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Vol. 17, Part II · pages 351–355

Dr. B. R. Ambedkar and His Egalitarian Revolution — Socio-political and Religious Activities

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326 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES of view of the Depressed Classes that there must be an agreed solution of the communal problem. It also meets the Congress point of view that no element in the national life of British India should be allowed the power to veto the birth of a dominion constitution. The argument that we are in the midst of the war is no argument against making the declaration. Indeed, it is an argument in favour of it. The war effort depends on three things :—(1) Sense of urgency; (2) appreciation of the purpose of the war ; and (3) a concrete conception of how we expect to win the war—the need for a realistic and convincing plan. The entry of Japan in the war has brought to the Indians the required sense of urgency; at any rate, to those who think that working to save ourselves from immediate destruction is more important than the ultimate goal. The appreciation of the purpose of the war is wanting and a declaration by the British Government to withdraw its authority in favour of the Indian people will bring about that appreciation. Should the declaration be accompanied by a National Government ? It would be better if it could be done. But Mr. Jinnah is making two demands. One is ultimate, namely Pakistan. The other is immediate, namely 50 per cent, representation in the Cabinet. I can quite understand the demand for Pakistan. When Mr. Jinnah says that the Muslims are a nation. I feel no reason to quarrel. When Mr. Jinnah says the Muslims must have Pakistan because they are a nation. I say, have it if you do not thereby run away with a large belt of the Hindu population who on your own theory, are of a different nationality. With regard to Pakistan, I feel like pointing out that Mr. Jinnah seems to be counting his chickens before they are hatched and reckoning without the host. The N. W. F. is the integral part of this Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah must admit that he is not the host of the N. W. F. The host is Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan. Without his consent, there could be no Pakistan. Rather than carry on whirlwind propaganda in favour of Pakistan, Mr. Jinnah should spend his time and energy in converting Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan. That is, however, a matter for Mr. Jinnah to consider.

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327DR. AMBEDKAR’S PLAN . . . . . . . . . CRITICISED Pakistan Demand As I said, I can understand Pakistan. But I cannot understand this demand for 50 per cent, representation for the Muslim community. Nor can I see how this immediate demand of 50 per cent is related to the ultimate demand of Pakistan. I am sure this demand of the Muslim League is a monstrous thing, and I have no doubt that Lord Linlithgow has done the greatest service to India by puting it down. I am definitely of opinion that no National Government ought to be established in India as an interim measure if it means conceding to Mr. Jinnah his claim for 50 per cent representation. After all, I cannot believe that the national Government can do more in the matter of war effort than what is being done. India simply cannot do more. Her capacity has not been developed. The fault lies entirely with the British Government. They chose not to develop the resources of India in peace time, and it is therefore impossible for the Government or the National Government to do more than what is being done. If she had been fully developed, she could have defended the Empire. She cannot now defend herself. She must. Indeed, she is compelled to look to England to defend her from the impending Japanese invasion; such is her helpless condition. The appointment of an Indian as Defence Member may be good but is that enough ? Without the means of defence at his disposal, what an Indian Defence Minister can do it is difficult to understand. I should have thought that the wiser course for Indian would be to ask England to sent out to India the means of defence which she is hoarding for her own safety. Therein lies the immediate interest of India and therein also lies the duty of England.” A. P. 1 zz 1. : The Times of India : February 27, 1942.

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15 INDIANS DESTINY IS BOUND UP WITH THE VICTORY OF DEMOCRACY “No one can expect consistency from Mr. Gandhi. But everybody did and had a right to expect a sense of responsibility from him. There can be no doubt that, Mr. Gandhi’s present move to launch a mass movement is both irresponsible and insane,” observed the Hon. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, Labour Member, Government of India, to a representative of “ The Times of India,” prior to his departure to Delhi on Monday evening.* Why does Mr. Gandhi not try the other method, namely, bringing about unity among all parties ? Why does he not call a conference of leaders of all the different parties to find out their demands and settle if there is any dispute?” These questions were asked by Dr. Ambedkar. He added : “Duty requires that those who do not believe in Mr. Gandhi’s movement must take steps to prevent his threatened action from taking shape.” “ It is difficult to understand why Mr. Gandhi should think it necessary to enter upon so hazardous a plan of action at so perilous a time in the history of India, Dr. Ambedkar said.— “ To me some points are quite clear. As to India’s reaching its political goal, no one can deny that the transfer of power from the British to the hands of Indians has been continuous and of late rapid—except those who affect a certain degree of passion for independence. Barring such passionate patriots, it can be said without exaggeration that the British vis-a-vis Indians are in the last ditch. That the British do not wish to enterench themselves in the last ditch and prevent the political advancement of India to its final goal is equally clear. If any proof was necessary, the Cripps Proposals are there. They conceded Independence and Constituent Assembly both of which have been the demands which the Congress has been making. After the Cripps Proposals it is hard to believe Mr. Gandhi when he says that the British do not intend to transfer power to the hands of Indians. It is a positive and deliberate untruth. *The 27th July, 1942.

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329INDIANS DESTINY . . . . . . . . . OF DEMOCRACY “That the Cripps Proposal have fallen through does not, to my mind, affect the fact that the British Government are committed to independence if Indians prefer it to Domminion Status. Short-Sighted View “One does not know what led the Congress to reject the Cripps Proposals even when they conceded Independence and Constituent Assembly. If the failure to transfer defence be the reason for starting a mass movement, I am sure very few will accept the soundness of so short-sighted view. In the first place the Congress claimed from the British only a declaration of their war aims and did not claim their implementation during the war. Secondly, there is no Indian politician so far as I know, competent to run the technical and military side of the Defence department. Indians have neglected to study this subject. In these circumstances, it is foolish to ask for Indian control of defence; for, such control when in the hands of an ignorant person can only be nominal. Thirdly, when all departments were transferred, as was contemplated by the Cripps Proposals, it was childish to quarrel over the non-transfer of the Defence Department. Any man with commonsense would know that the reserved department could not have held out on matters insisted upon by the transferred departments if they are necessary and reasonable. This is what had happened to the special powers of the Governors when the Congress took office in 1937. It is surprising that the Congress should have forgotten its own experience in this matter. “I am clearly of the opinion that the Congress deserves on sympathy in this move for causing disorder. It has rejected the best opportunity it was given to serve the country. Looking at it from this point of view, I cannot see how this move, proposed to be taken by Mr. Gandhi, can be held to be in the interests of the country. “It seems to me that Mr. Gandhi is merely trying to retrieve the prestige which he and the Congress have lost since the war started. “The Congress can live with prestige in either of two ways. It can live by the glamour of direct action or it can live by the partronage which office gives. Mr. Gandhi compelled the Congress to give up office and he refused to be a party to direct action. The slump

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330 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES caused in the Congress prestige by this do nothing, policy of Mr. Gandhi has been disastrous to Mr. Gandhi and to the Congress and this desperate game of Mr. Gandhi is intended to retrieve his position and to die covered with glory. “This move may be the best way to serve the best interests of the Congress party. But it certainly is not the way to serve the country. At this juncture such a move is fraught with the greatest mischief and is sure to result in the greatest harm to the country. “There are two ways open to the Congress party to further the political advancement of this country ; direct action by the Congress and united demand by all parties representing the different elements in the national life of the country. Mr. Gandhi and the Congress are very keen about the first. It is a stock plan. Except Mr. Gandhi, everyone knows that beyond a certain limit it is worse than useless and even when it succeeds because the British Government, unlike the Nazi Government are not addicted to the use of brute force and do not use unmoral means to suppress a moral cause. Mr. Gandhi will not admit it. That is only because he fortunately has no experince as to how the Nazis will deal with his mass Civil Disobedience. No doubt the Nazis will give Mr. Gandhi a very short shrift and prove that his plan of direct action can be put out of action at the very start. Unity among Parties “The question that agitates my mind is this : Why does Mr. Gandhi resort to his method of direct action carried on singlehanded by the Congress when it is proved to be so inefficacious ? Why does he not try the other method, namely bringing about unity among all parties ? Why does Mr. Gandhi not call a conference of all leaders of the different parties to find out their demands and to settle if there is any dispute about them. This is a way worth trying. It is also a way of statesmanship and a way which will bring enduring peace among the communities. But Mr. Gandhi has never made such an attempt and I have never been able to understand his reasons for avoiding this way of solving the problem. To say that no settlement can take place while the British are there can, to my mind, mean only two things : that the leaders of the minority communities are tools in the hands of the British or that the Congress thinks it would be better to talk of communal settlement after the British