Vol. 13 · pages 756–760

723DRAFT CONSTITUTION Commission to have an independent machinery to carry on all the work of the preparation of the electoral roll, the revision of the roll, the conduct of the elections and so on would be really duplicating the machinery and creating unnecessary administrative expense which could be easily avoided for the simple reason, as I have stated, that the work of the Electoral Commission may be at times heavy and at other times it may have no work. Therefore we have provided in clause (5) that it should be open for the Commission to borrow from the provincial Governments such clerical and ministerial agency as may be necessary for the purposes of carrying out the functions with which the Commission has been entrusted. When the work is over, that ministerial staff will return to the provincial Government. During the time that it is working under the Electoral Commission, no doubt administratively, it would be responsible to the Commission and not to the Executive Government. These are the provisions of this article and I hope the House will now realise what it means and in what respects it constitutes a departure from the original articles of the draft Constitution. * * * * * *The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar (Bombay : General): Mr. President, Sir, this amendment of mine has been subjected to criticism from various points of view. But in my reply I do not propose to spread myself over all the points that have been raised in the course of the debate. I propose to confine myself to the points raised by my Friend Professor Shibban Lal Saksena and emphasized by my Friend Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru. According to the amendment moved by my Friend Professor Saksena, there are really two points which require our consideration. The one point is with regard to the appointment of the Commissioner to this Election Commission and the second relates to the removal of the Election Commissioner. So far as the question of removal is concerned, I personally do not think that any change is necessary in the amendment which I have proposed, as the House will see that so far as the removal of the members of the Election Commission is concerned the Chief Commissioner is placed on the same footing as the Judges of the Supreme Court. And I do not know that there exists any measure of greater security in any other Constitution which is better than the one we have provided for in the proviso to clause (4). *CAD, Vol. VIII, 16th June 1949, pp. 928-30.

724 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES With regard to the other Commissioners the provision is that, while the power is left with the President to remove them, that power is subjected to a very important limitation, viz., that in the matter of removal of the other Commissioners, the President can only act on the recommendation of the Chief Election Commissioner. My contention therefore is, so far as the question of removal is concerned, the provisions which are incorporated in my amendment are adequate and nothing more is necessary for that purpose. Now with regard to the question of appointment I must confess that there is a great deal of force in what my friend Professor Saksena said that there is no use making the tenure of the Election Commissioner a fixed and secure tenure if there is no provision in the Constitution to prevent either a fool or a knave or a person who is likely to be under the thumb of the Executive. My provision—I must admit—does not contain anything to provide against nomination of an unfit person to the post of the Chief Election Commissioner or the other Election Commissioners. I do want to confess that this is a very important question and it has given me a great deal of headache and I have no doubt about it that it is going to give this House a great deal of headache. In the U.S.A. they have solved this question by the provision contained in article 2 Section (2) of their Constitution whereby certain appointments which are specified in Section (2) of article 2 cannot be made by the President without the concurrence of the Senate; so that so far as the power of appointment is concerned, although it is vested in the President it is subject to a check by the Senate so that the Senate may, at the time when any particular name is proposed, make enquiries and satisfy itself that the person proposed is a proper person. But it must also he realised that that is a very dilatory process, a very difficult process. Parliament may not be meeting at the time when the appointment is made and the appointment must be made at once without waiting. Secondly, the American practice is likely and in fact does introduce political considerations in the making of appointments. Consequently, while I think that the provisions contained in the American Constitution is a very salutary check upon the extravagance of the President in making his appointments, it is likely to create administrative difficulties and I am therfore hesitating whether I should at a later stage recommend the adoption of the American provisions in our Constitution. The Drafting Committee had paid considerable attention to this

725DRAFT CONSTITUTION question because as I said it is going to be one of our greatest headaches and as a via media it was thought that if this Assembly would give or enact what is called an Instrument of Instructions to the President and provide therein some machinery which it would be obligatory on the President to consult before making any appointment, I think the difficulties which are felt as resulting from the American Constitution may be obviated and the advantage which is contained therein may be secured. At this stage it is impossible for me to see or anticipate what attitude this House will take when the particular draft Instructions come before the House. If the House rejects the proposal of the Drafting Committee that there should be an Instrument of Instructions to the President which might include, among other things, a provision with regard to the making of appointments, this problem would then be solved by that method. But, as I said, it is quite difficult for me to anticipate what may happpen. Therefore in order to meet the criticism of my Honourable Friend Prof. Saksena, supported by the criticism of my Honourable Friend Pandit Kunzru, I am prepared to make certain amendments in amendment No. 99. I am sorry I did not have time to circulate these amendments, but when I read them the House will know what I am proposing. My first amendment is : “That the words ‘to be appointed by the President’ at the end of clause (1) be deleted.” “In clause (2) in line 4, for the word ‘appoint’ substitute the word ‘fix’ after which insert the following :— “The appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners shall, subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, be made by the President.” “The rest of the clause from the words ‘when any other Election Commissioner is so appointed’ etc., should be numbered clause (2a). Shri M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar (Madras : General): Sir, on a point of order, new matter is being introduced which ought not to be allowed at this stage. Otherwise there will have to be another debate. The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : I hope the Chair will allow other members to offer there views. Mr. President : In that case I think the best course would be to postpone consideration of this article. The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : These amendments are quite inoffensive; they merely say that anything done should be subject to laws made by Parliament.

726 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES Shri T. T. Krishnamachari (Madras : General): I suggest that these amendments may be cyclostyled and circulated, and they may be taken up later on. The Honourable Shri K. Santhanam (Madras : General) : I suggest that these may be considered by the Drafting Committee. Even if they are merely technical we must have an opportunity of considering them. The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : These amendments have been brought after consultation with the Drafting Committee. * * * * * *Mr. President: Let the amendments be moved. The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : My next amendment is : “That in the beginning of clause (4) the following words should be inserted :— ‘subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament’.” The Honourable Shri K. Santhanam : Sir, this is a material amendment because the President’s discretion may be fettered by parliamentary law. Mr. President : I do not think any further discussion is necessary; let these be moved. The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : You cannot deal with a Constitution on technical points. Too many technicalities will destroy constitution-making. Shri H. V. Kamath : Sir, you ruled some days ago that substantial amendments would be postponed. Mr. President : If these are considered to be substantial amendments they will be held over. As there sems to be a large body of opinion in the House in favour of postponement, the discussion will be held over. NEW ARTICLE 289-A †The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir, I move : “That with reference to amendment No. 110 of List I (Fifth Week), for the proposed new article 289-A, the following article be substituted : — No person to be inelligible for inclusion in, or to claim to be excluded from the electoral roll on grounds of religion, race, caste or sec. 289-A. There shall be one general electoral roll for every territorial constituency for election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State and no person shall be ineligible for inclusion in, or claim to be excluded from, any such roll on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or any of them.” *CAD, Vol. VIII, 16th June 1949, p. 930. †Ibid., pp. 930-31.

727DRAFT CONSTITUTION Sir, the object of this is merely to give effect to the decision of the House that there shall hereafter be no separate electorates at all. As a matter of fact this clause is unnecessary because by later amendments we shall be deleting the provisions contained in the Draft Constitution which make provision for representations of Muslims, Sikhs, Anglo-Indians and so on. Consequently this is unnecessary. But it is the feeling that since we have taken a very important decision which practically nullifies the past it is better that the Constitution should in express terms State and that is the reason why I have brought forward this amendament. Mr. President : Do I take it that only for the purpose of discussion you have brought it up and that you do not want it to be passed ? The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : No, Sir, not like mat. I have moved the amendment. I was only giving the reasons why I have brought it up. I shall move the other amendment also for inserting new article 289B, I move : “That for amendment No. 3087 of the List of Amendments, the following be substituted :— “That after article 289-A, the following new article be inserted :— Elections to the House of the People and to the Legislative Assemblies of states to be on the basis of adult suffrage. 289-B. The elections to the House of the People and to the Legislative assembly of every State shall be on the basis of adult suffrage, that is to say, every citizen, who is not less than twenty-one years of age on such date as may be fixed in this behalf by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature and is not otherwise disqualified under this Constitution or any law made by the appropriate Legislature on the ground of non-residence, unsoundness of mind, crime or corrupt or illegal practice, shall be entitled to be registered as a voter at any such election.’” [Amendment was adopted. Article 289-B was added to the Constitution.] * * * * * ARTICLE 290 *The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir, I move : “That for article 290, the following article be substituted :— Power of Parliament to make provisions with respect to elections to Legislatures. 290. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may from time to time by law make Provisions with respect to ail matters relating to, or in connection with, elections to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State including matters necessary for securing the due constitution of such House or Houses and the delimitation of constituencies.” *CAD, Vol. VIII, 16th June 1949, p. 932.