Vol. 2 · pages 231–235

212 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES Now, Sir, the question that I would like to ask is, is this departure from the position taken in 1929 any way justifiable ? And I think it would be desirable if I begin by stating what was the position of the Congress Party in 1929 when this Bill was placed before the Central Assembly. Now, Sir, I have taken the trouble to hunt up and read the report of the Select Committee which was appointed by the Central Legislature to consider the provisions of the Bill which ultimately became the Act of 1929 and confining my attention to the two contestants, if I may say so, the bureaucracy, I use the terms which are familiar on the other side, the bureaucracy, on the one hand and the Congress Party on the other, what were the points of contention there when this Act of 1929 was on the anvil ? I find that the points of difference were these two. Government wanted that public utility services should be left to be defined by them at their discretion. They did not want to give in the Act itself a definition of what was a public utility nor were they prepared at the time to enumerate what, in their opinion, were the public utility services. They said that a public utility and its importance depended upon the circumstances of the case. It may vary according to times and circumstances. A service which may not be a public utility at one time may be a public utility at another time and they felt that in the interests of society as was conceived and understood by them it was necessary that the situation should be left in a flux undefined to be defined at the discretion of the Government. Now the Congress stood for two things at the time. The one thing it stood for was that nothing should be left to the discretion of the bureaucracy, that it could not be persuaded to bureaucratic purposes and therefore the Congress Party took the attitude that no discretion ought to be left with the Government. Whatever public utility was to be brought within the purview of section 15 ought to be stated clearly in the Act itself. The second position which the Congress Party took in the year 1929 when the Bill came up was this. They said that the category of a public utility was too large and that a strike should not be made illegal only because it related to a public utility serivce. The position that they took was that it should be confined to what is called “social security services”. That was the position in 1929. In this contest Government gave up on one point. They agreed that a public utility should be defined in the Act and therefore you will find, Sir, that section 2 of the Act, which is an interpretation clause, has got a definition of what is a public utility and you have got there a public utility enumerated, Government not having any discretion to add to it or to take anything out of it. With regard to the other position, namely, narrowing the category of service to which the illegality of the strike was to be confined, Government did not yield. Government said that their formula that it should be extended to public utility services must stand and the Congress Party did not succeed, but that does not really matter for my argument, because my argument is this that in 1929 the Congress Party stood for restricting the illegality of the strike to social security services. Sir, I want to read from the report of the select

213ON THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES BILL committee some of the minutes which members of the Congress wrote. I believe the honourable member Mr. Jamnadas Mehta was a member of the Congress then, but I am not sure. Mr. Jamnadas M. Mehta : I have maintained that attitude even today. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : This is, Sir, from a minute written by Mr. Jamnadas Mehta, Mr. M. S. Sesha Aiyangar, Mr. S. C. Mitra and Mr. V. V. Jogiah : “The fundamental objections to the Bill as it emerges from the Select Committee remain unaffected. We feel that clauses 15 and onwards, far from settling trade disputes, will only multiply them ; they will embitter relations between the employer and the employed and will, as all experience of similar legislation testifies, be utilised by the authorities for crushing political propaganda unpleasant to the bureaucracy. If the object of the Bill is to develop and foster genuine trade union movement in the country, clause 15 and onwards will surely defeat that object.” That was the position that they took that no strike ought to be penalised even though it was applied to public utility services. The minute of dissent proceeds : “……. . But having failed in that object we are obliged to append this minute of dissent. Up to clause 14 the Bill is a genuine attempt towards settlement of trade disputes by means of courts of inquiry and boards of conciliation. We believe that so far as that portion of the Bill is concerned, it emerges from the Select Committee considerably improved and strengthened. Almost all the changes that have been made in the Bill up to that clause have served to make it more equitable and just. Of course we leave out of account the definition of the ‘public utility services’ in clause 2( g). That definition is consequential to clause 15 and should therefore be considered along with it. We believe that this clause is a great danger to friendly relations between the employers and the employed. A public service may be a ‘utility service’, but it does not therefore follow that a strike in such services without notice ought to be visited with criminal prosecution. It is true that a lock-out in such services has been made an offence also, but that does not affect the argument against making a strike a penal offence. We cannot understand why a strike in a postal, telegraph or telephone service or for the matter of that in any Railway service should be made a crime. No doubt such a strike is inconvenient and interferes with our ordinary comforts, but it is monstrous to claim that if any body of men refuses to minister to our comforts if any to claim that body as criminals especially when the strikers feel that these comforts and conveniences can only be satisfied by their own degradation and misery. Can it be seriously contended that the Frontier Mail and similar luxurious services are so vital to society that strikes thereon should be made illegal ?” I commend these last few lines to my honourable friends opposite. Then the quotation goes on : “For the Legislature to give sanction to so iniquitous a doctrine as the one which is embodied in clause 15 is to proclaim to the world that the

214 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES mass of mankind ought to remain wage slaves and that they would strike only on the pain of being clapped into jail. We are most anxious to promote the industrial advancement of our country but not by methods of coercion as proposed under this clause. We grant that services like the supply of water, light and sanitation are absolutely essential to the very existence of society and that any strike in such services should be discouraged by all legitimate means, not because they are ‘public utility services’ but because they are ‘social security services’ ; and as no man could be permitted to have interest against the very existence of society, we are not opposed to any legislation against making strikes in the ‘social security services’ illegal …………” Sir, that was the position the Congress members took then. Sir, I would also like to read an extract from the minute of dissent appended by Mr. Kunzru. He is a Liberal. I emphasize that because you would be able to know what even moderate men who did not profess the principles and policies of Congress said in 1929. This is what he says : “Clause 15 which deals with strikes in public utility services renders a strike in violation of the terms of services without previous notice illegal. If it was attempted to make sudden strike penal only in services where stoppage of work without adequate notice would endanger human health or life, the case for such action would theoretically be clear, however difficult the enforcement of the law might be in practice. But the definition of a public utility service in spite of the deletion of that provision by the Select Committee which would have vested Government with a discretionary power to declare any service a public utility service still includes services sudden strikes in which, whatever the inconvenience they may cause, cannot involve danger to life. However undesirable sudden strikes may be in any undertaking, there is no ground for making them penal where they do not affect the safety of the community. It may further be pointed out that sudden strikes in services which affect the existence of the community have been remedied by the provinces. Besides strikes, if resorted to in breach of contract, can be severely dealt with under the Indian Penal Code ……….” That was the attitude of Mr. Kunzru. I too agree in the proposition, that the right to strike without notice should be restricted, but it should be restricted only in case of service which are not public utility services but social security services. Now, Sir, that is in perfect consonance with the English legislation. In this connection, I would like to draw the attention of the House to what is called the Emergency Powers Act of 1920. It was passed by the British Parliament a year or two after the War was over. There too Government was given power to make regulations to deal with emergencies. I will just read one or two sections from that Act. Section 1 says : “If at any time it appears to His Majesty that any action has been taken or immediately threatened by any person or body of persons of

215ON THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES BILL such a nature and on so extensive a scale as to be calculated to be interfering with the supply and distribution ………. .” I desire to draw the attention of the House to these particular words : “of food, water, fuel or light or with means of locomotion, to deprive the community or any single portion of the community of the essential services ……. .” “His Majesty may, by proclamation declare that a state of emergency exists.” Then section 2 says : “Where a proclamation of emergency has been made, and so long as the proclamation is in force, it shall be lawful for His Majesty’s Court, to make regulations for securing the essentials of life to the community, and these regulations may confer or impose on a ……. . Government ……. . such powers and duties as His Majesty may deem necessary ……. .” The point to bear in mind is that all this is confined to cases of essential to public safety and life of the community. This has always been the view taken, that if you want to restrict the right to strike and to make it illegal, then you must do it only in relation to services on which the sustenance of the life of the community depends. Now, it is obvious that this Bill extends to every trade and every industry. I do not wish to say anything with the object of making fun, but I should like to illustrate my point by saying that, supposing tomorrow the Indian women—I hope they do not—adopt the fashion of painting their lips and some manufacturer who had a nose for money started an industry for making lip-sticks for supplying their needs, and if under this Act the workers went on strike, its provisions would fall upon their head like the sword of Damocles. Can anybody seriously maintain that the lip-stick industry is essential to life, that the right to strike should be curtailed because some women are deprived of the pleasure of having the usual paint on their lips ? Sir, this Government has not only let go by the board the attitude that it took in 1929, of restricting the penalty to strikes in social security services, but they have beaten the bureaucracy by going beyond the provisions of the Act of 1929. The bureaucracy had at least the sense, if I may say so, the responsibility, to realise that the right to strike was so important that it should not be penalised beyond the four corners of what was covered by public security ; and here is a Bill which, I would like to repeat, would make a strike in the lip-stick industry penal. All this, for what? What are we to gain by all these trials and tribulations which they are trying to impose upon these poor workmen ? The result, as I see, is to wait at the table of some gentlemen, whom the Bill calls the conciliator, for 4 months and 25 days. Beyond that I see nothing. The Honourable the Home Minister said that one of the reasons why this Bill has been introduced was because the State was taking upon its own shoulders to collective bargaining. I think he said something to that effect. If I am wrong, I hope he will correct me.

216 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES The Honourable Mr. K. M. Munshi : No ; not taking upon its shoulders collective bargaining, but regulating collective bargaining. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Regulating collective bargaining. I shall be very candid. What is the use of these regulations ? There are heaps of regulations in the Civil Procedure Code. Is the litigant interested in them ? The litigant is interested in the result of his suit. With all the formalities, with all the provisions and procedure, who is to give notice, what is to happen after notice, who is to draft the written statement and all other things—the hungry workman is not interested in them in the least. The Honourable Mr. K. M. Munshi : Therefore, repeal the Civil Procedure Code ? Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : I do not say anything of the kind. What I am saying is, with all the provisions that they have got, they should have bucked up, they should have had the courage and said “we shall compulsorily arbitrate, whether you agree to it or not”. (Interruption.) It is another matter whether I agree or not. If you had taken up that attitude, I could have certainly understood it, because the position then would have been this, that at the end of 4 months and 25 days you would have been certain of some tangible result. An Honourable Member : That would have been slavery to the wage earner. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : You have enough, and you need not have been abashed for going a step further in this Bill. (Interruption). The Honourable the Speaker : Order, order. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Therefore, Sir, what is all this for ? You have to go through several stages—a Registrar, a Conciliator, and a Board of Conciliators if both parties agree. It is only a case of securing appearances before certain amiable gentlemen who will talk sweetly to different people and bring about probably a good temper, if a hungry man who wants some thing can be said to be in a good temper. I do not see anything in it. This is, in my judgment, absolutely a futility, an utter futility which can have no tangible result at all. The only tangible result of this will be that this delaying process for 4 months and 25 days will disable the worker from going on strike ultimately. Here again, I would like to draw the attention of the House to the contrast that exists between the Bombay Act of 1934 and the present Bill. Sir, when the Bill of 1934 was on the anvil, it was suggested that a strike should be prohibited during the period of conciliation. There was a proposal to that effect. But that proposal was rejected by the Honourable Sir Robert Bell. It was even pressed upon him that if a strike was not prohibited, at least picketing ought to be prohibited, but he refused even to be a party to that. (An Honourable Member : No, no.) As there is a challenge, I will read a portion of his speech. This is what he says on page 180, Vol. XL, of the Bombay Legislative Council Debates : “I wish to refer to one matter connected with the subject of picketing. In clause 15 you will see that provision is made for preventing picketing