Vol. 8 · pages 286–290
Pakistan or the Partition of India
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261PAKISTAN : COMMUNAL AGGRESSION
means of the pressure of a fast unto death. * Some people
encouraged by this success actually agitated for revision of
that part of the Award which related to the Muslims and some
Muslims were even found to be in favour of entering into such
negotiations.† This alarmed the Muslim community. The other
reason for the fear of a revision of the terms of the grants arose
out of certain amendments in the clauses in the Government of
India Bill which were made in the House of Commons permitting
such revision under certain conditions. To remove these fears and
to give complete security to the Muslims against hasty and hurried
revision of the grants, His Majesty’s Government authorized the
Government of India to issue the following communique‡:—
“It has come to the notice of His Majesty’s Government that
the impression is prevalent that what is now Clause 304 of the
Government of India Bill (numbered 285 in the Bill as first
introduced and 299 in the Bill as amended by the Commons in
Committee) has been amended during the passage of the Bill
through the Commons in such a way as to give His Majesty’s
Government unfettered power to alter at any time they may think
fit the constitutional provisions based upon what is commonly
known as Government’s Communal Award.
“His Majesty’s Government think it desirable to give the
following brief explanation both of what they consider is the
practical effect of Clause 304 in relation to any change in the
Communal Award and of their own policy in relation to any such
change.
“Under this Clause there is conferred on the Governments
and Legislatures in India, after the expiry of ten years, the right
of initiating a proposal to modify the provisions and regulating
various matters relating to the constitution of the Legislature,
including such questions as were covered by the Communal Award.
“ The Clause also imposes on the Secretary of State the
duty of laying before Parliament from the Governor-General or
the Governor as the case may be his opinion as to the proposed
amendment and in particular as to the effect which it would have
on the interests of any minority and of informing Parliament of
any action which he proposed to take.
“ Any change in the constitutional provisions resulting from
this procedure can be effected by an Order in Council, but this
is subject to the proviso that the draft of the proposed Order has
been affirmatively approved by both Houses of Parliament by a
resolution. The condition is secured by Clause 305 of the Bill.
* This resulted in the Poona Pact which was signed on 24th September 1932.
† For the efforts to gel the Muslim part of the Award revised, see All-India
Register, 1932. Vol. II, pp. 281-315.
‡The communique is dated Simla July 2, 1935.
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262 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
“Before the expiry of ten years there is no similar constitutional
initiative residing in the Governments and the Legislatures of
India. Power is, however, conferred by the Clause to make such
a change by an Order in Council (always with the approval of
both Houses of Parliament) even before the end of ten years,
but within the first ten years (and indeed subsequently, if
the initiative has not come from the Legislatures of India)
it is incumbent upon the Secretary of State to consult the
Governments and the Legislatures of India who will be affected
(unless the change is of a minor character) before any Order in
Council is laid before Parliament for its approval.
“The necessity for the powers referred to in the preceding
paragraph is due to such reasons as the following:—
“ (a) It is impossible to foresee when the necessity may arise
for amending minor details connected with the franchise and
the constitution of legislatures, and for such amendment it will
be clearly disadvantageous to have no method available short
of a fresh amending Act of Parliament, nor is it practicable
statutorily to separate such details from the more important
matter such as the terms of the Communal Award;
“(b) It might also become desirable, in the event of a unanimous
agreement between the communities in India, to make a
modification in the provisions based on the Communal Award ;
and for such an agreed change it would also be disadvantageous
to have no other method available than an amending Act of
Parliament.
“Within the range of the Communal Award His Majesty’s
Government would not propose, in the exercise of any power
conferred by this Clause, to recommend to Parliament any
change unless such changes had been agreed to between the
communities concerned.
“In conclusion, His Majesty’s Government would again
emphasise the fact that none of the powers in Clause 304 can,
in view of the provisions in Clause 305, be exercised unless
both Houses of Parliament agreed by an affirmative resolution.”
After taking into account what the Muslims demanded at the
R. T. C. and what was conceded to them, any one could have
thought that the limit of Muslim demands was reached and that
the 1932 settlement was a final settlement. But, it appears that
even with this the Musalmans are not satisfied. A further list of
new demands for safeguarding the Muslim position seems to be
ready. In the controversy that went on between Mr. Jinnah and
the Congress in the year 1938, Mr. Jinnah was asked to disclose
his demands which he refused to do. But these demands have
come to the surface in the correspondence that passed between
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263PAKISTAN : COMMUNAL AGGRESSION
Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah in the course of the
controversy and they have been tabulated by Pandit Nehru
in one of his letters to Mr. Jinnah. His tabulation gives the
following items as being matters of disputes and requiring
settlement* :—
(1) The fourteen points formulated by the Muslim League
in 1929.
(2) The Congress should withdraw all opposition to the
Communal Award and should not describe it as a negation
of nationalism.
(3) The share of the Muslims in the state services should
be definitely fixed in the constitution by statutory enactment.
(4) Muslim personal law and culture should be guaranteed
by statute.
(5) The Congress should take in hand the agitation in
connection with the Sahidganj Mosque and should use its
moral pressure to enable the Muslims to gain possession of
the Mosque.
(6) The Muslims’ right to call Azan and perform their
religious ceremonies should not be fettered in any way.
(7) Muslims should have freedom to perform cow- slaughter.
(8) Muslim majorities in the Provinces, where such majorities
exist at present, must not be affected by any territorial redistribution or adjustments.
(9) The ‘Bande Mataram’ song should be given up.
(10) Muslims want Urdu to be the national language of
India and they desire to have statutory guarantees that the
use of Urdu shall not be curtailed or damaged.
(11) Muslim representation in the local bodies should be
governed by the principles underlying the Communal Award,
that is, separate electorates and population strength.
(12) The tricolour flag should be changed or alternately the
flag of the Muslim League should be given equal importance.
(13) Recognition of the Muslim League as the one
authoritative and representative organization of Indian
Muslims.
(14) Coalition Ministries should be formed.
* Indian Annual Register, 1938, Vol. I, p. 369.
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264 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
With this new list, there is no knowing where the Muslims
are going to stop in their demands. Within one year, that is,
between 1938 and 1939, one more demand and that too of a
substantial character, namely 50 per cent. share in everything,
has been added to it. In this catalogue of new demands
there are some which on the face of them are extravagant
and impossible, if not irresponsible. As an instance, one may
refer to the demand for fifty-fifty and the demand for the
recognition of Urdu as the national language of India. In 1929,
the Muslims insisted that in allotting seats in Legislatures, a
majority shall not be reduced to a minority or equality.* This
principle, enunciated by themselves, it is now demanded, shall
be abandoned and a majority shall be reduced to equality. The
Muslims in 1929 admitted that the other minorities required
protection and that they must have it in the same manner as
the Muslims. The only distinction made between the Muslims
and other minorities was as to the extent of the protection.
The Muslims claimed a higher degree of protection than was
conceded to the other minorities on the ground of their political
importance. The necessity and adequacy of protection for the
other minorities the Muslims never denied. But with this new
demand of 50 per cent. the Muslims are not only seeking to
reduce the Hindu majority to a minority but they are also
cutting into the political rights of the other minorities. The
Muslims are now speaking the language of Hitler and claiming
a place in the sun as Hitler has been doing for Germany. For
their demand for 50 per cent. is nothing but a counterpart of
the German claims for Deutschland Uber Alles and Lebensraum
for themselves, irrespective of what happens to other minorities.
Their claim for the recognition of Urdu as the national
language of India is equally extravagant. Urdu is not only not
spoken all over India but is not even the language of all the
Musalmans of India. Of the 68 millions of Muslims† only 28
millions speak Urdu. The proposal of making Urdu the national
language means that the language of 28 millions of Muslims
is to be imposed particularly upon 40 millions of Musalmans
or generally upon 322 millions of Indians.
* See point No. 3 in Mr. Jinnah’s 14 points.
† These figures relate to the Census of 1921.
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265PAKISTAN : COMMUNAL AGGRESSION
It will thus be seen that every time a proposal for the reform
of the constitution comes forth, the Muslims are there, ready with
some new political demand or demands. The only check upon
such indefinite expansion of Muslim demands is the power of
the British Government, which must be the final arbiter in any
dispute between the Hindus and the Muslims. Who can confidently
say that the decision of the British will not be in favour of the
Muslims if the dispute relating to these new demands was referred
to them for arbitration ? The more the Muslims demand the more
accommodating the British seem to become. At any rate, past
experience shows that the British have been inclined to give the
Muslims more than what the Muslims had themselves asked. Two
such instances can be cited.
One of these relates to the Lucknow Pact. The question was
whether the British Government should accept the Pact. The
authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report were disinclined to
accept it for reasons which were very weighty. Speaking of the
weightages granted to the Muslims by the Lucknow Pact, the
authors of the Joint Report observed*:—
“Now a privileged position of this kind is open to the
objection, that if any other community hereafter makes good
a claim to separate representation, it can be satisfied only by
deducting the non-Muslim seats, or by a rateable deduction
from both Muslim and non-Muslim ; and Hindu and Muslim
opinion are not likely to agree which process should be adopted.
While, therefore, for reasons that we explain subsequently
we assent to the maintenance of separate representation for
Muhammadans, we are bound to reserve our approval of the
particular proposals set before us, until we have ascertained
what the effect upon other of interests will be, and have made
fair provision for them.”
Notwithstanding this grave flaw in the Lucknow Pact,
the Government of India, in its despatch referred to above,
recommended that the terms of the Pact should be improved in
so far as it related to the Muslims of Bengal. Its reasons make
a strange reading. It argued that:—
“The Muhammadan representation which they [the
authors of the Pact] propose for Bengal is manifestly
insufficient.† It is questionable whether the claims
of the Muhammadan population of Eastern Bengal
* Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 1918, para 163.
† The Government of India felt that injustice was done to the Punjab as well.
But as there was no such special reason as there was in the case of Bengal,
namely, the unsettling of the partition, they did not propose any augmentation
in its representation as settled by the Pact.