Vol. 2 · pages 391–395

372 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES one near at hand. The constitution of Ceylon had also given recognition to pacts and agreements between various organisations allowing communal representation and communal distribution of seats. But the Ceylon Commission of 1928 was emphatic in its view that “in any case, in considering afresh the whole problem of representation, private arrangements between races or groups, while worthy of attention, cannot take precedence of considerations in the interests of the Ceylon people as a whole.” It had therefore no hesitation in revising the whole scheme of representation in Ceylon out of recognition. What is asked herein is no more than what is done elsewhere. 92. It is further to be remembered that the Lucknow Pact is valueless not merely because its terms, to use the words of Government of India, “were the result rather of political negotiation than of deliberate reason,” but also because it was brought about by organisations neither of which had any real authority to speak in the name of those on whose behalf they purported to act. The All-India Muslim League was not entitled to speak for all Mohamedans, and that it was the view of the Government of India in their despatch on the Report of the Southborough Committee is abundantly clear. Regarding the Congress, it is indisputable that it is a body which does not represent the vast mass of the Non-Brahmins and the Depressed Classes. A pact arrived at by organisations which are not constituent assemblies of the mass of people may bind themselves, but they certainly cannot bind the generality of the people. To give the pact an authority as though it was treaty negotiated between duly empowered plenipotentiaries of different States is to assume in the League and the Congress an authority which they did not possess. It has become necessary to assess the binding force of the agreement because of the view taken by the Government of Bombay that, “Any change in the direction of abolishing separate electorates must, however, be based on agreement between the two communities, and cannot be forced on the Mohamedans against their wish. The question is also an All-India one and can hardly be dealt with on different lines for each Presidency. The Government of Bombay adhere to the view which they had expressed in 1916 that communal electorates are not acceptable to them and that their abolition is desirable, if it can be secured with the consent of both parties as in the case of the Lucknow Pact.” In my opinion this is an attitude which is as irresponsible as it is dangerous. It is irresponsible because it involves the surrender of the right of Parliament to decide in the matter. That the Government of India thought it wise not to “ignore” the pact, which in their opinion represented a genuine attempt on the part of the two communities upon so highly controversial a subject and “on behalf of the larger community at least a subordination of their immediate interests to the cause of unanimity and united political advance,” is true. But that is far from saying that the Government of India or any other authority held the view that on the question of Mohamedan representation

373PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE their position was merely to register the decision which the Congress and the League may by mutual negotiations make. Indeed, Sir William Vincent was careful to point out that “in this matter (the Government of India) cannot delegate (its) responsibility to Parliament into other hands.” 93. The attitude taken by the Bombay Government is dangerous because, admitting that an error has been committed, it refuses to take upon itself the task of correcting it. I would have looked upon such an attitude as a pardonable sin if the error was not an error in the constitutional arrangement of the country. But unfortunately it is an error in the constitution, and, having found its lodgment in a most vital part thereof, it affects its working in a fatal manner. An error of such a character cannot be tolerated. A mistake in constitutional innovation directly affects the entire community and every part of it. It may be fraught with calamity or ruin, public or private, and correction is virtually impossible. The Government of Bombay practically takes for granted that all constitutional changes are final and must be submitted to, whatever their consequences. Doubtless this assumption arises from a fateful renunciation that in these matters we are propelled by an irresponsible force on a definite path towards an unavoidable end towards destruction. But I am glad to find that the Government of India in accepting the pact did not concede that its terms as embodied in the Act should stand unaltered. Far from leaving the matter shrouded in ambiguity, they made it quite clear that the arrangement was not to stand beyond the first Statutory Commission. In their Despatch on the Report of the South-borough Committee they said : “Before we deal in detail with the Report, one preliminary question of some importance suggests itself. As you will see, the work of the Committee has not to any great extent been directed towards the establishment of principles. In dealing with the various problems that came before them they have usually sought to arrive at agreement rather than to base their solutions upon general reasonings. It was no doubt the case that the exigencies of time alone made any other course difficult for them. But in dealing with their proposals, we have to ask ourselves the question whether the results of such methods are intended to be in any degree permanent…… Whatever be the machinery for alteration, however, we have to face the practical question of how long we intend the first electoral system set up in India to endure. Is it to be opened to reconstruction from the outset at the wish of the Provincial Legislature or is it to stand-unchanged at least until the first Statutory Commission ? There are reasons of some weight in either direction. In the interest of the growth of responsibility it is not desirable to stereotype the representation of the different interests in fixed proportion; the longer the separate class and communal constituencies remain set in a rigid mould, the harder it will become to progress towards normal methods of representation. On the other hand, it is by no means desirable to invite incessant struggle over their revision.” It is for the Commission to say whether the life of this error shall be prolonged. I have hopes that the Commission will not merely

374 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES say, “Well, we feel the force of the objections to principle of the communal system fully. But we cannot help as India has deliberately chosen her road to responsible government.” For the Commission will realise that its duty to point out the right road and lead India on to it arises not merely out of a conscientious regard for what is right but also out of the moral obligation of the British authorities who are primarily responsible for pointing out in 1909 this wrong road. CHAPTER 5 SECOND CHAMBER 94. My colleagues have recommended the institution of a second chamber as a part of the Provincial Legislature of this Presidency and have suggested a framework for its constitution. I am afraid my colleagues have not devoted sufficient thought to the difficulties pertaining to its construction. In the matter of its composition, a second chamber, if there is to be one, must be different than the first. In the matter of its powers, they must be such that a second chamber can work without impediment to the first chamber. It seems to me to be very difficult to constitute a second chamber which will satisfy both these conditions. A nominated second chamber is out of question. The Canadian Senate is a standing warning against the introduction of a nominated second chamber. It cannot have the moral authority of a popularly elected chamber to command respect for its decisions. Nor can it have the independence possessed by a popularly elected chamber to sit in judgment, as a revising chamber must, over the very executive which brings it into being. If the second chamber is an elective chamber then its working smoothly with the first will depend upon their respective franchise, times of election and their powers. If the second chamber is elected on the basis of a restricted franchise, it is sure to end in the raising of a small group from amongst the aristocracy into a governing class having a special degree of control over the destiny of the masses. Such a second chamber, far from being a revising chamber acting as a check upon the supposed rashness of the lower chamber, will be a chamber which, instead of putting a premium upon improvement in general, will put a premium upon the upkeep of vested interests. It would be dormant under a conservative administration and would be vigilant only under a radical one. When it ought to revise it will refuse, and when it ought to refuse to revise it will revise and may perhaps obstruct. If the two are elected on a uniform franchise, then the second will only be a replica of the first and will be quite superfluous. The same would be the result if the second chamber was elected simultaneously with the first. On the other hand, if the second chamber is elected at a different time than the first, then it is bound to unfeeble the executive and diminish its efficiency. For it would work as a hindrance to adequate policy making and may cause such a violent break in the policy of the executive as to lead to constant general elections.

375PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE If the two chambers are coequal in powers there are bound to be deadlocks, and the inevitable result of all deadlocks is an unhappy compromise, if not a total abandonment of the principle in dispute. On the other hand, if the powers of the second chamber are inferior to those of the first, it will not be able to control the supposed rashness of the first chamber and will thus fail to perform the purpose of its life. 95. In framing the constitution of a second chamber my colleagues have ignored all these difficulties. In doing so they have created a second chamber which, if I may say so, has all the faults and none of the virtues which a second chamber should have. In supporting the idea of a second chamber it seems to me that my colleagues have more or less followed the crowd psychology. A widespread existence of second chambers in historical times has given rise to the dogma of political science that a second chamber is a necessary accompaniment of a popular government. But it is forgotten that a two-chamber system which had its origin in England was a purely historical accident. That it found a place in the constitution of other countries was the result of the imitation of the superior by the inferior, and the virtue ascribed to it of serving as a brake on the rashness of the popular chamber is a subsequent invention of the human mind to justify the existence of what had become a universal fact. But it must be noted that this faith in the second chamber has been dwindling of late and that pre-war constitutions like Canada and South Africa and many post-war constitutions like those of Latvia, Lithuania, Esthonia and Yugoslavia have dispensed with the second chamber. This reaction has come about by the growing conviction that a government must be judged not by the symmetry of its structure, but by its practical achievement, by the content of actual service that it renders to the community and by the amount of well-being that it brings to the nation as a whole. 96. Looking at the institution of a second chamber from the utilitarian point of view, I refuse to accept that it can perform the function of a revising chamber. If to revise means to interpret the will of the electorates, I fail to understand how the second chamber is more likely than the first to be correct in its judgment as to what the electoral will is. My view is that the electorate and not the second chamber will be the best judge when such a question arises, unless we suppose that the members of the second chamber by virtue of their position have a greater presence than the members of the lower chamber. I deny that the second chamber possesses any such virtue. Indeed, a second chamber is not only as much likely to fail in correctly gauging the popular will, but its own interests in the matter are likely to give it such a personal bias one way or the other as to make it quite incapable of coming to an independent and rational judgment It is therefore better, safer and more reasonable to have a single chamber and to throw the responsibility of decision, when doubt arises, upon the electorate which chooses the chamber. Besides, if the idea underlying the second chamber is to delay the decision of the first chamber,

376 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES then this is already secured by the Governor having the power to refer back any particular measure which has been passed by the Legislature for reconsideration. If the Legislature does not reconsider, but passes it in original form, the Governor can still stop it by vetoing it. And if the Legislature does not abide by the decision of the Governor, it may compel him to submit the matter in dispute to the electorate by compelling the dissolution of the House. It is therefore obvious that what the second chamber can do or is expected to do, can be done by the Governor with his powers to veto, to refer back and to dissolve. If this is admitted, then a second chamber becomes a useless appendage to a popular chamber. 97. I am sure my colleagues would not have been led away by what exists in some other countries without applying the utilitarian standard if they had made sure that their assumption that a single chamber is likely to pass hasty and ill-conceived laws was based on sure foundations. It seems to me that the assumption is quite unfounded and displays a total ignorance of the working of modern politics. No piece of legislation in modern times is flung upon the Legislature as a surprise. On the other hand every legislative proposal before it is enacted into law goes through a long process of discussion and dissection at the hands of the public extending over a long period of years. Indeed, if the antecedent history of every measure which has found its place in the Statute Book were investigated it would demonstrate that the period that has intervened between the conception of the idea and its enactment into a law has varied more often on the side of length than on the side of brevity. Such being the case the assumption that a popular chamber acts hastily and therefore needs a brake upon its wheels is to prescribe for a disease which does not exist. 98. What however my colleagues are after is not a revising chamber but a governing caste. This is clear from the purpose assigned to it, from the franchise on which it is sought to be built and the powers which are proposed to be given to it I confess I am somewhat surprised that they should have thought that a devolution of powers on the Legislature must be circumscribed by the institution of a second chamber as an insurance against such powers being used to the detriment of a particular community, or a particular interest. For the desire really felt, as I understand it, is not that we should have a reform in which the centre or the balance of political power shall remain unchanged but that within certain limits it shall be surreptitiously shifted in the direction of the mass of the people. To attempt to circumscribe this devolution of power seems to suggest that my colleagues think that the most desirable kind of political reform is one which does not alter the balance of power amongst the different communities concerned. Persons who hold such a view in my opinion either do not know what political reform means or, knowing what it means, do not desire a reform which will disturb the status quo. As for myself, I make no mistake about the fact that the essence of all reforms is to change the balance of power among the different classes. If the lower classes gain, some