Vol. 17, Part II · pages 356–360

331INDIANS DESTINY . . . . . . . . . OF DEMOCRACY Government have withdrawn because the Congress than in charge of law and order will be in a better position to dictate to the minorities and force a settlement on its own terms. If it means the first, then it is a vile and wanton aspersion on the character of, the leaders of the minority communities. The Congress must drop this selfrighteous attitude and admit that even those who differ from it are as good patriots, if not better, Settlement of the communal problem, is, I am sure, rendered more difficult by such stupid and baseless allegations which the Congress and its Press have persistently indulging in against the leaders of the minority communities. If it means the second, then there is no doubt that the move is a deceitful one. In either case, it proclaims the bankruptcy of statesmanship on the part of Mr. Gandhi. “Mr. Gandhi has not realised one thing which the sooner he realises the better. His most advertised political virtues were to bring about-Hindu-Muslim unity and to serve the Untouchables. “After 20 years, neither the Muslims nor the Untouchables trust Mr. Gandhi. This is the greatest tragedy in his life. “The sooner he realises this, the better. Even now Mr. Gandhi can call the leaders of the minorities for consultation. There is no use saying that they are making impossible demands : for, it is always open to Mr. Gandhi to call upon them to agree to refer the matter to international arbitration. “The general public has no cause to support Mr. Gandhi in this move which is quite uncalled for. The minorties have no reason to join Mr. Gandhi for, he refuses to give them an assurance as to their safety and security under the new constitution in terms which are explicit and in a spirity which has all the hallmark of sincerity. “We are living in such perilous times that our duty cannot end in merely expressing our disagreement with Mr. Gandhi. Duty requires that those who do not believe in his movement must take steps to prevent it from taking shape. In the C. D. movement of 1930, the Muslims and the Depressed Classes, although they did not participate in it, had observed a kind of benevolent neutrality towards it. The situation in 1930 was very different from what it is now. In the 1930 movement, there were only two possibilities. Either political power would have remained with the

332 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES British or it would have devolved upon Indians. There was no possibility of Japan or Germany stepping in and making itself the master of India. The possibility is now staring us in the face. It would be madness to weaken law and order at a time when the barbarians are at our gates, intending not merely to defeat the British but to enslave us for ever. There, in my mind, lies the great difference between the C. D. Movement of 1930 and the mass movement now threatened by Mr. Gandhi. False Claim “The Congress and Mr. Gandhi have been arrogating to themselves the right to speak in the name of the country. It is a false claim but nobody has cared to challenge it. That is because of the feeling that so long as the Congress was doing no harm to the interests of the country it was a matter of small moment whether it claimed to speak in the name of the nation or in the name of the party which it is. But when the Congress, being only a party, proposes to launch upon a policy which puts the safety, security and even the possibility of the independence of the country in jeopardy, it becomes the duty to other parties to drop the attitude of benevolent neutrality and oppose the Congress when it is throwing the country in chaos and inviting certain frustration of the realisation of the political destiny of this country which is so near at hand. I wish Indians to realise two things : first, that their destiny is bound up with the victory of democracy against Nazism and second, that once democracy wins nothing in the world can stop India to gain her freedom if Indians take care to unite themselves. I am sure Mr. Gandhi’s move is quite uncalled for. “If democracy wins, no one can stand in the way of India’s freedom. The supreme task of Indians at the moment is to see that democracy wins. It is not out of love for principle that they should do so. It is our country’s future that requires us to do it as our duty. Mr. Gandhi is an old man in a hurry. Indians should be careful not to do anything in a hurry which they will have to regret in leisure.” Dr. Ambedkar left Bombay on Monday night for New Delhi by the Frontier Mail. At Bombay Central, he was given a hearty sendoff by nearly 400 persons, representing the Scheduled Classes, the Independent Labour Party, the Municipal Kamgar Sangh and various other organisations, and several personal friends and admirers.”1 zz 1. : The Times of India, dated 28th July 1942.

16 HOW TO END INDIAN POLITICAL IMPASSE “A plan for ending the political deadlock in India which would, at the same time, solve the knotty problems raised by the Pakistan issue and pave the way for the formation of a national government during the war was adumbrated by the Hon. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, Labour Member, Government of India, in an interview to a representative of Tire Times of India, at Bombay, on Wednesday.* “The Pakistan issue, he said, must be regarded as a preliminary issue. No steps can be taken for the framing of a constitution unless this issue is settled one way on the other. We have, hitherto, depended upon the leaders—Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah—to come to terms on this question, but they have failed. It seems to me now that the time has come when the decision of this issue must be taken by the people. “I do not think Pakistan is an issue which the British Government can solve. It would not be right to ask them to do it, nor would it be justifiable for them to give a decision on it. The Pakistan issue is one of self-determination, and, as such, can be decided only by the people affected by it. If this position is accepted, it seems that an Act would have to be passed by Parliament called’ The Indian Constitution Preliminary Provisions Act.’ Referendum of Muslims In that Act provisions should be made for the following points:— (a) a referendum of Muslims in the Pakistan areas exclusively to determine whether they want severnce of the predominantly Muslim areas from the rest of India; (b) a separate referendum exclusively of non-Muslims in Pakistan areas to determine whether they prefer to go into Pakistan or desire to remain in Hindustan; (c) if Non-Muslims decide by a majority not to go into Pakistan, a boundary commission to be setup to demarcate those districts in which Muslims predominate and those in which Non-Muslims predominate. * The 12th May 1943.

334 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES A schedule should be prepared consisting of a list of the districts set apart by the boundary commission as being predominantly Muslim districts. This should be called the scheduled districts schedule. After this is done, the next step is to permit the Muslims to decide by a referendum on one of the following alternatives:— To consent to allow the scheduled districts to remain part of a united India for period of ten years at the end of which they may be permitted to sever the scheduled districts and to establish Pakistan; or to decide that the Scheduled districts be forthwith constitued into a separate state of Pakistan, and to permit the State of Pakistan, ant to permit the State of Pakistan to be amalgamated with Hindustan on a referendum to be taken after ten years on terms agreed upon by Pakistan and Hindustan. Council of India In case the Muslims should decide to have Pakistan forthwith there may be established a council of India having equal representatives from Hindustan and Pakistan to discuss matters of common concern. This Council will be dissolved, if, after ten years, the Pakistan State decides to amalgamate with Hindustan.” Dr. Ambedkar emphasised that the passing of the Act suggested by him need not be followed up immediately by a referendum. It could be taken after the war. The passing of the Act would have, in his view, a salutary effect on Hindus and Muslims, because both of them would know that whatever constitution came into existence, it would have the consent of the people. If matters could be brought to such a state, it would pave the way for the formation of a National Government during the war. “I cannot see,” Dr. Ambedkar concluded, “how a statute like this can be avoided. It shall have to be passed in any case, now or after peace, but necessarily before constitution making is taken in hand. So far as the first referendum is concerned it should be made dependent upon Muslims of legislatures of Pakistan provinces passing a resolution demanding separation.”1 zz 1. : The Times of India, dated 13th May 1943.

17 JINNAH’S FEARS WILL HAVE TO BE ALLAYED New Delhi, July 12, 1944. “Welcoming the Rajagopalachari formula, as a sign of” Return to Sanity “Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, Labour Member, Government of India, in a Press interview said he nevertheless preferred his own scheme outlined in 1943, under which Pakistan would be tried as an experiment for ten years and if at the end of that period Mussalmans in Pakistan decided to amalgamate with Hindustan, they should be free to do so. His scheme further contemplated an Act of the British Parliament, the setting up of a delimitation commission, and the holding of two plebiscites, first of Mussalmans to determine whether they wanted partition and second of Non-Muslims, to decide whether they would prefer to stay in Pakistan or go out of it. Boundary Commission If Non-Muslims decided to be in Pakistan, then the boundaries of Pakistan would be the present provincial boundaries, while if Non-Muslims declared themselves opposed to staying in Pakistan, a Boundary Commission would be set up to demarcate the predominantly Muslim district from predominantly Non-Muslim districts. Dr. Ambedkar, however, welcomed Gandhiji’s acceptance of the principle of the self-determination, but felt that it would have been much better if the offer was made by him and it would also have been better if the offer was unconditional and not subject to conditions such as joining in the demand for independence and for the establishment of full National Government. Jinnah’s Fears Dr. Ambedkar could not see on what grounds Mr. Jinnah could turn down the offer. The fact that in a plebiscite Hindus might influence Muslims to secure their votes against Pakistan might be Mr. Jinnah’s ground for rejection of the offer. But plebiscite was the only way in which a problem of this kind could be decided. Dr. Ambedkar knows of no case in history in which such a problem was decided without a plebiscite.