Vol. 17, Part II · pages 361–365

336 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES Will Congress Buy Off Muslims ? “There are risks in a plebiscite,” Dr. Ambedkar conceded, “but such risks Mr. Jinnah will have to take. Sincerity behind the offer is more important than the offer itself. Mr. Jinnah may well feel disinclined to accept the offer, knowing that Mr. Rajagopalachari and the Congress may have made it purely, as a matter of fact, to put him in the wrong and may simultaneously with the making of the offer have devised ways and means of buying the votes of Muslims. Mr. Jinnah may well ask Mr. Rajagopalachari if there was any truth in the disclosures made in his defamation case about his intention to offer Pakistan to Muslims and then to circumvent it by purchasing Muslims in Pakistan to negative the offer. “Gandhiji will have to prove his sincerity behind the offer and also guarantee that Hindus would not prevent Muslims from giving free vote.” 1 zz 1. : Free Press of India dated 13th July 1944.

18 FIRST PROPOSAL ON CENTRAL IRRIGATION AND WATERWAYS ADVISORY BOARD “The Labour Department formed an opinion that it would be preferable to create a Central Irrigation and Waterways Advisory Board. We want a Board constantly in being and having the necessary authority. Our idea of this Board could be that it should be composed as follows : Chairman:—Waterways and Irrigation Commissioner to the Government of India. This officer would have to have experience of India and should therefore be a senior officer of the Indian Service of Engineers. He would have required knowledge both of waterways and irrigation, but the strength of the Board as an advisory body would be the collective strength of the Board and not the individual strength of the Chairman. (He would, however, in his individual capacity supervise the working of the Indian Waterways Research Institution.) Members:—There would be 3 permanent members: 1. Waterways member 2. Irrigation member 3. Hydro-Electric member. There would also be part-time members—e.g. the Chief Engineers of any Provinces when any matter concerning the Provinces was under consideration, the Agricultural Advisor to the Government of India when any agricultural matters were under consideration. Power would also be given to co-opt members for particular matters. Note : This constitution leaves the Board without a member for gravity irrigation but it is probable that the Chairman would always have this knowledge. The responsibilities of the Central Irrigation and Waterways Board would be : 1. A general responsibility for initiating, co-ordinating and pressing forward schemes of river and waterways control with a view to

338 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES (a) prevention of floods ; (b) prevention of erosion ; (c) prevention of waterlogging ; (d) control of water for irrigation purposes; (e) control of water for power purposes ; (f) utilisation by cheap power provision of sub-soil water for irrigation ; (g) dewatering by use of electric power of waterlogged areas ; (h) regulation of flow of water for navigation purposes. 2. Preparation in consultation with Provincial Governments of water control schemes for all major waterways and preparation of project reports. 3. Organisation of procurement of statistical information regarding waterways, and organisation and control of subsoil water surveys. 4. Advice to the Government of India on the principles that should be laid down to govern the settlement of disputes between Provinces. The Board would further require Consulting Engineers on such matters as— (i) Dam construction; (ii) Barrage construction. H. C. Prior Secretary 31.8.44 I agree. The only remark I have to make is whether it would not cause considerable delay if we were to consult the Provinces now. Can we not consult them at a later stage ? B. R. Ambedkar 9.9.1944” 1 zz 1. : Thorat, Pp. 150-151

19 BOTH ARE MAKING SERIOUS MISTAKE “A large gathering of his followers and admirers was present at the Victoria Terminus to accord a reception to the Hon. Dr. Bhimrao R. Ambedkar, Labour Member, in the Viceroy’s Executive Council, on his arrival by the Poona Express on Tuesday evening.* Upon alighting on the platform Dr. Ambedkar was profusely garlanded by representatives of several Scheduled Castes and other Associations. A Procession was then taken out in his honour which wended its way from the Station to Rajgrah at Dadar.” 1 “The Hon. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, in an interview with a Representative of The Times of India on Wednesday,** stated that nothing but failure was expected of the Gandhi-Jinnah talks. “They did not meet each other, he said,” with empty minds, but it is equally true that neither had an open mind.” The failure, in the opinion of Dr. Ambedkar, was due to among other causes, the obstinacy of both Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah, and the fundamental faults of the formula of Mr. Rajagopalachari. He added that no settlement of the Indian question could be considered complete without the consent of the Scheduled Castes. Neither Mr. Gandhi nor Mr. Jinnah was entitled to speak for them. “I cannot believe,” observed Dr. Ambedkar in his interview, “that Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah met to bring about a communal settlement. The adoption of Gujerati by Mr. Gandhi as a medium of communication with Mr. Jinnah when he asked for an interview was enough to make me feel that the talks would fail. Mr. Jinnah was too elated by the receipt of the letter to understand its implication. By writing it Gujerati, Mr. Gandhi, in his inimitable way, told Mr. Jinnah that he was only a Lohana, whose mother-tongue was Gujerati. * The 3rd October 1944. ** The 4th October 1944. 1. : The Bombay Chronicle : dated 4th October 1944.

340 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES Similarly, Mr. Jinnah knew that the formula of Mr. Rajagopalachari was different from the Lahore resolution of the Muslim League. Mr. Jinnah knew that Mr. Gandhi was seeing him in his personal capacity. Mr. Jinnah also knew that Mr. Gandhi was not going to him as a representative of Hindus. All these circumstances were quite contrary to the conditions upon which Mr. Jinnah was insisting before his debacle in Lahore. Leaders’ Obstinacy “Failure was inevitable. If it was inevitable because of the obstinacy of the two men, it was also inevitable because of the fundamental faults in the C. R. formula. The formula is bad because it tied up the communal question with the political question. No political settlement, no communal settlement on which the formula proceeds. The formula did not offer a solution. It invited Mr. Jinnah to enter into a deal. It was a bargain—“If you help us in getting independence, we shall be glad to consider your proposal for Pakistan.” “The second fault in the C. R. formula relates to the machinery for giving effect to any agreement that may be arrived at. The agency suggested in the C. R. formula is the provisional Government. “By consenting to the establishment of a provisional Government, the Muslim League would have executed its promise to help the Congress to win independence. But the promise of the Congress to bring about Pakistan would remain executory. Mr. Jinnah, who insists, and quite rightly, that the promises should be concurrent, could never be expected to agree to place himself in such a position. “The second difficulty which Mr. Rajagopalachari has overlooked is what would happen if the provisional Government failed to give effect to the Hindu part of the agreement. Who is to enforce it? The provisional Government is to be a sovereign government; not subject to any superior authority. If it was unwilling to give effect to the agreement the only sanction open to the Muslims would be rebellion. To make the provisional Government the agency for forging a new Constitution for bringing about Pakistan nobody will accept. It is a snare and not a solution. The only way of bringing about constitutional changes will be through an Act of