Vol. 2 · pages 226–230

207ON THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES BILL himself. That was section 491. Then, section 492 covered a case of breach of contract of service at a distant place to which the servant was conveyed at the expense of the master. These were the three provisions that were enacted when the Indian Penal Code came into operation. Now, Sir, what has been the history of these three sections ever since they were enacted? The history is this, that by Act III of 1925 the Central Legislature has repealed section 490 and section 492. Those sections no longer apply, and the breaches of service which were crimes under them are no longer crimes at all. The only section, therefore, that remains is section 491 of the Indian Penal Code. So that, so far as the law now stands in India, the only breach of contract of service that can involve penal consequences, as distinguished from damages, is section 491 ; and I do not think that any member of the House would cavil at this provision if he knows that it is really intended to cover the case of a person who is a helpless person and who cannot look after himself. Now, Sir, taking stock of all that I have stated so far relating to the legal position involved as a result of breach of contract of service, which, I say, is merely a popular description of that forbidding word “strike”, what is the position ? The position is this. A breach of contract of service is not a crime, and is not punishable under the Indian Law except when the case falls under section 491. That means it is only a civil wrong ; it is not a crime. And, further, it is a civil wrong for which the remedy can only be damages and never a specific performance. I want to emphasise that. Now, the question which I am sure the House would like to consider with all the seriousness that it can command is this : Why is it that the Indian law does not make a breach of contract of service a crime ? And why is it that the Indian law does not provide for a specific performance ? Whatever answer other members of the House would choose to give, my answer is very simple. My answer is this, that the Indian Legislature does not make a breach of contract of service a crime because it thinks that to make it a crime is to compel a man to serve against his will ; [and making him a slave (Hear, hear.)] To penalise a strike, therefore, I contend, is nothing short of making the worker a slave. For what is slavery ? As defined in the constitution of the United States, slavery is nothing else but involuntary servitude. And this is involuntary servitude. This is contrary to ethics ; this is contrary to jurisprudence. Sir, the framers of the Indian Penal Code were very much concerned, when they drafted the provisions to which I have just referred, namely, sections 490, 491 and 492, as I see from the head-note here ; they evidently had great qualms of conscience, and they were wondering whether they would be right in enacting even the small provisions contained in sections 490, 491 and 492. This is what the framers of the Indian Penal Code said with regard to Chapter XIX, which is headed “Of the Criminal Breach of Contract of Service”:

208 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES “We agree with the great body of jurists in thinking that, in general, a mere breach of contract ought not to be an offence, but only to be the subject of a civil action. To this general rule there are, however, some exceptions. Some breaches of contract are very likely to cause evil such as no damages or only very high damages can repair, and are also very likely to be committed by persons from whom it is exceedingly improbable that any damages can be obtained. Such breaches of contract are, we conceive, proper subjects for penal legislation.” With all the great survey that they had made of the different kinds of acts of omission which could be penalised, they found that the only acts of omission which could be penalised, consistently with the provisions of ethics and jurisprudence, were these three provisions, and nothing more. Now, Sir, it has been said that there is no such thing as the right to strike. My reply is that this statement can come from a man who really does not understand what a strike is. If members are prepared to accept my meaning of the word “strike” as being nothing more than a breach of contract, then I submit that a strike is simply another name for the right to freedom ; it is nothing else than the right to the freedom of one’s services on any terms that one wants to obtain. And once you concede the right to freedom, you necessarily concede the right to strike, because, as I have said, the right to strike is simply another name for the right to freedom. A sort of ridicule is sought to be poured upon it by saying that this is something like the divine right of kings. Sir, I would only say in reply that a poetic phrase or a picturesque description does not dispose of an argument ; I have never seen that result anywhere—certainly not in courts of law. If you accept that the right to freedom is a divine right, then I contend that the right to strike is a divine right (Hear, hear.) I go further and say that because ten people or twenty people or two hundred people simultaneously declare a strike, that cannot make any difference in the situation so far as the law is concerned. I know, Sir, that some will point out section 120A of the Indian Penal Code and I am going to deal with that matter before I leave this subject Now, Sir, section 120A of the Indian Penal Code is a section which deals with conspiracy. I wonder if members opposite wish to argue from it that there is no right to strike because a strike by a body of workers is a conspiracy. If they do, I would like those gentlemen opposite who rely on section 120A as a ground for submitting that there is no right to strike for a body of workers, to prove that a strike is a conspiracy. Unless they prove that a strike is a conspiracy section 120A will not apply, and I contend that a strike is not a conspiracy. An Honourable Member : Who says it is applicable ? It is a matter of public utility. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : I am coming to the question of public utility later on. Sir, unfortunately we have no decided cases in India. My research is not rewarded with a case where strikers have been hauled up under section 120A

209ON THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES BILL on the ground that it was a conspiracy. But I find some support from the English law on the subject, which also deals with strike in its aspect of conspiracy, and I will read to the House a short passage from a book called “The Legal Position of Trade Unions” by Scholosser. I read the passage at p. 76 : — “Strikes, therefore, and similar combinations to better the conditions of labour, are not in themselves unlawful at common law. There is no foundation for the proposition that strikes are per se illegal or unlawful by the law of England. It is true that occasional dicta are to be found to the effect that combinations to better the conditions of labour are unlawful at common law, but the courts have never accepted the law thus laid down, and eminent judges have expressed views to the contrary. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries no court treated combinations to better the conditions of labour as being contrary to common law, and none of the series of legislative enactments, resisting attempts of workmen to better the conditions of labour, purported to declare or rest upon the common law. If we accept an obiter dictum by Grose, J., in Rex v. Mawbey, there were no judicial dicta in support of the suggested proposition until after the Legislature swept away all those statutes by the Combination Act of 1925. Conclusions as to the common law which first appear in recent times, and are based upon an accepted principle of earlier date, are to be looked upon with great suspicion. Ever since 1824 the weight of authority is against this doctrine. Strikes per se are combinations” This is an important part of the judgment : “neither for accomplishing an unlawful end, nor for accomplishing a lawful end by unlawful means. The law is clear that workmen have a right to combine for their own protection, while the combination is to obtain a benefit which by law they can claim. The power of choice in respect of labour and terms, which one may exercise” This is the point I was trying to emphasise : “and declare singly, many, after consultation, may exercise jointly, and they may make simultaneously declaration of their choice, and may lawfully act thereon for the immediate purpose of obtaining the required terms. The maintenance of a strike is not necessarily illegal, and if a strike has taken place, in breach of contract, but the broken contracts have expired, those who help to maintain the strike by supporting the workmen after their current contracts have expired in a refusal to enter into new contracts of service on new terms, are not doing anything illegal. Thus combinations” This is the point to which I wish to draw the attention of the House, because it has a direct bearing on section 120A of the Indian Penal Code, “which result in injury to another may be unlawful, when the object of the

210 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES combination is injury” the words are “when the object of the combination is injury”: “and if the injury is effected, an action may lie for conspiracy. The question to be decided in each individual case is, haw far the resulting injury is ancillary to a legitimate combination and how far the combination exists for the purpose of injury.” Therefore, my submission is that in order to bring strikes under section 120A what would be necessary for the prosecution to prove is that the purpose of the strike was to cause injury. If injury merely resulted from the strike, that would not make the strike an unlawful combination within the meaning of section 120A. Therefore, my first contention is this that this Bill, by penalising a strike, is reducing the workers to a state of slavery and nothing else. The Bill really, in my judgment ought to be called “The Workers’ Civil Liberties Suspension Act”. That would be the proper title for it. Some have got the impression that, after all, the suspension is only for two months— until the conciliation proceedings are terminated—and after that the workers would be at liberty to strike if they wish. Sir, I would like to say that this would be a very wrong impression. My contention is that the provisions of this Bill, when they are set in operation, will bring about perpetual slavery and the workers will never be able to strike. Let us look at the provisions. First of all, the Bill provides that when the Act comes into operation, there is not to be any strike at all for one year. Whether conditions are such that a reasonable worker would accept them or whether conditions are such that no reasonable worker would accept them, for one year there is complete slavery. The workers are bound down to the terms mentioned in the Second Schedule. There is no escape, there is no going away from that position. What happens after the first year is over ? What happens is this. You have got to give notice ; that takes away a part of the time during which you cannot strike. Then after notice is given, time is allowed for reply. During the period of reply you cannot strike. Then, conciliation proceedings commence. They may last for two months, if the parties are fortunate, if the parties are reasonable ; but the Bill provides that the term may extend to four months. Therefore, from the date of the origin of the grievance of the workers, for four months and practically 25 days—I will stand corrected if my calculation is wrong because I have not gone into the details—the worker must do nothing. He must not talk, he must not deliver a speech, he must not organise, he must do nothing. All mobilisation, included a word or a speech or an action is penalised during this period. Suppose that no conciliation is effected during this long period of four months and 25 days—I submit a long period of gestation—what is to happen ? The worker is allowed only two months to strike after the conciliation period is over. I do not know whether my honourable friend the mover of the Bill thinks that two months is a sufficiently long period for the demobilised forces of labourers to mobilise for action. I have been an active worker in the

211ON THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES BILL labour field. I cannot say that I am a fieldman and I therefore do not know what are the difficulties which a person who is organising the workers for strike will have to meet. But looking at the situation from such experience as I possess as an observer in the City of Bombay, I have not the slightest hesitation that two months would be the most inadequate period for a body of labourers who have been held at bay so to say, for four months and 25 days to mobilise their forces in order to strike. If they do not strike within two months, what happens ? What happens is this that they are deemed in law to have accepted the situation. If they again raise their head and find out new grievances, the law says you shall again wait for four months and 25 days and allow conciliation to go on. Wait and see what we do. Wait and see, for four months and 25 days. Again if nothing happens at the end of four months and 25 days, if you think you can strike, do so within two months. If you do not and after two months you raise another grievance, you shall have to wait again for four months and 25 days. Sir, I would like to know whether such an endless cycle of don’ts would not produce complete slavery, perpetual slavery, of the workers for all time. If this is not a Bill for introducing slavery amongst workers, I would like to know what sort of Bill would introduce slavery. So much with regard to the provisions of the Bill which relate to strike. Now, Sir, it will be necessary and I say very instructive to compare the provisions of this Bill, in so far as they relate to strike, with the provisions contained in Trade Disputes Act of 1929. That is an Act which also imposes certain limitations upon the right to strike and it would be, therefore, very instructive to compare the provisions contained in that Act with the provisions contained in this Bill, so that the House may be in a position to realise in what direction we are moving, whether we are moving in the direction of slavery. Sir, the Act of 1929 imposes certain limitations upon the right of the workers to strike and it would be enough if I refer to two of its sections. That Act of 1929 penalises a general strike for political purposes. That is section 16 of the Act and the other section which is more relevant for my purpose is section 15 which penalises a strike without notice. Apparently there does appear to be some sort of similarity between the Act of 1929 and the present Bill in so far as this Bill also penalises a strike without notice. But, Sir, beyond that the one Bill is as different from the other as chalk is from cheese. The one has nothing to do with the other and, comparatively speaking, I have not the slightest hesitation in saying that this Bill is reactionary and retrograde, and that the author of this Bill is a far greater Tory than the author of the Act of 1929. Sir, let us compare the provisions of section 15 of the Act of 1929. As everyone who is acquainted with the subject knows, that section 15 of the Act of 1929 is restricted to public utilities. What that Act penalises is not all strikes, but strikes in what are called public utility services and this, I submit, is a fundamental difference between this Bill and the Act of 1929.