Vol. 17, Part II · pages 111–115

88 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES Christianity with a rationalistic outlook - all under the inspiring banner of his unflagging faith in the teachings of the Great Buddha. In recent times many people from different parts of India have been asking me to recommend a good book on Buddhism. In responding to their wishes, I felt no hesitation in suggesting Prof. Narasu’s book. For, I think that it is the best book on Buddhism that has appeared so far. Unfortunately, the book has been out of print for a long time. I, therefore, decided to reprint it so that the desire of those who have an interest in the teachings of Buddhism may have in their hand a text which is complete in its treatment and lucid in its exposition. I must thank the representatives of the old firm of Varadachari and Co., Madras, who held the copy right of the original publication for permission to reprint the book. In writing this foreword to this reprint, it was my intention to deal with some of the Criticisms which have been levelled against the teachings of Buddha by his adversaries—past and present. I have given up that intention for two reasons. In the first place, my health will not permit me to engage myself in this task. Secondly, I am myself working on a Life of Buddha and I think that I could deal with this matter better in my own work wherein I could do more justice to it than in a foreword to another man’s work. I have taken this decision more especially bacause I am sure that the reader of Prof. Narasu’s book will not suffer in any way as a result of my decision. B. R. Ambedkar. 1 “RAJ GRAHA,” HINDU COLONY, DADAR, BOMBAY 14. 10 th March 1948. zz (First edition 1907, Second edition 1912) 1 : Third edition 1948 by Thacker and Co. Ltd, Rampart Row, Bombay.

15 INDIA’S ANCIENT PAST GAVE PLACE TO PESSIMISM ‘ RASHTRA RAKSHA KE VAIDIK SADHAN ’ BY SWAMI VEDANANDA TEERTHA PREFACE I am asked to write a Preface to the booklet by Swami Vedananda Teertha. Owing to pressure of work I had declined to accede to the request of the author. But as he has been insisting on my writing a few words, I have agreed to do so. The author’s plea is that free India should adopt as its religion the gospel preached by the Vedas which is scattered all over the Vedas and which he has collected together in one place in this booklet. I do not know that the book will become the gospel of new India. But I can say that the book is not merely a wonderful collection of statements drawn from the Religious Books of the ancient Aryans but it brings out in a striking manner the vigour of thought and motion which prevailed among the ancient Aryans. What the book shows is that there is nothing in it of that pessimism among the ancient Aryans which dominates the modern Hindus. The work would have been of greater value if the author had considered why the positivism and optimism of India’s ancient past gave place to the pessimism of later days. I hope that the author will deal with this problem at some later stage. In the meantime it is no small contribution to our knowledge that the theory that world is Maya is a new invention. It is from this point of view that I commend this booklet. B. R. Ambedkar 1 zz 1: Swami Vedananda Teertha (1892-1956)— Rashtra Raksha Ke Vaidik Sadhan—1948

16 THE MEANING OF THE WORD ‘RECEIPT’ The point at issue is the meaning to be given to the word receipt occuring in clause (2) of Article 198. Does it mean receipt by the Secretariat of the Legislative Council or does it mean by receipt by the Legislative Council ? The distinction is of course important because it determines the starting point of the period of limitation which is fourteen days for a money Bill. The matter is referred to the Goverment of India for opinion because there is a difference of opinion between the R.L.A. and the Advocate General of Bihar, the R.L.A. upholding the former interpretation and the Advocate General the latter. There are three contentions relied upon by the R.L.A. :— (1) Clause (2) of Article 198 speaks of ‘Fourteen days from the date of its receipt.’ (2) There is a difference between the language used in clause (2) (b) of Article 197 and that used in clause (2) of Article 198. (3) The delay that may occur in getting through a money Bill if the contention of the Advocate General of Bihar was accepted as valid. I will deal with these contention seriatum. Taking up the first contention of the R.L.A. I find his argument is vitiated by his failure to note the following points- (1) The R.L.A. picks out the words ‘its receipt of the Bill’ from clause (2) of Article 198 and builds up his argument. He contends that in using the words ‘its receipt’ the intention of the Constitution was only to provide for a vicarious receipt by the Secretariat of the Upper Chamber and not actual receipt by the Chamber. But the altogether omits to take into account the words ‘transmitted to the Legislative Council for its recommendations’ which also occur in clause (2) and

91THE MEANING . . . . . . . . . ‘RECEIPT’ which in opinion are the key words of the clause. The words ‘its receipt’ by themselves are quite unimportant. Their meaning must be derived by reading them in conjunction with the words ‘transmitted to the Legislative Council for its recommendation.’ So read they cannot mean receipt by the Secretariat. (2) The R.L.A. has not taken into consideration the provisions of clauses (3) and (4). He relied upon clause (5) to justify the result. But he forgets that clause (5) becomes operative only when the steps laid out in clauses (3) and (4) of Article 198 have been gone through by the Legislative Council. Clauses (3) and (4) require that the Council has been in Session and has had an opportunity to consider the Bill. The rule of construction adopted by the R.L.A. is not a sound rule of construction. The correct rule relevant to the issue is the rule known as ex vicerius actus. It has the authority of no less a person than Coke. Says Coke: “The office of a good expositor of an Act of Parliament is to make construction on all the parts together, and not of one part only by itself……….. It is the most natural and genuine exposition of a Statute to construe one part of a Statute by another of the same Statute, for the best expresseth the meaning of the makers ” (Quoted in Craie’s, P. 95). The Second contention of the R.L.A. is founded on difference in the language in clause (2) (b) of Article 197 and clause (2) of Article 198. It is true that difference in language exists. It is also true that difference in language can be relied upon by interested parties as an argument in support of the contention that the intentions in two cases are different. As against the argument of the R.L.A. I wish to urge the following considerations– The original language of clause (2) (b) of Article 197 was the same as that of clause (2) of Article 198. Altogether four drafts of Article 197 were presented to

92 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES the Constituent Assembly. In the first three the language was the same as in Article 198. I have ascertained these facts from the records of the Constituent Assembly. In these circumstances various questions arise. Why was the language of Article 198 not changed when the language of Article 197 was changed ? What was the reason for changing the language of article 197 (2) (b) ? Was the language changed because the original intenion underlying Article 197 (2) (b) was changed ? Or was it because the intention was the same but it was fell that the new language expressed the same old and original intention better ? Is it difficult to give any definite answer to these questions? As far as my recollection goes we changed the language of Article 197 not because we changed our original intention but because it was felt that the changed language expressed our original intention better. In any case the argument based on difference in language is not at all decisive. I realize that for a pedant this may not dispose of the argument based on difference of language. For it is possible to turn back and say if your intention in Article 198 was the same as in 197 (2) (b) why did you not follow suit and change its language when you changed the language of Article 197 (2) (b) and bring it in line ? To this argument my reply is very simple. It is wrong to argue that in every case difference of language means difference of intentions. For it is a well accepted proposition that the intention may be the same though it is experssed in different words. In this connection I would like to quote the following extract from Craie’s on Statute Law : “But although, as has been said, this presumption is generally to be made, and “it is certainly to be wished”, as the Judicial Committee said in Casement v. Fulton (i), “that, in framing statutes, the same words should always be employed in the same sense”; still, there are many instances to be found of the Legislature departing from language previously used for the purpose of conveying a