Vol. 8 · pages 116–120

91 PAKISTAN : WEAKENING OF THE DEFENCES to the debates on the Honourable Mr. P. N. Sapru’s Resolution regarding recruitment of all classes to the Indian Army and the Honourable Mr. Sushil Kumar Roy Chaudhary’s Resolution regarding Military training for Indians, on the 13th March 1935 and 21st February 1938 respectively. This conspiracy of silence on the part of the Government of India, was quite recently broken by the Secretary of State for India, who came forward to give the fullest information on this most vital and most exciting subject, in answer to a question in the House of Commons. From his answer given on 8th July 1943 we know the existing communal and provincial composition of the Indian Army to be as follows :— I. Provincial Composition of the Indian Army Province Percentage Province Percen- tage 1. Punjab 50 7. Bengal Presidency 2 2. U.P. 15 8. C.P. & Berar 3. Madras Presidency 10 9. Assam 5 4. Bombay Presidency 10 10. Bihar 5. N. W. F. Province 5 11. Orissa 6. Ajmere & Merwara 3 12. Nepal 8 II. Communal Composition of the Indian Army 1. Muslims 34 p.c. 2. Hindus & Gurkhas 50 p.c. 3. Sikhs 10 p.c. 4. Christians & The Rest 6 p.c. The information given by the Secretary of State is indeed very welcome. But, this is the war-time composition of the Indian Army. The peace-time composition must be very different. It rested on the well-known distinction between the Martial and Non-Martial Races. That distinction was abolished during the War. There is, however, no certainty that it will not be revived

92 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES now that peace has returned. What we want to know is the peacetime communal composition of the Indian Army. That still remains an unknown fact and a subject of speculation. Some say that the normal pre-war proportion of Muslims was between 60 and 70 p.c. Others say that it is somewhere in the neighbourhood of 50 p.c. In the absence of exact information, one could well adopt the latter figure as disclosing the true situation especially, when on inquiry, it happens to be confirmed by those who are in a position to form some idea on the matter. Even if the proportion be 50% it is high enough to cause alarm to the Hindus. If this is true, it is a flagrant violation of well established principles of British Army policy in India, adopted after the Mutiny. After the Mutiny, the British Government ordered two investigations into the organization of the Indian Army. The first investigation was carried out by the Peel Commission which was appointed in 1859. The second investigation was undertaken by a body, called the Special Army Committee, appointed in 1879 to which reference has already been made. The principal question considered by the Peel Commission was to find out the weaknesses in the Bengal Army, which led to the Mutiny of 1857. The Peel Commission was told by witness after witness that the principal weakness in the Bengal Army which mutinied was that “In the ranks of the regular Army men stood mixed up as chance might befall. There was no separating by class and clan into Companies ……….. In the lines, Hindu and Mahomedan, Sikh and Poorbeah were mixed up, so that each and all lost to some extent their racial prejudice and became inspired with one common sentiment.”* It was, therefore, proposed by Sir John Lawrence that in organizing the Indian Army care should be taken “to preserve that distinctiveness which is so valuable, and while it lasts, makes the Mahomedan of one country despise, fear or dislike the Mahomedan of another; Corps should in future be provincial, and adhere to the geographical limits within which differences and *MacMunn and Lovett, The Armies of India, pp. 84-85, quoted by Chaudhari.

93 PAKISTAN : WEAKENING OF THE DEFENCES rivalries are strongly marked. Let all races, Hindu or Mahomedan of one province be enlisted in one regiment and no others, and having created distinctive regiments, let us keep them so, against the hour of need…….. By the system thus indicated two great evils are avoided : firstly, that community of feeling throughout the native army and that mischievous political activity and intrigue which results from association with other races and travel in other Indian provinces.” * This proposal was supported by many military men before the Peel Commission and was recommended by it as a principle of Indian Army Policy. This principle was known as the principle of Class Composition. The Special Army Committee of 1879 was concerned with quite a different problem. What the problem was, becomes manifest from the questionnaire issued by the Committee. The questionnaire included the following question :— “If the efficient and available reserve of the Indian Army is considered necessary for the safety of the Empire, should it not be recruited and maintained from those parts of the country which give us best soldiers, rather than among the weakest and least warlike races of India, due regard, of course, being had to the necessity of not giving too great strenght or prominence to any particular race or religious group and with due regard to the safety of the Empire ?” The principal part of the question is obviously the necessity or otherwise of “not giving too great strength or prominence to any particular race or religious group”. On this question official opinion expressed before the Committee was unanimous. Lt.-General H. J. Warres, Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, stated :— “I consider it is not possible to recruit the reserve of the Indian Army altogether from those parts of India which are said to produce best soldiers, without giving undue strength and prominence to the races and religions of these countries.” The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick P. Haines, said:— “Distinct in race, language and interests from the more numerous Army of Bengal, it is, in my opinion, eminently politic and wise *As quoted by Chaudhari.

94 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES to maintain these armies (the Madras and Bombay Armies) as a counterpoise to it, and I would in no way diminish their strength in order that a reserve composed of what is called ‘the most efficient fighting men whom it is possible to procure’ may be established. If by this it is meant to replace Sepoys of Madras and Bombay by a reserve of men passed through the ranks of the Bengal Army and composed of the same classes of which it is formed, I would say, that anything more unwise or more impolitic could hardly be conceived.” The Lt.-Governor of the Punjab also shared this view. He too declared that he was “opposed to having one recruiting field for the whole armies” in India. “It will be necessary,” he added, “for political reasons, to prevent preponderance of one nationality.” The Special Committee accepted this view and recommended that the composition of the Indian Army should be so regulated that there should be no predominance of any one community or nationality in the Army. These two principles have the governing principles of Indian Army policy. Having regard to the principle laid down by the Special Army Committee of 1879, the changes that have taken place in the communal composition of the Indian Army amount to a complete revolution. How this revolution was allowed to take place is beyond comprehension. It is a revolution which has taken place in the teeth of a well established principle. The principle was really suggested by the fear of the growing predominance of the men of the North-West in the Indian Army and was invoked with the special object of curbing that tendency. The principle was not only enunciated as a rule of guidance but was taken to be rigorously applied. Lord Roberts, who was opposed to this principle because it set a limit upon the recruitment of his pet men of the North-West, had to bow to this principle during his regime as the Commander-inChief of India. So well was the principle respected that when in 1903, Lord Kitchener entered upon the project of converting fifteen regiments of Madrasis into Punjab regiments, he immediately set up a counterpoise to the Sikhs and the Punjabi Musalmans by raising the proportion of

95 PAKISTAN : WEAKENING OF THE DEFENCES the Gurkhas and the Pathans. As Sir George Arthur, his biographer, says :— “The Government, mindful of the lesson taught by the Mutiny, was alive to the danger of allowing any one element in the Indian Army to preponderate unduly. An increase in the Punjabee infantry had as its necessary sequel a further recruitment of the valuable Gurkha material and the enlistment of more trans-border Pathans in the Frontier Militia.” That a principle, so unanimously upheld and so rigorously applied upto the period of the Great War, should have been thrown to the wind after the Great War, without ceremony and without compunction and in a clandestine manner, is really beyond comprehension. What is the reason which has led the British to allow so great a preponderance of the Muslims in the Indian Army ? Two explanations are possible. One is that the Musalmans really proved, in the Great War, that they were better soldiers than the Hindus. The second explanation is that the British have broken the rule and have given the Musalmans such a dominating position in the Army because they wanted to counteract the forces of the Hindu agitation for wresting political power from the hands of the British. Whatever be the explanation, two glaring facts stand out from the above survey. One is that the Indian Army today is predominantly Muslim in its composition. The other is that the Musalmans who predominate are the Musalmans from the Punjab and the N. W. F. P. Such a composition of the Indian Army means that the Musalmans of the Punjab and the N. W. F. P. are made the sole defenders of India from foreign invasion. So patent has this fact become that the Musalmans of the Punjab and the N. W. F. P. are quite conscious of this proud position which has been assigned to them by the British, for reasons best known to them. For, one often hears them say that they are the ‘gatekeepers’ of India. The Hindus must consider the problem of the defence of India in the light of this crucial fact. How far can the Hindus depend upon these ‘gate-keepers’ to hold the gate and protect the liberty and freedom of India ? The answer to this question must depend upon who comes to force the gate open. It is obvious that there are only two foreign countries