Vol. 2 · pages 711–715

690 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES rise to that Act; supposing there was necessity for Indian representation on any international tribunal and India wanted that right of representation should be reserved to Indian British subjects of His Majesty or Indian subjects of His Majesty, would you not in that case allow the Legislature to pass a law providing for such a status being created on the analogy of the Canadian Act, or for the matter of that, the South African Act ? Mr. F. E. James : The answer to that really is the last sentence of our paragraph. Perhaps Mr. Page will explain it in greater detail. Mr. Page : I think, Sir, that you need be under no misapprehension that there is any such hidden meaning. The whole of our object as regards that paragraph is this, that the creation of what we may call an Indian citizenship should not affect, in our view, the rights of a British National as a British subject. What we really want to say is this, that we wish to preserve for all individuals of British nationality, while resident in India either temporarily or otherwise, all the rights to which an Indian subject of His Majesty similarly resident is entitled, and we wish to prevent the passing of any law, or the making of any regulation or rule, which would have the effect of restricting or taking away any of these rights. That is the whole object of that paragraph. We have not the slightest objection to the formation of an Indian citizenship. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : My Lord Chairman : Is it in order to put a similar question to Mr. Gavin Jones on the suggestions he has made, but if it is not, I will not pursue that point ? Chairman : If Dr. Ambedkar ask my personal view, it is that perhaps the matter is not sufficiently important at this stage to justify the time taken. (6) Sir John Perronet Thompson, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Sir Alfred Watson and Mr. Edward Villiers *4659. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Just one question, Sir John Thompson. Yesterday you raised a question regarding making some provision for safeguarding the financial position of the Provinces, and, by way of illustration, you mentioned that under the present circumstances the water rate, which provides a very large part of the Provincial Revenue, is liable to be changed by Executive order—I think that is what you said yesterday ? Sir John P. Thompson : Yes. 4660. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Is it not a fact that for a long time the Indians have been agitating that all this taxation which is raised by mere Executive order—and, as you know the Land Revenue is also raised by Executive order—should not be raised any further hereafter by Executive order, but should be raised by legislative enactments ? Sir John P. Thompson : Certainly there has been an agitation to that effect, as regards Land Revenue. I am not quite sure how far that goes in regard to the Irrigation rates. *Minutes of Evidence, Vol. II-A, 6th July 1933, p. 540.

691EVIDENCE : SIR JOHN P. THOMPSON AND OTHERS 4661. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru : May I point out that in point of fact Land Revenue is not raised by Executive Order ? What he is probably thinking of is that Land Revenue settlements are effected by Executive Order ? Sir John P. Thompson : Yes. 4662. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Yes ; and a recommendation was made that all these finances which are raised by Executive Order should no longer be raised by Executive Order but by legislation ? Sir John P. Thompson : I do not know that. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : That has not been carried into effect. (7) Sir Charles Innes, K.C.S.L. C.L.E. *5161. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir Charles, you laid considerable emphasis on Second Chamoers ? Sir Charles Innes : Yes. 5162. Dr. B. R Ambedkar : The reason that you gave was that it would mitigate the necessity of the constant use of the special powers ? Sir Charles Innes : No. I do not know that I said it would mitigate the necessity. I said that it would reinforce the special powers, and I hoped that the existence of the Second Chamber would make it unnecessary, or make it necessary very rarely, to use the special powers which nobody wants to be used. 5163. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : It is not your position that you would substitute Second Chambers for the special powers ? Sir Charles Innes : No. 5164. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : The second question I want to ask you is this : I think this morning you stated that there was nothing unusual in these special responsibilities, and that you found them in some of the Constitutions of the Dominions ? Sir Charles Innes : I said there was nothing new in safeguards. I think those were my exact words. 5165. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : I want to put to you this : Is not there this difference between whatever safeguards there might be in the Constitutions of the Dominions and the provisions in the White Paper ? I am sorry I cannot put the question in a short form, because I have to give some explanation of the position as I understand it before I can put this question. I think under responsible government it is never understood (at least, I do not understand) that the Governor is absolutely bound by the advice given by the Ministry. He can refuse to take their advice if he thinks that he need not take it, but when I think the next step that he can take is to form another Ministry which will support him in the particular view which he takes. If that Ministry does not take the view that he takes he can dissolve the Legislative Council and have a new Legislature elected, and if he then *Minutes of Evidence, Vol. II-A, 6th July 1933, pp. 573-74

692 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES finds that there cannot be a Ministry constituted from the new Legislature he must yield. Is not that so ? Sir Charles Innes : Yes, that would, ordinarily, be the case, unless he thought it was so important that he should not do it. 5166. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Under the proposals in the White Paper is not there this vital difference, that under the White Paper proposal the Governor will be in a position to overrule any and every Ministry ? Sir Charles Innes : Only in the exercise of his special responsibility. 5167. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : He will never be bound by the advice of any Ministry ? Sir Charles Innes : Just as on our side we are assuming that the Indian is going to work the constitution in a spirit of reasonable co-operation, so also I think you have to assume that the Governor is going to do his best to work the constitution in the spirit in which it was conceived. 5168. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Yes ? Sir Charles Innes : I do not see why you should assume that the Governor will try to exercise these powers. I think every Governor will try to avoid exercising them as much as he possibly can. 5169. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : I am trying to bring out the difference between the two positions as I see it : the special powers do not give the Governor the power to overrule a particular Ministry with whose advice he disagrees ? Sir Charles Innes : I really do not know what you are driving at. 5170. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : The point I want to put to you is this, that the special powers which are to be given to the Governor are not given in order that he may overrule a particular Ministry whose advice he does not accept ; but the powers are given so that he may overrule any Ministry ? Sir Charles Innes : Exactly, because what he has got to do is to discharge certain special responsibilities. It is not a question of overruling a particular Ministry or not : it is a question of whether or not he has got to preserve that special responsibility. 5171. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : That is a vital difference between the safe guards ? Sir Charles Innes : That is exactly what I said : that the safeguards in India may have to be more precise and more defined because of certain facts. For instance, this communal trouble necessitates safeguards. 5172. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : I am not asking whether there are any grounds for it. I am trying to point out that there is a difference ? Sir Charles Innes : Yes. (8) Sir Edward Benthall, Sir Thomas Catto and Mr. G. L. Winterbotham, on behalf of Associated Chambers of Commerce of India *6214. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir Edward, I want to ask you, first of all, *Minutes of Evidence, Vol. II-A, 13th July 1933, pp. 640-42.

693EVIDENCE : SIR EDWARD BENTHALL AND OTHERS a question with regard to that part of your statement dealing with Federal Finance. I think (I do not know whether I am putting it correctly) you attach a great deal of importance to uniformity of taxation in India ? Sir Edward Benthall : Yes. 6215. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : And on that account, you have made the suggestion that almost all sources of Revenue, as between the Centre and the Provinces, should be segregated at the Centre, and that the Centre should divide ? Is that not so ? Sir Edward Benthall : Do we make that suggestion ? 6216. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : I am summing it up generally, that you want that almost all the principal taxes, at any rate, should be levied by the Centre in order that there may be uniformity of taxation ? Sir Edward Benthall : We did not go so far as to say that We desired uniformity, but we did not go so far as to say that all taxes should be levied by the Centre. 6217. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : How would you otherwise have uniformity of taxation, if there was not one tax levying authority in India as a whole ? Sir Edward Benthall : Some methods of co-ordination might be devised. 6218. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Suppose, for instance, we adopted the principle that a Province was to levy a surcharge on Income Tax for Provincial purposes, that would cut across the principle of uniformity ? Sir Edward Benthall : Yes ; we are totally opposed to that. 6219. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Then again, you oppose terminal taxes ? Sir Edward Benthall : We are opposed to them on principle, and we have suggested that any taxes which are likely to lead to inter-Provincial Customs duties or inter-Provincial barriers, should require Federal approval. That is the purport of our evidence. 6220. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : That would ultimately mean that there would be segregation of the sources of taxation ; either the Province could not levy, or could levy only with the prior approval of the Centre ? Sir Edward Benthall : There would be a third method of devising some scheme of co-ordination, I think. 6221. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : I do not know. Have you any method to suggest as to how this co-ordination is to be brought about ? Sir Edward Benthall : I think there are rules laid down at the present moment. Of course, at the present moment we are dealing with a unitary Government which lays down rules. 6222. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : We want to look at this thing, surely, from the standpoint of the Provincial Autonomy which we are contemplating, and also of the responsible Government that we are introducing into the Provinces ? Sir Edward Benthall : Yes. 6223. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Now I want to put this : From the stand point of Provincial Autonomy, it would be very difficult to realise this

694 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES Autonomy in practice if the Province is not to be free to devise its own method and system of taxation and has to go to the Centre every time ? Sir Edward Benthall : Not every time, but in the case of these particular taxes which are likely to result in the stoppage of development of Indian commerce. May I just say this, that our intention in bringing forward these points was not to lay down any rules but to bring them to the notice of the Joint Select Committee, so that they might consider them. 6224. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Then I will put this generally : That you would recognise that in devising any system of finance as between the Centre and the Provinces, it is necessary to recognise that whatever system is adopted, it will not be incompatible with Provincial Autonomy and responsible Government, in the Provinces ? Sir Edward Benthall : Yes. In answer to a previous question, I said there should not be more concurrent powers than are necessary, and we agree to that. The division of subjects and of taxation should be as clear-cut as possible, but, from the point of view of trade, we desire to point out how these provisions might lead to inter-Provincial Customs barriers. 6225. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Now I want to ask you a question about this Reserve Bank, referred to in paragraph 3. You say that the bank ought to be free from political interference ? Sir Edward Benthall : Yes. 6226. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : I suppose you will agree that political aid would be necessary for the bank in times of crisis ? Sir Edward Benthall : It might be. 6227. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : It might be necessary in a crisis, in order to support the bank to have the Government declare a moratorium ? Sir Edward Benthall : Yes, it is customary I think, in the constitutions of all Reserve Banks to allow them ultimate power of intervention by the Government in case of a financial crisis, and I would not object to that in a Reserve Bank. 6228. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : You would, therefore, permit, if the Government is to aid the bank in times of crisis, either by way of a moratorium or by way of advancing money in order to stabilise its reserves so that it could carry on, that it should have some influence over the bank, and its operations ? Sir Edward Benthall : The Government, in some form of other, will appoint some of the officers of the bank and some of the Directors, but the Government should not appoint a majority of such Directors. 6229. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar. I want to make this point clear. I make this distinction : Political intervention, interference and influence. What is it that you would allow the Government to have and what is it you would exclude the Government from ? Sir Edward Benthall : To define that would mean drawing up the constitution of the Reserve Bank.