Vol. 9 · pages 506–510

477 WHAT CONGRESS AND GANDHI HAVE DONE TO THE UNTOUCHABLES : A PLEA TO THE FOREIGNER Even a simpleton can imagine what answer they are likely to return. I am sure that a theory which produces such a result will be regarded as an absurd one on all hands without exceptions. How then can such a theory be applied to India where the difference between the governing class and the servile class is the same both in degree and in kind as the difference between French and Germans, Turks and Russians or Chinese and Japanese ? The fact is that the governing class in India blinded by self-interest is unmindful of the absurdity of the argument of naked efficiency and being conscious that it has the power to convert its opinion into law does not bother what the servile classes have to say on the point. The governing class does not bother to inquire into the ways and means by which it has acquired its supremacy. It does not feel the necessity of doing so, partly because it believes that it acquired its supremacy by dint of merit and partly because it believes that no matter how it acquired its power it is enough that it is in a position to dictate its policy on the servile classes. Assuming that the governing class did not find it necessary to examine the ways and means by which it obtained its supremacy what would it find ? Strange as it may seem the governing class has obtained its power by the same system of reservations which it is now opposing on the ground of communalism. Many may find it difficult to accept the truth of this statement. Those who have any doubt need do no more than read the Manu Smriti, the Bible of the Hindus. What will they find in it ? They will find and will no doubt be shocked to know that the Brahmins, the chief and the leading element in the governing class, acquired their political power not by force of intellect—for intellect is nobody’s monopoly—but by sheer communalism. According to the Laws of Manu Smriti the post of the Purohit, King’s Chaplain and Lord Chancellor, the posts of the Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court and the post of Ministers to the Crown were all reserved for the Brahmins. Even for the post of the Commander-in-Chief the Brahmin was recommended as a fit and a proper person though it was not in terms reserved for him. . All the strategic posts having been reserved for the Brahmins it goes without saying that all ministerial posts came to be reserved for the Brahmins. This is not all. The Brahmin was not content with reserving places of profit and

478 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES power for his class. He knew that mere reservation will not do. He must prevent rivals shooting up from other non-Brahmin communities equally qualified to hold the posts and agitate and blow up the system of reservations. In addition to reserving all executive posts in the State for Brahmins a law was made whereby education was made the monopoly and privilege of Brahmins. As has already been pointed out the law made it a crime for the Shudra, i.e., the lower orders of Hindu Society to acquire learning, the infringement of which was followed by not only heavy but cruel and inhuman punishment such as cutting the tongue of the criminal and filling his ear with hot molten lead. It is true that these reservations do not exist under the British rule. But it must be admitted that though the reservations made by Manu have gone, the advantages derived from their continuance over several centuries have remained. In asking for reservations the servile classes are not asking for anything new or anything extraordinary. The demand for reservation is a demand for protection against the aggressive communalism of the governing class, which wants to dominate the servile class in all fields of life and without imposing on the governing class any such ignominious conditions as was done by the Brahmins for their own aggrandisement and for the perpetuation of their own domination on the Shudra, namely, to make it a crime for the governing class to learn or to acquire property. This argument of naked efficiency has also to be considered from the point of view of public welfare. It was said by Campbell Bannerman in the course of a debate in the House of Commons on Ireland, that self-government is better than good government. The statement had become so popular in India that it had become more than a mere slogan. It had become a maxim. As it stands the statement is quite absurd. Campbell Bannerman was not contrasting self-government with good government. He was contrasting self-government with efficient government or rather with “resolute government” to use the phrase of his opponent Lord Salisbury. There is no denying that self-government must be good government, otherwise it is not worth having. The question is, how is good government to be had. Some people seem to be under the impression that as self-government is a sovereign government it is bound to result in good government. This is one of the greatest delusions from which most people in dependent

479 WHAT CONGRESS AND GANDHI HAVE DONE TO THE UNTOUCHABLES : A PLEA TO THE FOREIGNER countries are suffering. Those who are living in such a delusion had better read what Prof. Dicey has to say on this point. Discussing the question what persons and bodies with full sovereign powers can do Dicey has the following observations to make :— “The actual exercise of authority by any sovereign whatever and notably by Parliament, is bounded or controlled by two limitations. Of these the one is an external, the other is an internal limitation. “The external limit to the real power of a sovereign consists in the possibility or certainty that his subjects or a large number of them, will disobey or resist his laws. “This limitation exists even under the most despotic monarchies. A Roman Emperor, or a French King during the middle of the eighteenth century, was (as is the Russian Czar at the present day) in strictness a ‘sovereign’ in the legal sense of that term. He had absolute legislative authority. Any law made by him was binding, and there was no power in the empire or kingdom which could annul such law . . . But it would be an error to suppose that the most absolute ruler who ever existed could in reality make or change every law at his pleasure . . . “The authority, that is to say, even of a despot, depends upon the readiness of his subjects or of some portion of his subjects to obey his behests; and this readiness to obey must always be in reality limited. This is shown by the most notorious facts of history. None of the early Caesars could at their pleasure have subverted the worship of fundamental institutions of the Roman world . . . The Sultan could not abolish Mahomedanism. Louis the Fourteenth at the height of his power could revoke the Edict of Nantes, but he would have found it impossible to establish the supremacy of Protestantism, and for the same reason which prevented James the Second from establishing the supremacy of Roman Catholicism . . . What is true of the power of a despot or of the authority of a constituent assembly is specially true of the sovereignty of Parliament ; it is limited on every side by the possibility of popular resistance. Parliament might legally tax the Colonies ; Parliament might without any breach of law change the succession to the throne or abolish the monarchy ; but everyone knows that in the present state of the world the British Parliament will do none of these things. In each case widespread resistance would result from legislation which.

480 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES though legally valid, is in fact beyond the stretch of Parliamentary power. * * * “There is an internal limit to the exercise of sovereign power itself. Even a despot exercises his powers in accordance with his character, which is itself moulded by the circumstances under which he lives, including under that head the moral feelings of the time and the society to which he belongs. The Sultan could not if he would, change the religion of the Mahommedan world, but if he could do so it is in the very highest degree improbable that the head of Mahommedanism should wish to overthrow the religion of Mahomet; the internal check on the exercise of the Sultan’s power is at least as strong as the external limitation. People sometimes ask the idle question why the Pope does not introduce this or that reform ? The true answer is that a revolutionist is not the kind of man who becomes a Pope and that the man who becomes a Pope has no wish to be a revolutionist . . . ” I have already pointed out that it is not enough for the servile classes to be content with the mere fact that their country has become an independent and a sovereign state. It is necessary for them to go further and to find out who are likely to be the instruments of the State, in other words who is going to be the governing class. Dicey’s observations and the profound truth which underlies them no one can question—add a further point namely that for good government, ability and efficiency of the governing class are not enough. What is necessary is to have in the governing class the will to do good or to use Dicey’s language, freedom from internal limitations arising out of selfish class interests. Efficiency combined with selfish class interests instead of producing good government is far more likely to become a mere engine of suppression of the servile classes. In selecting the instrumentalities of the State considerations of class bias in the instrumentalities cannot be overlooked. It is in fact fundamental to good government. It is unfortunate that the importance of this fact is not generally recognized even by those who regard themselves as the champions of democracy. Karl Marx was the first to recognize it and take account of it in the administration of the Paris Commune. It is unnecessary to say that it is to-day the basis of Government in Soviet Russia. The demand for reservations put forth by the servile classes in India is essentially based upon the same considerations

481 WHAT CONGRESS AND GANDHI HAVE DONE TO THE UNTOUCHABLES : A PLEA TO THE FOREIGNER pointed out by Dicey, advocated by Marx and adopted by Russia. Only those who belong to the servile class can be trusted to protect the interest of that class. This consideration is so important that the principle of efficiency cannot be allowed to altogether override it. If the governing class in India stands on the principle of efficiency and efficiency alone it is because it is actuated by the selfish motive of monopolizing the instrumentalities of Government. IX The foregoing discussion has extended over such length that the foreigner is likely to miss the points which it is intended to bring out. It may therefore be well to assemble them together with a view to underline them. The main problems, which those desirous of establishing democracy in India must face, are:—(1) the position of the governing class of India, (2) the aims and objects of the governing class towards the servile classes, (3) the raison d’etre of the demands of the servile classes for constitutional safeguards and (4) the relation of the governing class to the Congress. Regarding the first point the argument is that the position of the governing class in India is quite different from the position of the governing classes in other countries of the world. It is not easy to understand this difference, nor is it easy to state it in expressive terms. Perhaps the illustration of a bar and a hyphen may help to give a clear idea of what the difference is. Nobody can mistake the difference between a hyphen and a bar. A bar divides but does not link. A hyphen does both. It divides but it also links. In India the governing classes and the servile classes are divided by a bar. In other countries there exists between them only a hyphen. The resultant difference is a very crucial one. In other countries, there is a continuous replenishment of the governing class by the incorporation of others who do not belong to it but who have reached the same elevation as the governing class. In India, the governing class is a close corporation in which nobody, not born in it, is admitted. In other countries where the governing class is not a close preserve, where there is social endosmosis between it and the rest, there is a mental assimilation and accommodation