. Sidhva.
Shri T. T. Krishnamachari : May I suggest that the House may take
up Part XIII—the election chapter, article 289 and onwards as put in the
Order Paper ?
Shri R. K. Sidhva : Sir, this new article which I seek to move relates to
the delimitation in local areas, urban and rural of the entire territory of India.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : This is to be held over.
* * * * *
ARTICLE 289
* * * * *
†The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Mr. President, Sir, I move :
“That for article 289, the following article be substituted :—
Superintendance,
directions and control of
elections to be vested in
an election commission.
289. (1) The superintendence, direction and control of
the preparation of the electoral rolls for, and the conduct
of, all elections to Parliament and to the Legislature of
every State and of elections to the offices of President and
Vice-President held under this Constitution, including the
appointment of election tribunals for the decision of doubts
and disputes arising out of or in connection with elections
to Parliament and to the Legislatures of States shall lie
vested in a Commission Rreferred to in this Constitution as
the Election Commission) to be appointed by the President.
(2) The Election Commission shall consist of the Chief Election Commissioner and
such number of other Election Commissioners, if any, as the President may, from
time to time appoint, and when any other Election Commissioner is so appointed,
the Chief Election Commissioner shall act as the Chairman of the Commisssion.
*CAD, Vol. VIII, 15th June 1949, p. 903.
†Ibid., pp. 904-07.
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719DRAFT CONSTITUTION
(3) Before each general election to the House of the People and to the
Legislative Assembly of each State and before the first general election
and thereafter before each biennial election to the Legislative Council of
each State having such Council, the President shall also appoint after
consultation with the Election Commission such Regional Commissioners
as he may consider necessary to assist the Election Commission in the
performance of the functions conferred on it by clause (1) of this article.
(4) The conditions of service and tenure of office of the Election
Commisssioners and the Regional Commissioners shall be such as the
President may by rule determine :
Provided that the Chief Election Commissioner shall not be removed from office
except in like manner and on the like grounds as a judge of the Supreme Court and
the conditions of the service of the Chief Election Commissioner shall not be varied
to his disadvantage after his appointment:
Provided further that any other Election Commissioner or a Regional Commissioner
shall not be removed from office except on the recommendation of the Chief Election
Commissioner.
(5) The President or the Governor or Ruler of a State shall, when so
requested by the Election Commission, make available to the Election
Commission or to a Regional Commissioner such staff as may be necessary
for the discharge of the functions conferred on the Election Commission
by clause (1) of this article.”
Mr. President : I have notice of a number of amendments, some in
substitution of the articles 289,290 and 291 and some amendments to
the amendments which are going to be moved. I think I had better take
the amendments which are in the nature of substitution of these articles.
Dr. Ambedkar has moved one. There is another amendment in the name
of Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava.
Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru (United Provinces : General) : May I ask,
Sir, whether Dr. Ambedkar is not going to say anything in support of the
proposition that he has moved ? It concerns a very important matter. Is
it not desirable that Dr. Ambedkar who has put forward an amendment
to article 289 should say something in support of his amendment. I think
he would be proceeding on sound lines if he took the trouble of explaining
to the House the reasons for asking it to replace the old article 289 by
a new article. The matter is of the greatest importance and it is a great
pity that Dr. Ambedkar has not considered it worth his while to make
a few remarks on this proposition.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Mr. President, Sir, I did
not make any observation in support of the motion for two reasons. One
reason was that if a debate took place on this article,—it is quite likely
that a debate would undoubtedly take place—there would be certain
points that will be raised in the debate, which it would be profitable for
me to reply to at the close so as to avoid a duplication of any speech on
my part. That is one reason.
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720 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
The second reason was that I thought that everybody must have
read my amendment; it is so simple that they must have understood
what it meant. Evidently, my Honourable Friend Pandit Kunzru in
a hurry has not read my new Draft.
Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru : I have read every line of it; I
only want that the Honourable Member should treat the House with
some respect.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : The House will remember
that in a very early stage in the proceedings of the Constituent
Assembly, a Committee was appointed to deal with what are called
Fundamental Rights. That Committee made a report that it should be
recognised that the independence of the elections and the avoidance
of any interference by the executive in the elections to the Legislature
should be regarded as a fundamental right and provided for in the
chapter dealing with Fundamental Rights. When the matter came
up before the House, it was the wish of the House that while there
was no objection to regard this matter as of fundamental importance,
it should be provided for in some other part of the Constitution and
not in the Chapter dealing with Fundamental rights. But the House
affirmed without any kind of dissent that in the interests of purity
and freedom of elections to the legislative bodies, it was of the utmost
importance that they should be freed from any kind of interference
from the executive of the day in pursuance of the decision of the House,
the Drafting Committee removed this question from the category of
Fundamental rights and put it in a separate part containing articles
289,290 and so on. Therefore, so far as the fundamental question is
concerned that the election machinery should be outside the control
of the executive government, there has been no dispute. What article
289 does is to carry out that part of the decision of the Constituent
Assembly. It transfers the superintendence, direction and control of
the preparation of the electoral rolls and of all elections to Parliament
and the Legislatures of States to a body outside the executive to be
called the Election Commission. That is the provision contained in
sub-clause (1).
Sub-clause (2) says that there shall be a Chief Election
Commissioner and such other Election Commissioners as the
President may, from time to time appoint. There were two
alternatives before the Drafting Committee, namely, either to
have a permanent body consisting of four or live members of the
Election Commission who would continue in office throughout
without any break, or to permit the President to have an ad hoc
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721DRAFT CONSTITUTION
body appointed at the time when there is an election on the anvil.
The Committee, has steered a middle course. What the drafting
committee proposes by sub-clause (2) is to have permanently in
office one man called the Chief Election Commissioner so that the
skeleton machinery would always be available. Elections no doubt
will generally take place at the end of five years; but there is this
question namely that a bye-election may take place at any time. The
Assembly may be dissolved before its period of five years has expired.
Consequently, the electoral rolls will have to be kept up to date all the
time so that the new election may take place without any difficulty.
It was therefore felt that having regard to these exigencies, it would
be sufficient if there was permanently in session one officer to be
called the Chief Election Commissioner, while when the elections
are coming up, the President may further add to the machinery by
appointing other members to the Election Commission.
Now, Sir, the original proposal under article 289 was that there
should be one Commission to deal with the elections to the Central
Legislature, both the Upper and the Lower House, and that there
should be a separate Election Commission for each province and each
State, to be appointed by the Governor or the Ruler of the State.
Comparing that with the present article 289, there is undoubtedly,
a radical change. This article proposes to centralise the election
machinery in the hands of a single Commission to be assisted by
regional Commissioners, not working under the provincial Government,
but working under the superintendence and control of the Central
Election Commission. As I said, this is undoubtedly a radical change.
But, this change has become necessary because today we find that in
some of the provinces of India, the population is a mixture. There are
what may be called original inhabitants, so to say, the native people
of a particular province. Along with them there are other people
residing there, who are either racially, linguistically or culturally
different from the dominant people who are the occupants of that
particular Province. It has been brought to the notice both of the
Drafting Committee as well as of the central Government that in
these provinces the executive Government is instructing or managing
things in such a manner that those people who do not belong to
them either racially, culturally or linguistically, are being excluded
from being brought on the electoral rolls. The House will realise that
franchise is a most fundamental thing in a democracy. No person
who is entitled to be brought into the electoral rolls on the grounds
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722 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
which we have already mentioned in our Constitution, namely, an
adult of 21 years of age, should be excluded merely as a result of the
prejudice of a local Government, or the whim of an officer. That would
cut at the very root of democratic Government. In order, therefore,
to prevent injustice being done by provincial Governments to people
other than those who belong to the province racially, linguistically
and culturally, it is felt desirable to depart from the original proposal
of having a separate Election Commission for each province under
the guidance of the Governor and the local Government. Therefore,
this new change has been brought about, namely, that the whole of
the election machinery should be in the hands of a central Election
Commission which alone would be entitled to issue directives
to returning officers, polling officers and others engaged in the
preparation and revision of electoral rolls so that no injustice may be
done to any citizen in India, who under this Constitution is entitled
to be brought on the electoral rolls. That alone is, if I may say so,
a radical and fundamental departure from the existing provisions of
the Draft Constitution.
So far as clause (4) is concerned, we have left the matter to the
President to determine the conditions of service and the tenure of
office of the members of the Election Commission, subject to one
or two conditions, that the Chief Election Commissioner shall not
be liable to be removed except in the same manner as a Judge of
the Supreme Court. If the object of this House is that all matters
relating to elections should be outside the control of the Executive
Government of the day, it is absolutely necessary that the new
machinery which we are setting up, namely, the Election Commission
should be irremovable by the executive by a mere fiat We have
therefore given the Chief Election Commissioner the same status so
far as removability is concerned as we have given to the Judges of
the Supreme Court. We, of course, do not propose to give the same
status to the Other members of the Commission. We have left the
matter to the President as to the circumstances under which he would
deem fit to remove any other member of the Election commission,
subject to one condition that the Chief Election Commissioner must
recommend that the removal is just and proper.
Then the question was whether the Electoral Commission should have
authority to have an independent staff of its own to carry on the work
which has been entrusted to it. It was felt that to allow the Election