Vol. 2 · pages 221–225

202 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES that the conciliation shall be compulsory, and the question, I submit, that arises for the consideration of the House is whether any case has been made out for altering the voluntary provision of the Act of 1934 and giving it a compulsory character. Now, taking the year 1934 and the conditions as they were in that year as the standard by which to measure the necessity for introducing compulsion, I desire to refer to certain facts which are relevant and important. The first fact that I would like to draw the attention of the House to is this, that the original Bill introduced by the Honourable Sir Robert Bell in 1934, which subsequently became the Act, contained provisions for compulsory conciliation. But at the time of the introduction of the Bill, at its very initial stage, the mover of that Bill was impressed by the fact that the circumstances existing in the year 1934 did not require compulsion in the matter of conciliation, and consequently, he of his own accord, at the very outset, at the first reading of the Bill, in his opening speech made a proposal that he was going to bring forward an amendment in order to substitute the word “may” for the word “shall”. That, I submit, is proof of the fact that in 1934 the Honourable Sir Robert Bell did not feel any necessity for introducing compulsion in the matter of conciliation. There was in the House at the time when that Bill was introduced my honourable friend Mr. Saklatvala, who represented the Bombay Millowners. He too in the year 1934 did not demand compulsion in the matter of conciliation. On the other hand, in the speech which be delivered at the first reading of the Bill, he was lukewarm in his support of the Bill, for he went to the length of saying that the Bill normally was unnecesary. That was the view point that he had taken, and with regard to conciliation, he did not certainly press or demand any compulsion in the matter at all. What was happened between the year 1934 and the year 1938 which compels this House to alter the provisions of that Act, changing voluntary conciliation into compulsory conciliation ? Now, in order to make out a case for compulsion, the Prime Minister started by giving us certain figures of strikes that have taken place in this country, in order to make out that the strikes that have taken place in this country, were so frequent and of such a grave character that the necessity had now arisen for changing the voluntary provision into a compulsory one. Now I have examined the figures of the strikes, the number of work-people involved and the number of working days lost. I have no hesitation in saying that I stand unconvinced by what the Honourable the Prime Minister seemed to say as a result of the figures relating to strikes. Turning our attention to the strikes that have taken place in the City of Bombay, I have here the March number of the Labour Gazette published by the Labour Office. On page 541 this number gives the figures of the strikes that have taken place in the Province of Bombay. From 1921 to 1937, it gives in column one the number of trade disputes. Secondly, it

203ON THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES BILL gives the number of work-people involved ; and, thirdly, it gives the number of working days lost. Running one’s eyes over these figures, I am sure any one would be able to see for himself that the industrial disputes far from increasing are diminishing year after year. For instance, in the year 1921, the industrial disputes in Bombay were 103 ; in 1922, there were 143 ; in 1923, there were 109 ; and between 1924 and 1927, they had fallen to 50, a drop of 50 per cent. Then, you get 1928 and the figure rises to 144. From 1929 to practically 1937, it varies between 88 and 53. I admit that the number of strikes that have taken place is no criterion for judging the amount of disturbance and dislocation that might have taken place in the industry. I find from the figures which are given in this table that there are cases in which although the number of strikes is small, the number of people involved is comparatively great and the number of hours lost are also comparatively great. But then taking the number of working days lost as the criterion, which is the only criterion, I find that the worst year was the year 1928 which resulted in 24 million working days being lost. The second worse year was 1925 when 11 million working days were lost ; and the third one was 1929 when 8 million working days were lost. But once you proceed further, beyond the year 1929, it will be found that the number of work-people involved and the number of working days lost and the number of strikes that have taken place after 1934, there is certainly nothing in the situation, so far as I am able to see, which can be said to create a situation which would cause anxiety to any Member of Government. The only bad year seems to be 1937 when 897 working days were lost. That is nothing as compared to the previous year. I am told that this happened because there was a general strike in the City of Ahmedabad which lasted for 15 days. My first submission, therefore, is this. No case has been made out by Government and by the Honourable the Prime Minister which would induce, at any rate, this part of the House, at any rate induce me to consent to so radical a change in the provisions of the Act of 1934. So much for the necessity of introducing compulsory conciliation. Turning to the other provisions of the Bill, the provision to which I wish to advert are the provisions relating to strikes which undoubtedly are the most important, which this part of the House, at any rate the party I represent, stoutly oppose. Now, the Bill makes strikes under certain circumstances illegal. The provisions declaring strikes illegal are contained in clause 62 of the Bill which is the most important clause in it. It says : “62. (1) A strike shall be illegal if it is commenced or continued— (a) in cases where it relates to any industrial matter mentioned in Schedule I, before the standing orders relating to such matter and submitted to the Commissioner of Labour under section 26 are settled by him or by the Industrial Court, as the case may be, or before the

204 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES expiry of one year from the date on which such standing orders come into operation under section 26 ; (b) without giving notice in accordance with the provisions of section 28 ; (c) only for the reason that the employer has not carried out the provisions of any standing order or has made an illegal change ; (d) in cases where notice of the change is given in accordance with the provisions of section 28 and where no agreement in regard to such change is arrived at, before the statement of the case referred to in section 34 is received by the Registrar ; (e) in cases where conciliation proceedings in regard to the industrial dispute to which the strike relates have commenced, before the completion of such proceedings ; (f) in cases where a submission relating to such dispute or such kinds of dispute is registered under section 43, until such submission is lawfully revoked ; or (g) in contravention of the terms of a registered agreement, settlement or award. (2) In cases where conciliation proceedings in regard to any industrial dispute have been completed, a strike relating to such dispute shall be illegal if it is commenced at any time after the expiry of two months after the completion of such proceedings”. Then, in order to make this clause effective, the Bill prescribes certain penalties for indulging in illegal strikes. These clauses are 66 and 67. Clause 66 says : “Any employee who has gone on strike or who joins a strike which has been held by the Industrial Court to be illegal shall, on conviction, be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months or with fine or with both.”. Section 67 says : “If any person instigates or incites others to take part in, or otherwise acts in furtherance of, a strike or lock-out which has been held to be illegal by the Industrial Court, whether such strike or lock-out has commenced or not, shall, on conviction, be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine or with both. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, a person who contributes, collects or solicits funds for the purpose of any strike or lock-out shall be deemed to act in furtherance of such strike or lock-out”. Now, Sir, it has been said that these clauses are justifiable, because there is no such thing as a right to strike, and the Bill, therefore, in penalising what the labourers call the right to strike is certainly not contravening any rules of ethics or any rules of jurisprudence. Sir, my first

205ON THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES BILL concern in this speech will be to refute that argument and repudiate that position. Now in order that I may make my position clear, I will begin from some very elementary propositions. First of all, let me make clear what we understand by the word “strike”. What does it mean ? It is better, I think, to understand the meaning of the term “strike”. In plain, popular language, a strike is nothing more than a breach of contract of service. When a worker strikes, all that it means is that he commits a breach of contract of service : there is nothing more in it, and nothing less in it. And the next question that I propose to raise is this : how is this breach of contract of service dealt with by the law as it stands today on the Indian Statute Book? Does the Indian law recognise this right to strike or not ? And, if it does, in what way ; and, if it punishes, in what way does it punish it ? Sir, here again, I will begin with an elementary proposition, and that elementary proposition is this : that an act or an omission may be a civil wrong, or it may be a crime. And the first question that I propose to raise—I really wish to deal with this matter exhaustively, because I do not want to leave any doubt at all as regards my position in this matter—the first question I propose to raise is : is breach of contract of service a civil wrong ? The answer that the law gives is : Yes, it is a civil wrong. What are the remedies for an aggrieved person who has suffered this civil wrong? That would be the next question to follow on. There again the answer is that the present law provides two remedies for an aggrieved person whose contract has been broken by a workman, and those are damages and specific relief. Now, although the law does provide these two remedies, namely, damages and specific performance wherever there is a civil wrong, there is one provision which applies particularly to contracts of service. Whenever a man breaks a contract of service all that the aggrieved party is entitled to is damages ; he can never seek specific relief, and the court can never give relief whereby it can compel a man to perform the contract of service which he has entered upon. All that the aggrieved party would be entitled to is damages. Sir, that is the position as far as breach of contract of service is concerned as a civil wrong. For this civil wrong the employer can get nothing more than damages. Looking at this breach of contract of service as a crime, the question is : Is it a crime ? What has been the provision of the Indian law so far as breach of contract of service is concerned ? Sir, it is necessary, in the interest of clarification, to give to the House a little bit of history as to how this matter has been treated by our Indian law. The Indian law which first dealt with breach of contract of service was Act XIII of 1859 ; it was called the Workmen’s Breach of Contract Act. This was passed in 1859, soon after the Mutiny or during the course of the Mutiny. I shall presently give to the House the reasons why this legislation was passed. Then, there

206 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES are provisions in the Indian Penal Code which also deal with this matter, namely, breach of contract of service as a crime, and those sections are 490, 491 and 492. With regard to Act XIII of 1859, that Act was of a limited application. It applied to artificers and artisans ; it applied to cases where artificers and artisans had taken advances from their employers and had subsequently refused to perform the obligations they had undertaken. It was dictated by the necessity of the circumstances. The British Government was faced with the Mutiny. During the period the Mutiny continued, the military engaged many artificers and many artisans to whom monies had been advanced in the expectation that they would render the service which they had undertaken to do, but by reason of fear or by reason of some other circumstances, those artificers and artisans went back to their native places and consequently were not in a position to perform the obligations that they had undertaken, although they had received an advance. It was to cover such cases that this Act of 1859 was passed. It is on record that although this Act was passed, which did make breach of service of contract a crime, it was very rarely put into operation ; it was really not a law which people were brought to suffer under. Sir, the subsequent history of this Act is also interesting. This Act, which stood as a formal statute from 1859, but which, as I said, was never put into operation, was amended in 1920 by Act XII of the Government of India. The amending Act introduced two very salutary principles in this Act One salutary principle that was introduced in this Act was that a magistrate, before punishing an artisan who had committed a breach of contract of service, was authorised to enquire into the equity of the contract, so that, if the magistrate came to the conclusion that the contract was inequitable, men, he was not authorised to punish the recalcitrant workman, notwithstanding the fact that he had taken an advance from his employer. That was the first change that was introduced by the Act of 1920. Then, the second salutary provision that was introduced by the Act of 1920 was that the magistrate was given the power to punish an employer who brought a frivolous complaint,—a provision which was not in the original Act. Coming to the sections of the Indian Penal Code, the three sections to which I referred have an interesting history. Section 490 dealt with a breach of contract of service during a voyage or journey. It was a section of a very limited application. It did not apply to all breaches of contract of service ; it applied only to seamen who went on a voyage or a journey. Obviously, it was very necessary to make an exception of this kind in the case of service of seamen, on whose continued service the success and safety of the voyage depended. The other section, section 491, related to breach of contract on the part of an attendant in supplying the wants of helpless persons. It applied, for instance, to an ayah who had contracted to take care of a helpless child ; it applied to a servant who had undertaken to supply he needs of a man who was lame and who could not look after