Vol. 2 · pages 381–385

362 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES community is above the rest ; that it is a still greater evil that sections of public should be taught to weigh themselves in the scales of political importance in such a manner as to lead one to look up to and the other to look down upon ; that the longer such notions are suffered to last the more difficult it is to eradicate them and that there can scarcely ever be a fairer opportunity for dispelling them than at the time when Parliament promulgates a new code of constitutional law binding alike on persons of different races and religion. 77. Equal treatment of all the minorities in the matter of representation is only a part of the problem of the representation of minorities. To determine a satisfactory quantitative measure for the distribution of seats is another and a more important part of the problem. But this is a most controversial question. Of the two opposing theories one is that the representation of a minority should be in a strict proportion to its population. The other theory which is strongly held by the minorities is that such representation must be adequate. I do not think that the arithmetical theory of representation can be agreed to. If the Legislative Council was a zoo or a museum wherein a certain number of each species was to be kept, such a theory of minority representation would have been tolerable. But it must be recognised that the Legislative Council is not a zoo or a museum. It is a battle ground for the acquisition of rights, the destruction of privileges and the prevention of injustice. Viewed in this light a minority may find that its representation is in full measure of its population yet it is so small that in every attempt it makes to safeguard or improve its position against the onslaught of an hostile majority it is badly beaten. Unless the representation of minorities is intended to provide political fun the theory of representation according to population must be discarded and some increase of representation beyond their population ratio must be conceded to them by way of weightage. 78. To recognise the necessity of weightage is no doubt important. But what is even of greater importance is to recognise that this weightage must be measured out to the minorities on some principle that is both intelligent and reasonable. For it must be recognised that the minorities under the pretext of seeking adequate protection are prone to make demands which must be characterised as preposterous. To avoid this we must define what we mean by adequacy of representation. No doubt adequacy is not capable of exact definition, but its indefiniteness will be considerably narrowed if we keep before our mind certain broad considerations. First of all a distinction must be made in the matter of minority representation between adequacy on the one hand and supremacy on the other. By supremacy, I mean such a magnitude of representation as would make the minority a dictator. By adequacy of representation I mean such a magnitude of representation as would make it worth the while of any party from the majority to seek an alliance with the minority. Where a party is compelled to seek an alliance with a minority, the minority is undoubtedly

363PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE in the position of a dictator. On the other hand where a party is only drawn to seek an alliance with the minority, the minority is only adequately represented. The first thing, therefore, that should be kept in mind in the matter of the allotment of seats to minorities is to avoid both the extremes— inadequacy as well as supremacy. These extremes can in my opinion be avoided if we adopt the rule that minority representation shall, in the main, be so regulated that the number of seats to which a minority is entitled will be a figure which will be the ratio of its population to the total seats multiplied by some factor which is greater than one and less than two. 79. This principle, it is true, merely defines the limits within which the representation of a minority must be fixed. It still leaves unsettled and vague with what this multiplier should vary. My suggestion is that it should vary with the needs of the particular minority concerned. By this method we arrive at a principle for measuring out the weightage to the minorities which is both intelligible and reasonable. For, the needs of a minority are capable of more or less exact ascertainment. There will be general agreement that the needs of a minority for political protection are commensurate with the power it has to protect itself in the social struggle. That power obviously depends upon the educational and economic status of the minorities. The higher the educational and economic status of a minority the lesser is the need for that minority of being politically protected. On the other hand the lower the educational and economic status of a minority, the greater will be the need for its political protection. 80. Taking my stand on the sure foundation of the principle of equality on the one hand and the principle of adequacy on the other I feel I must demur to the allotment of seats proposed by my colleagues to the different minorities. My proposal is that out of 140 seats the Mohamedans should have 33 and the Depressed Classes 15. This gives the Mohamedans 23 per cent. and the Depressed Classes 10.7 per cent. of the total seats in the Council. By this, the Mohamedans get nearly 4 per cent. and the Depressed Classes 2 per cent. above their respective population ratios. This much weightage to the respective communities is, in my opinion, reasonable and necessary and may be allowed. Besides my proposal has one thing in its favour and that is, it keeps the ratio of Mohamedan representation unaltered. In the present Council, the Mohamedans have 23 per cent. of the total representation. As a result of my proposal they will have the same ratio of representation in the new Council. 81. In view of the fact that some people disfavour, I do not say oppose, the degree of representation I have allowed to the Depressed Classes, I think it is necessary that I should clear the cloud by additional explanation. There is no doubt that the initial representation allowed to the Depressed Classes was grossly unfair. The authors of the Joint Report expressly stated (paragraph 153) “we intend to make the best arrangements we can for (the) representation (of the Depressed Classes)”. But this promise was thrown to the wind by the Southborough Committee which was subsequently

364 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES appointed to devise franchise, frame constituencies and to recommend what adjustments were needed to be made in the form of the proposed popular Government as a consequence of the peculiar social conditions prevalent in India. So grossly indifferent was the Southborough Committee to the problem of making adequate provision for safeguarding the interests of the Depressed Classes that even the Government of India which was not particular in this matter, felt and called upon in paragraph 13 of then Despatch on the Report of the Southborough Committee to observe : “We accept the proposals (for non-official nomination) generally. But there is one Community whose case appears to us do require more consideration than the Committee gave it. The Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms clearly recognised the problem of the Depressed Classes and gave a pledge respecting them. The castes described as ‘Hindus—others’ in the Committee’s Report though they are defined in varying terms, are broadly speaking all the same kind of people. Except for differences in the rigidity of their exclusion they are all more or less in the position of the Madras Panchamas, definitely outside the part of the Hindu Community which is allowed access to their temples. They amount to about one-fifth of the total population, and have not been represented at all in the Morley-Minto Councils. The Committee’s Report mentions the Depressed Classes twice but only to explain that in the absence of satisfactory electorates they have been provided, or by nomination. It does not discuss the position of these people of their capacity for looking after themselves. Nor does it explain the amount of nomination which it suggests for them. Paragraph 24 of the Report (of the Franchise Committee) justified the restriction of the nominated seats on grounds which do not suggest that the Committee were referring to the Depressed Classes. The measure of representation which they proposed for this Community is as follows : Province Total population in millions Population of Depressed classes in millions Total Seats Seats for the Depressed Classes Madras .. .. 39.8 6.3 120 2 Bombay .. .. 19.5 .6 113 1 Bengal .. .. 45.0 9.9 127 1 United Provinces .. .. 47.0 10.1 120 1 Punjab .. .. 19.5 1.7 85 .... Bihar and Orissa .. .. 32.4 9.3 100 1 Central Provinces .. .. 12.0 3.7 72 1 Assam .. .. 6.0 .3 54 .... 221.2 41.9 791 7 These figures speak for themselves. It is suggested that the one-fifth of the entire population of British India should be allotted seven seats out of

365PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE practically 800. It is true that in all the councils there will be roughly a one- sixth proportion of officials who may be expected to bear in mind the interests of the Depressed ; but that arrangement is not, in our opinion, what the Report on Reforms aims at. The authors stated that the Depressed Classes should also learn the lesson of self-protection. It is surely fanciful to hope that this result can be expected from including a single member of the Community in an assembly where there are 60 to 90 Caste Hindus. To make good the principles of paragraphs 151, 152, 155 of the Report we must treat the out-castes more generously. . . . . . . . . .” 82. Even the Joint Select Committee recognised that the Depressed Classes were unjustly treated in the matter of representation by the Southborough Committee. For the Committee in its Report felt bound to observe that “the representation proposed for the Depressed Classes is inadequate. Within the definition are comprised, as shown in the Report of the Franchise Committee, a large proportion of the whole population of India. They think that the Government of India should, as it advises, be instructed to give such classes a larger share of representation by nomination, regard being had to the numbers of Depressed Classes in each Province, and after consultation with the Local Governments. This representation should, if necessary, be in addition to, but not in diminution of, the general electorate.” All this of course was of no avail and the wrong done by the Southborough Committee to the Depressed Classes remained unredressed. The present is not an attempt to give excessive representation to the Depressed Classes. It is only an attempt to rectify the wrong done. Nor can it be said that in suggesting the measure of representation it is open to the objection of being extravagant. For, even the Muddiman Committee which said that there was “a very general recognition of the fact that it is desirable that both these interests (i.e., the labouring classes and the Depressed Classes) should receive further representation” and expressed itself as being “in agreement with this view” proposed to give them 11 seats in a Legislative Council of 113. If 11 seats out of 113 was a reasonable allotment, then the allotment of 15 out of 140 must be admitted to be very moderate. The quota of 15 appears excessive only because the initial quota was small. Those who object to the quota of 15 because it is out of proportion to the existing quota forget that the initial quota of seats which they are adopting as the standard measure is neither just nor proper. 83. There is one other matter which needs to be cleared up. My colleagues in paragraph 16 of their Report in which they discuss the question of the allotment of seats to the Mohamedan community say, “Two of our members, Sirdar Mujumdar and Dr. Ambedkar, are of the opinion that this arrangement can stand only so long as the Lucknow pact stands as regards all provinces.” My colleagues have misunderstood me and have therefore misrepresented me. What I wanted to point out was that as they had not justified communal electorates or the number of seats to be given to the Mohamedans it would be better if they stated in their report that this was

366 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES in pursuance of the Lucknow pact. The way in which my colleagues have reported me seems to suggest that I support the Lucknow pact. I take this opportunity to say that the suggestion is quite unwarranted. II. Geographical distribution of seats 84. My difference with my colleagues is not confined only to the question of allotment of seats to the different minorities. It extends also to the question of distribution of seats among the different constituencies. One unpleasant feature of the Council as now constituted is the over- representation of some part and an under-representation of the rest. The enormous extent of the evil is made clear by the following figures : Area in Square miles Population Land Revenue demand for 1925-26 Seats in the Council at present Rs. Maharashtra .. .. 47,854 8,536,217 2,18,18,155 25 Gujarat .. .. 10,118 2,958,849 99,41,264 16 Karnatak .. .. 18,870 3, 188,523 82,91,225 8 Sind .. .. 46,506 3,279,377 1,03,85,031 19 85. How glaring are the inequalities becomes evident from the above table. Taking population as the basis, Maharashtra and Karnatak are grossly under-represented. Adopting representation of Gujarat as the standard, Maharashtra ought to be allowed 48 seats and Karnatak 17. Even taking revenue as the basis of distribution, Maharashtra and Karnatak have undoubtedly been treated quite unfairly. For, on that basis also Maharashtra is entitled to 32 and Karnatak 15. This demand for equal electoral power is not a mere sentimental demand or a demand for exact electoral symmetry. It has also behind it ample theoretical justification. For, in a system in which the value of a vote is high in one constituency and low in another, it is open to objection that every member of the community has not an equal share with each of the rest of the people in the choice of their rulers. But even if the principle of exact equivalence of all votes be not treated as a fundamental principle of political justice, yet the differences of this kind do not fail to produce the evil consequences of the over-representation of one part of the country or one set of opinions or interests at the expense of the other. Experience has shown that the existing distribution of seats has unduly divided the centre of gravity of legislative and executive action to certain parts of the Presidency to the prejudice of other parts of the Presidency, with the result that the latter have unintentionally been deprived of an adequate share of consideration and attention from the Government. From this practical point of view the existing distribution of seats is a grievance, the justice of which cannot be denied. As matters now stand Karnatak and Maharashtra can never exercise in this Province that influence on the Government to which they consider themselves entitled by