Vol. 17, Part II · pages 116–120

93THE MEANING . . . . . . . . . ‘RECEIPT’ certain meaning without intending to depart from that meaning. “When the Legislature,” said Blackburn, J., in R. V. Buttle (k), “change the words of an enactment, no doubt it must be taken prima facie that there was an intention to change the meaning.” This, however is not necessarily so, for we find, as a matter of fact, that, as Blackburn, J. observed in Hadley v. Perks (1), “in drawing Acts of Parliament, the Legislature, as it would seem, to improve the graces of the style, and to avoid using the same words over and over again, constantly change” the words without intending to change the meaning. Thus, in Re Wright (m), Mellish, L.J., said, with regard to the departure in the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, from the language used in the repealed Bankruptcy Act, 1849; “Every one who is familiar with the present Act knows that the language of the former Acts has been very much altered in many cases where it could not have been intended to make any change in the law.” In Actt.-Gen. V. Bradlaugh (n), it was contended that the word “made” in the expression in the Parliamentary Oaths Act, 1866, “the oath shall be made,” was to be construed as if it were different from the word “taken”. “But,” said Brett, M. R., “it seems to me, looking at the Preamble, and at the manner in which the word is used, that the word ‘made’ has precisely the same effect as if it were “taken”. In Monteith v. McGavin (o), Lord Cottenham said that “when Parliament provides for a particular mode of proceeding in one particular case, and makes no such provision in another case, it must not, as a general rule, be assumed that this arises from mere negligence or inattention in the framers of the Act.” But, as Brett M. R. said in Nottage v. Jackson (p), “persons who draw Acts of Parliament will sometimes use phrases that nobody else uses; consequently we do sometimes meet with expressions in statutes which we are compelled to believe were introduced, not for any specific purpose, but in consequence of the slovenliness of the draftsman.” Thus, in R. v. Buttle (q), the question was whether, when 26 & 28 Vict. c. 29, s. 7, enacted that “no statement made by

94 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES any person in answer to any question put by [certain] commissioners shall, except in cases of indictments for perjury, be admissible in evidence in any proceeding,” the expression “indictments for perjury” applied to perjury in general, or only to perjury committed before the commissioners. It appeared that a previous statute has contained a similar provision, but that the expression used in that statute was “indictments for perjury committed in such answers”; consequently it was argued that the Legislature intended a change of meaning by this change of words. It was held, however that to put upon the expression used in the later statute the meaning contended for would be subversive of one of the most important principles of the common law, and that it must be supposed, therefore, that there was no reason at all for altering the language used by the earlier statute, and that, as Kelly, C. B., said, “whoever framed the statute did it in a slovenly way, and showed great want of care in drawing it.” So also, if it appears that the older statute contains words of surplusage, these words may very well be left out in subsequent Act without there being any intention on the part of the Legislature to alter the law. “It appears to me,” said Mellish, L. J., in Re Wood (r) “that the framers of this [ later ] Act thought it would be an improvement to omit words as to intent in the cases where it was not necessary to prove such an intent, the words being then surplusage and misleading; and I think they may have very properly left out without in any way altering the law.” With regard to his third contention I must say that I am not at all impressed by it. There are two causes of delay that may be apprehended. Delay is caused by the Council though in Session and in receipt of the Bill. Delay is caused by the Council not being in Session when the Bill is transmitted. No delay beyond fourteen days can take place at the hands of the Council nor can any harm be done to the Assembly if it does take place. For there is a penalty for it and which is provided for in clause (5). Delay following upon the Council not being in session at the time when the Bill is transmitted cannot be due to any fault of the Council. It is those who are responsible to advise the Governor to call a Session of the Council are responsible for such delay. If they wish to get the benefit of clause (5) they should call the Session of the Council immediately and give it fourteen days and avoid delay. It is in their power. But

95THE MEANING . . . . . . . . . ‘RECEIPT’ they cannot have it both ways. To permit them the discretion to call or not to call the session of the Council and at the same time to allow them to take the benefit of clause (5) is not only to give them the freedom to cheat one House of the Legislature but to play a fraud upon the Constitution. This is exactly what the Bihar Government has done. When a money Bill is transmitted to the Upper Chamber it is the duty of the Government to call a Session of the Council and it is a matter which is entirely and exclusively with its power. If it does not do so it cannot take advantage of clause (5) of Article 198. For these reasons I agree with the view taken by the learned Advocate General of Bihar and reject the view of the learned R.L.A. I have dwealt with the arguments of the R.L.A. at such a considerable length only out of respect for him. Otherwise I would have summarily rejected it. The point to my mind is not at all abstruse. It is so plain that a man having nothing more than common-sense could have understood that the intention of the framers of the Constitution was. What the Government of Bihar has done is a deliberate and calculated act of fraud. I refuse to believe that what it has done is done out of want of understanding. I cannot help saying that the Government of Bihar has descended to the low level of a common cheat. I feel so strongly about it that I do not mind my sentiments in this respect being conveyed to the Bihar Government. Before I conclude I would like to raise a question which is solely for the consideration of the Law Department. We are getting a large number of references from State Government for advice on disputed points arising out of the Constitution. We entertain these references and give our advice. That advice is followed and becomes part of the Constitutional usage. I wonder if we are acting wisely in doing this. Would it not be better to leave the parties to act as they think and take their chance in Court ? For as pointed out by Craie’s (Statute Law, p. 140) usage becomes an important element in the interpretation of a Statute. By our advice we set up a usage and thereby support a particular interpretation which in the absence of it may not be supportable and if our advice is wrong we become

96 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES responsible for a wrong interpretation. Perhaps the practice is a long standing practice and I realize that it is difficult to discontinue it. All the same it is well to remember the length to which our responsibility in these matters does go. B. R. Ambedkar zz As regard to this article, the then officer on special Duty, Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Source Material Publications Commitee, noted that the papers were found in the record received by the Government from the Administrator General, Maharashtra State in 1979. This note is signed by Dr. Ambedkar. —Editors.

17 BUDDHA AND FUTURE OF HIS RELIGION I Out of the many founders of Religion, there are four whose religions have not only moved the world in the past, but are still having a sway over the vast masses of people. They are Buddha, Jesus, Mahommed and Krishna. A comparison of the presonalities of these four and the poses they assumed in propagating their religions reveals certain points of contrast between the Buddha on the one hand and the rest on the other, which are not without significance. The first point which mark off Buddha from the rest is his self-abnegation. All throughout the Bible, Jesus insists that he is the Son of God and that those who wish to enter the kingdom of God will fail, if they do not recognise him as the Son of God. Mahommed went a step further. Like Jesus he also claimed that he was the messenger of God on earth. But he further insisted that he was the last messenger. On that footing he declared that those who wanted salvation must not only accept that he was a messenger of God, but also accept that he was the last messenger. Krishna went a step beyond both Jesus and Mahommed. He refused to be satisfied with merely being the Son of the God or being the messenger of God; he was not content even with being the last messenger of God. He was not even satisfied with calling himself a God. He claimed that he was ‘ Parameshwar’ or as his followers describe him “ Devadhideva” God of Gods. Buddha never arrogated to himself any such status. He was born as a son of man and was content to remain a common man and preached his gospel as a common man. He never claimed any supernatural origin or supernatural powers nor did he perform miracles to prove his supernatural powers. The Buddha made a clear distinction between a Margadata and a Mokshadata. Jesus, Mahommed and Krishna claimed for themselves the Mokshadata. The Buddha was satisfied with playing the role of a Margadata.