Vol. 15 · pages 351–355

334 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES which are nothing else but a collection of certain castes, those who are excluded are persons who belong to certain castes. Therefore, in the circumstances of this country, it is impossible to avoid reservation without excluding some people who have got a caste. On these points I do not think personally that the judgment is a very satisfactory judgment. In this connection I would like to state, notwithstanding what the House and some Members are saying, that I have often in the course of my practice told the presiding judge in very emphatic terms that I am bound to obey his judgment but I am not bound to respect it. That is the liberty which every lawyer enjoys in telling the judge that his judgment is wrong and I am not prepared to give up that liberty. I have always told the judges before whom I practised that that is my view of the matter. Now the point has to be borne in mind that in article 46 of the Directive Principles an obligation has been laid upon the Government to do everything possible in order to promote the welfare and the interest of what are called the weaker sections of the public by which I understand to mean the backward classes or such other classes who are for the moment not able to stand on their legs—the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes. It is therefore incumbent not merely on the Government but upon this Parliament to do everything in its hands to see that article 46 is fulfilled and if that fulfilment is to come, I cannot see how one can escape an amendment so as to prevent article 29, clause (2), and article 16, clause (4) being interpreted in the way in which it has been interpreted and being made to block the advancement of the people who are spoken of as the weaker class. That is the necessity for amending article 15. I now come to the provisions of article 19, an article which gave rise to great excitement among the Members of the House. I first propose to take clause (3) (1) (a) of the Bill which amends the original clause (2) of article 19. As Members will see this sub-clause proposes to add three heads: 1. Relations with foreign States, 2. Public Order, 3. Incitement to offence.

335PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES A question was asked as to what was the necessity for introducing three new heads. The necessity has arisen out of certain judgments which have been delivered by the Supreme Court as well as by the Provincial High Courts. I would like to refer in this connection to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Ramesh Thapar’s case and in Brij Bhushan’s case. These are the two judgments of the Supreme Court. Then I come to the judgments of the State High Courts. The following judgments of the Punjab High Court may be taken into consideration: 1. Master Tara Singh’s case. 2. Amarnath Bali versus the State of Punjab. There are two judgments of the Patna and Madras High Courts : 1. Shilabala Devi versus the Chief Secretary of Bihar. 2. Bynes versus the State of Madras. In Ramesh Thapper’s case what was involved was the validity of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order, 1949. Brij Bhushan’s case involved the validity of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949. Master Tara Singh’s case involved the validity of sections 124A and 153 A of the Indian Penal Code. Amarnath Bali’s case involved the validity of section 4 of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act of 1931. Shilabala Devi’s case also involved the validity of section 4 of the Press Act and the same was involved in the case of Bynes versus Madras State. All these cases have resulted in the decision that they are void laws, that is to say, in view of the provisions contained in clause (2) of article 19, the courts have held that all these Acts, however valid they might have been before the Constitution came into existence, are bad laws now, because they are inconsistent with the Fundamental Rights. What I want to ask the House to consider is, what is the effect of these decisions of the Supreme Court and the various High Courts in the States ? In order to give the House a very clear idea I can read many of the sections of the Acts which have been declared to be null and void but in view of the

336 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES shortness of time I would content myself by reference to the Press Act, section 4, which has been called in question. This is what section 4 of the Press Act says: “Whenever it appears to the Provincial Government that any Printing Press, in respect of which any security has been ordered to be deposited under section 3 is used for the purpose of printing or publishing any newspaper, book or other document containing any words, signs or visible representations which”— I want the House to mark these clauses carefully— “(a) incite to or encourage, or tend to incite to or to encourage, the commission of any offence of murder or any cognisable offence involving violence, or ( b) directly or indirectly express approval or admiration of any such offence or of any person, real or fictitious, who has committed or is alleged or represented to have committed any such offence. or which tend directly or indirectly. ( c) to seduce any officer, soldier, etc……….. The important point to which I wish to draw the attention of the House is (a) “incite to or encourage, or tend to incite to or encourage, the commission of any offence of murder or any cognisable offence involving violence.” It means that under the decisions of the Provincial High Courts to which I had referred it is now open to anybody to incite, encourage, tend to incite or encourage the commission of any offence of murder or any cognisable offence involving violence. The one question that I would like the House to consider. is this. Is it a satisfactory position that any person should now be free to incite or encourage the commission of offences of murder or any cognisable offence involving violence ? I want the House to consider the matter dispassionately. Is it a desirable state of affairs ( Several Hon. Members : No. no.) that our Constitution should leave us in this desperate position that we could not control the right of free speech which has been granted by clause (1) of article 19 and it should be so unlimited that any person should be free to preach murder or the commission of any cognisable offence. I have tried to put the matter in a nutshell. That is the position. The same thing has now occurred with regard to the public safety laws or the laws made by the various States for the

337PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES maintenance of public order, because they also have been held by the Supreme Court to be not open to any limitation by virtue of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has made a distinction between the security of the State and the maintenance of public order. They say that it may be open for Parliament to make a law for the security of the State but it is not open to parliament to make a law for the maintenance of public order. There again I wish the House to consider the matter seriously. Is the House prepared to allow the right of freedom of speech and expression to be so untrammelled, to be so unfettered, that any man can say anything and go scot-free, although such speech creates public disorder ? If the judgments of the Supreme Court and the High Courts stand as they are, then the only consequence that follows is that we shall never be able to make a law, which would restrict the freedom of speech in the interests of public order and that we shall never be able to make a law which would put a restraint upon incitement to violence. I want my friend Dr. Mookerjee who—as coming events cast their shadow—played the part of a leader of the Opposition, whose business undoubtedly, from a party point of view is to oppose every thing to consider whether the void created in our legislation by the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Provincial High Courts should be allowed to remain in the name of freedom of speech. That is the simple question. I am sure in my mind that if my friend Dr. Mookerjee were to study the different decisions of the Supreme court and the Provincial High courts in the light of the observations I have made he will beyond question come to the conclusion that this is a situation which must be remedied and cannot be allowed to go on. Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava (Punjab): He wants detention laws to be used for the purpose. Dr. Ambedkar: Detention laws are something quite different. That is in a nutshell ( Shri Kamath: What a poor nutt!) the case for amending article 19 of the Constitution.

338 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES It is next important to consider why the Supreme Court and the various State High Courts have come to this conclusion. Why is it that they say that Parliament has no right to make a law in the interests of public order or in the interests of preventing incitement to offences ? That is a very very important question and it is a question about which I am personally considerably disturbed. For this purpose I must refer briefly to the rules of construction which have been adopted by the Supreme Court as well as by the various State High Courts, but before I go to that I would like to refer very briefly to the rules of construction which have been adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States—and I think it is very relevant because the House will remember that if there is any Constitution in the world of a country of any importance which contains Fundamental Rights it is the Constitution of the United States, and those of us who were entrusted with the task of framing our own Constitution had incessantly to refer to the Constitution of the United States in framing our own Fundamental Rights. There are many Members I know, who are familiar with the Constitution of the United States. How does the Constitution of the United States read ? I think hon. Members will realise that apparently there is one difference between the Constitution of India and the Constitution of the United States so far as the Fundamental Rights are concerned. The Fundamental Rights in the Constitution of the United States are stated in an absolute form; the Constitution does not lay down any limitation on the Fundamental Rights set out in the Constitution. Our Constitution, on the other hand, not only lays down the Fundamental Rights but it also enumerates the limitations on the Fundamental Rights, and yet what is the result ? It is an important question to consider. The result is this, that the Fundamental Rights in the United States, although in the text of the Constitution they appear as absolute, so far as judicial interpretations are concerned they are riddled with limitations of one sort or another. Nobody can in the United States claim that his Fundamental Rights are absolute and that the Congress has no power to limit them or to regulate them. In our country I find that 10-00 A.M.